Highlights of the NTSB's findings on the Colgan Air accident near Buffalo in February 2009

by B. N. Sullivan

Yesterday the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a summary of its findings regarding the February, 2009 crash of a Colgan Air Bombardier DHC-8-400 near Buffalo, NY. The title of the press release that announced the findings read (in capital letters), CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS. Talk about cutting to the chase, right in the title!

Yesterday's report elaborated on the stark title of the press release, with this statement of probable cause:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.

Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

The NTSB summary included a list of 46 individual conclusions. Among the findings:

• The recovered components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures, including no indications of any problems with the airplane’s ice protection system.
• The air traffic controllers who were responsible for the flight during its approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport performed their duties properly and responded immediately and appropriately to the loss of radio and radar contact with the flight.
• This accident was not survivable.
• The captain’s inappropriate aft control column inputs in response to the stick shaker caused the airplane’s wing to stall.
• The minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the airplane.

So, no support for those who theorized that icing was the cause of the accident. Instead, the NTSB seems to be saying that pilot error, independent of weather conditions, led to the tragic outcome.

Here's more:

• Explicit cues associated with the impending stick shaker onset, including the decreasing margin between indicated airspeed and the low-speed cue, the airspeed trend vector pointing downward into the low-speed cue, the changing color of the numbers on the airplane’s indicated airspeed display, and the airplane’s excessive nose-up pitch attitude, were presented on the flight instruments with adequate time for the pilots to initiate corrective action, but neither pilot responded to the presence of these cues.
• The reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick shaker could not be determined from the available evidence, but the first officer’s tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likely reduced opportunities for her timely recognition of the impending event; the failure of both pilots to detect this situation was the result of a significant breakdown in their monitoring responsibilities and workload management.
• The flight crew did not consider the position of the reference speeds switch when the stick shaker activated.
• The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion.
• The captain did not recognize the stick pusher’s action to decrease angle-of-attack as a proper step in a stall recovery, and his improper flight control inputs to override the stick pusher exacerbated the situation.
• It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to perform a tailplane stall recovery.
• No evidence indicated that the Q400 was susceptible to a tailplane stall.
• Although the reasons the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested raising the gear could not be determined from the available information, these actions were inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training.
• The Q400 airspeed indicator lacked low-speed awareness features, such as an amber band above the low-speed cue or airspeed indications that changed to amber as speed decrease toward the low-speed cue, that would have facilitated the flight crew’s detection of the developing low-speed situation.
• An aural warning in advance of the stick shaker would have provided a redundant cue of the visual indication of the rising low-speed cue and might have elicited a timely response from the pilots before the onset of the stick shaker.
• The captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight (1) enabled conversation that delayed checklist completion and conflicted with sterile cockpit procedures and (2) created an environment that impeded timely error detection.

These findings are uniformly damning of the captain and, to a lesser extent, the first officer. But then the NTSB report broadens the focus of responsibility to include Colgan Air, the pilots' employer:

• The monitoring errors made by the accident flight crew demonstrate the continuing need for specific pilot training on active monitoring skills.
• Colgan Air’s standard operating procedures at the time of the accident did not promote effective monitoring behavior.
• Specific leadership training for upgrading captains would help standardize and reinforce the critical command authority skills needed by a pilot-in-command during air carrier operations.
• Because of the continuing number of accidents involving a breakdown of sterile cockpit discipline, collaborative action by the Federal Aviation Administration and the aviation industry to promptly address this issue is warranted.
• The flight crewmembers’ performance during the flight, including the captain’s deviations from standard operating procedures and the first officer’s failure to challenge these deviations, was not consistent with the crew resource management (CRM) training that they had received or the concepts in the Federal Aviation Administration’s CRM guidance.

Next, issues related to the role played by pilot fatigue and possible illness are addressed:

• The pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined.
• All pilots, including those who commute to their home base of operations, have a personal responsibility to wisely manage their off-duty time and effectively use available rest periods so that they can arrive for work fit for duty; the accident pilots did not do so by using an inappropriate facility during their last rest period before the accident flight.
• Colgan Air did not proactively address the pilot fatigue hazards associated with operations at a predominantly commuter base.
• Operators have a responsibility to identify risks associated with commuting, implement strategies to mitigate these risks, and ensure that their commuting pilots are fit for duty.
• The first officer’s illness symptoms did not likely affect her performance directly during the flight.

A number of the NTSB's findings addressed pilot qualificactions and training deficiencies:

• The captain had not established a good foundation of attitude instrument flying skills early in his career, and his continued weaknesses in basic aircraft control and instrument flying were not identified and adequately addressed.
• Remedial training and additional oversight for pilots with training deficiencies and failures would help ensure that the pilots have mastered the necessary skills for safe flight.
• Colgan Air’s electronic pilot training records did not contain sufficient detail for the company or its principal operations inspector to properly analyze the captain’s trend of unsatisfactory performance.
• Notices of disapproval need to be considered along with other available information about pilot applicants so that air carriers can fully identify those pilots who have a history of unsatisfactory performance.
• Colgan Air did not use all available sources of information on the flight crew’s qualifications and previous performance to determine the crew’s suitability for work at the company.
• Colgan Air’s procedures and training at the time of the accident did not specifically require flight crews to cross-check the approach speed bug settings in relation to the reference speeds switch position; such awareness is important because a mismatch between the bugs and the switch could lead to an early stall warning.
• The current air carrier approach-to-stall training did not fully prepare the flight crew for an unexpected stall in the Q400 and did not address the actions that are needed to recover from a fully developed stall.
• The circumstances of this and other accidents in which pilots have responded incorrectly to the stick pusher demonstrate the continuing need to train pilots on the actions of the stick pusher and the airplane’s initial response to the pusher.
• Pilots could have a better understanding of an airplane’s flight characteristics during the post-stall flight regime if realistic, fully developed stall models were incorporated into simulators that are approved for such training.
• The inclusion of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration icing video in Colgan Air’s winter operations training may lead pilots to assume that a tailplane stall might be possible in the Q400, resulting in negative training.

The remaining findings address systemic oversight issues; flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs; personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck; the use of safety alerts for operators (SAFOs), and weather data, including information related to icing.

The NTSB summary also includes 25 new recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Here is the link to the synopsis of the NTSB report, where you can read all of the findings and safety recommendations arising from the investigation of the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident: NTSB/AAR-10-01: Summary of Findings

The full final report will be released later this month. When that happens, I will post the link here on Aircrew Buzz.

UPDATE Feb. 25, 2010: The complete final report on the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident has been released. It is available for download from the NTSB Web site. Here is the link: NTSB Air Accident Report 1001 - 299-page 'pdf' file

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about  Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

NTSB Animation of the Colgan Air accident near Buffalo

On February 12, 2009 a Colgan Air Dash-8 Q400, operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407, crashed while on approach to Buffalo, NY. As a part of its investigation of the accident, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) produced a three-dimensional animated reconstruction shows the final two minutes of the flight, which has been posted to YouTube by airboyd.

From the description of the video:

During the approach, a pitchup motion occurred, followed by a left roll and then a right roll. During these maneuvers, both the stick shaker and stick pusher were activated, and the speed decreased. After further pitch and roll excursions, the airplane entered a steep descent from which it did not recover.

The animation shows excerpts from the flight data recorder (FDR), the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, recorded radar data, and aircraft performance data. It does not depict the weather or visibility conditions at the time of the accident. The animation does not include audio.

The upper portion of the animation shows a 3-D model of the airplane and the airplanes motions during the accident sequence. In this area, selected content from the CVR transcript or other annotations are superimposed as text at the time that the event occurred. All times (in eastern standard time) are shown on the right side of the screen.

The lower portion of the animation depicts instruments and indicators, which display selected FDR or calculated parameters. The instruments and indications are shown in three sections, which are (from left to right):

• Airspeed, airspeed tape, low speed cue, attitude indicator showing pitch and roll attitude, altitude, altitude tape, rate of climb, and heading
• Stick shaker and stick pusher indicated as text, control wheel/column icon depicting the control wheel (rotating right or left) and control column (moving up or down) inputs, and an indicator showing rudder pedal inputs
• The power lever and condition lever as indicators, the flap handle selection as an indicator, and auto pilot status and gearhandle position indicated as text

Excerpts from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcript also appear.

Here is the animation video:

If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript from Colgan Air Flight 3407 released by the NTSB

Public hearings got underway yesterday regarding the crash of a Colgan Air Dash-8 Q400 near Buffalo in February of this year. The hearings are being held in Washington, DC at the Board Room and Conference Center of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Yesterday was the first of three days of hearings about the accident flight, which was operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407.

Among the documents released by the NTSB yesterday is the transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) from the accident flight. The CVR transcript documents crew conversations throughout the flight, as well as radio transmissions between the flight deck and various ground facilities, and sounds from inside the cockpit.

A number of news media outlets have quoted excerpts and snippets from the CVR transcript in articles about the accident. Sadly, these have been presented out of context in several instances. I encourage anyone with an interest in this accident to read the entire transcript, which is available for download from the NTSB website.

I understand that the NTSB website has been very busy since the beginning of the hearings. If you are unable to access the CVR transcript directly from the NTSB site, here is an alternative source:

• NTSB: Colgan Air Dash 8-Q400, N200WQ, Feb. 12, 2009 - CVR Transcript - 63-page 'PDF' file

Note: The present hearings are a part of the ongoing investigation of this accident by the NTSB. It will be some time before a final report is issued. Determination of probable cause will be a part of that final report. Until that time, all interpretations by the news media of the data released so far should be considered with a certain level of skepticism, as they are based on incomplete information.

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UPDATE: I'd like to draw readers' attention to two particularly interesting articles related to information that has emerged at the NTSB hearings about the Colgan accident.

For a former Q400 pilot's view of events during the final minutes of Flight 3407, have a look at Sam's thoughtful analysis: Thirty Seconds of Silence, on Blogging At FL250.

Then see journalist Joe Sharkey's article about the issue of pilot fatigue (and a bit about regional pilot pay), with reference to (and quotes from) testimony given at the NTSB hearing: Blaming the Dead Tired Pilots for Colgan Air Buffalo Crash, on Joe Sharkey At Large.

Both articles are well thought out, and each makes several points that should not be overlooked. They are well worth the time it takes to read them.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

Public hearing on the crash of the Colgan Air Dash-8 near Buffalo slated for next week

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will hold a three-day public hearing next week on the February crash of the Colgan Air Dash-8 near Buffalo, New York. The hearing will begin on May 12, 2009 in Washington, D.C. There will be a live webcast of the hearing (details below).

Readers will recall that the accident occurred on the night of February 12, 2009, when a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash 8-Q400 (registration N200WQ), operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, crashed during an instrument approach to the Buffalo-Niagara International Airport (BUF), Buffalo, New York. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. The accident killed all 49 people on board, and one person on the ground.

The NTSB has announced that a public docket will be opened at the start of the hearing. The public may view and download the docket contents on the web under the "FOIA Reading Room" at http://www.ntsb.gov/Info/foia_fri-dockets.htm at that time.

From the NTSB Advisory announcing the hearing:

The information being released is factual in nature and does not provide analysis or the probable cause of the accident.

The docket will include investigative group factual reports, interview transcripts, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcripts, Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data and other documents from the investigation.

In addition, docket items that will be used as exhibits during the public hearing will be available on the website under "Public Hearings".

The hearing, which is part of the Safety Board's efforts to develop all appropriate facts for the investigation, will cover a wide range of safety issues including:

• Icing effect on the airplane's performance
• Cold weather operations
• Sterile cockpit rules
• Crew experience, fatigue management
• Stall recovery training

An agenda is posted on the Board's website, http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/Buffalo-NY/Default.html.

The hearing will convene at 9:00 a.m. on May 12, 2009 at the NTSB's Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C.

A live webcast of the proceedings will be available on the Board's website at www.ntsb.gov.

For directions to the Conference Center location, or for more information about the webcast, see the NTSB Advisory about the hearing.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

The Colgan Air accident: Don't draw conclusions from incomplete information

Yesterday the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a factual update about last month's Colgan Air Dash 8-Q400 accident near Buffalo. The NTSB update provided fodder for a new round of speculation by the news media regarding what may have caused Flight 3407 to crash on February 12, 2009. Last month those stories focused on icing; now the media spotlight has shifted to actions by the crew.

But hey, folks: we still have only bits and pieces of the story. The investigation is still underway, and -- more to the point -- it is only in its early stages. The NTSB is still collecting and collating a massive amount of data - about the aircraft and its systems; about the crew, their actions during the accident flight, their backgrounds and training; about operations, maintenance procedures and training practices of the carrier; and about environmental conditions aloft on the night of the crash. The latest update gives us a peek at a few more data points among the thousands that will be considered, but does not draw conclusions. Neither should the press.

I think this is the underlying message in a statement issued yesterday by Colgan Air in response to the latest NTSB update. Here is that statement:

We welcome the update from the NTSB on the progress of this investigation. As the report clearly indicates, there is still no definitive conclusion as to what caused this accident. It remains an active investigation and one with which we are cooperating thoroughly.

It’s important not to jump to conclusions, and instead focus on what is factual and released by the investigating team at the NTSB. Nothing in today’s announcement pinpoints a cause nor does it offer theories on a cause, as was suggested in some news reports. Again, the only absolute fact is that we do not know the cause of this accident.

We look forward to discussing recommendations the NTSB may have that could make our industry even safer. We stand by our FAA-certified crew training programs which meet or exceed the regulatory requirements for all major airlines and include training on emergency situations. When our crews fly our aircraft, we believe, and the FAA has certified, that our crews are prepared to handle emergency situations they might face.

It is tempting to infer probable cause from isolated facts in NTSB updates, but all of us would do well to remember that we do not yet know all the facts. We were not on the flight deck of the accident aircraft; we have not heard the contents of the cockpit voice recorder; we have not seen all the data from the flight data recorder; we have not examined all the debris from the aircraft - and even if we had heard and seen all of the above, we -- like the NTSB, at this point -- still would not be able to conclusively state the cause for this accident.

Once the NTSB assembles and models all of the data and information they have collected, they will issue a comprehensive final report that will make public their conclusions regarding probable cause. In addition, they will likely make one or more safety recommendations intended to correct a flaw, refine a procedure, or supplement crew training so that a similar accident can be avoided in the future.

Armchair accident investigators -- in the media and elsewhere -- would do well to learn and acknowledge that there is very rarely a single item than can be isolated as a causal event. Instead, accidents result from the interaction of a host of conditions, decisions, actions, and reactions, known colloquially as the Swiss Cheese Model. It is the job of the NTSB to figure out how it was that the holes in the Swiss Cheese slices lined up, allowing the accident to happen. This can't be discerned by examining one slice at a time.

We all can guess what might have caused an accident, and in the end, some of us will have guessed correctly.  But until all of the details and data are known, we cannot -- and should not -- present our guesses about probable cause as if they were facts.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

Colgan Air Flt. 3407 crash near Buffalo: New info from NTSB

Earlier today, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released new information from their ongoing investigation of last month's crash of a Colgan Air Dash 8-Q400 near Buffalo. Readers will recall that the aircraft, operating as a Continental Connection flight between Newark and Buffalo, crashed during an instrument approach to runway 23 at the Buffalo-Niagara International Airport on February 12, 2009, killing all 49 people on board, and one person on the ground.

We'll get to the new factual information about the aircraft, etc., in a minute, but first, I want to point out something that immediately jumped out at me when I read through today's news release from the NTSB, in which the Board also announced plans to hold a public hearing in Washington regarding this accident. The hearing, which is scheduled for May 12-14, 2009, "will cover a wide range of safety issues including: icing effect on the airplane’s performance, cold weather operations, sterile cockpit rules, crew experience, fatigue management, and stall recovery training," says the NTSB.

Whoa, whoa, whoa! Sterile cockpit rules? What the heck was on that Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)? Nothing about the CVR's content -- not even a partial transcript -- has been revealed publicly to date. I can't imagine that they would specifically mention 'sterile cockpit rules' unless there was a reason.

Fatigue management? That phrase gave me a start as well, as did the mention of crew experience and stall recovery training. In fact,I can't help but notice that the "wide range of safety issues" actually is loaded with a wide range of human factors issues. Are you thinking what I'm thinking?

Now, about the aircraft. Today's NTSB update provides the following factual information about Flight 3407:

A preliminary examination of the airplane systems has revealed no indication of pre-impact system failures or anomalies. Investigators will perform additional examinations on the dual distribution valves installed in the airplane’s de-ice system. The de-ice system removes ice accumulation from the leading edges of the wings, horizontal tail, and vertical tail through the use of pneumatic boots. The dual distribution valves, which transfer air between the main bleed air distribution ducts and the pneumatic boots, were removed from the airplane for the examination.

The airplane maintenance records have been reviewed and no significant findings have been identified at this time.

The ATC group has completed a review of recordings of controller communications with the flight crew during the accident flight and conducted interviews with air traffic controllers on duty at the time of the accident. The group has no further work planned at this time.

Further review of the weather conditions on the night of the accident revealed the presence of variable periods of snow and light to moderate icing during the accident airplane’s approach to the Buffalo airport.

Examination of the FDR data and preliminary evaluation of airplane performance models shows that some ice accumulation was likely present on the airplane prior to the initial upset event, but that the airplane continued to respond as expected to flight control inputs throughout the accident flight. The FDR data also shows that the stall warning and protection system, which includes the stick shaker and stick pusher, activated at an airspeed and angle-of-attack (AOA) consistent with that expected for normal operations when the de-ice protection system is active. The airplane’s stick shaker will normally activate several knots above the actual airplane stall speed in order to provide the flight crew with a sufficient safety margin and time to initiate stall recovery procedures. As a result of ice accumulation on the airframe, an airplane’s stall airspeed increases. To account for this potential increase in stall speed in icing conditions, the Dash 8-Q400’s stall warning system activates at a higher airspeed than normal when the de-ice system is active in-flight to provide the flight crew with adequate stall warning if ice accumulation is present.

Preliminary airplane performance modeling and simulation efforts indicate that icing had a minimal impact on the stall speed of the airplane. The FDR data indicates that the stick shaker activated at 130 knots, which is consistent with the de-ice system being engaged. FDR data further indicate that when the stick shaker activated, there was a 25-pound pull force on the control column, followed by an up elevator deflection and increase in pitch, angle of attack, and Gs. The data indicate a likely separation of the airflow over the wing and ensuing roll two seconds after the stick shaker activated while the aircraft was slowing through 125 knots and while at a flight load of 1.42 Gs. The predicted stall speed at a load factor of 1 G would be about 105 knots. Airplane performance work is continuing.

Further to the crew issues, the NTSB said:

Since returning from on-scene, the Operations & Human performance group have conducted additional interviews with flight crew members who had recently flown with and/or provided instruction to the accident crew, as well as personnel at Colgan Air responsible for providing training of flight crews and overseeing the management and safety operations at the airline. The group also conducted interviews with FAA personnel responsible for oversight of the Colgan certificate, which included the Principal Operations Inspector (POI) and aircrew program manager for the Dash 8 Q-400. The team has also continued its review of documentation, manuals, and other guidance pertaining to the operation of the Dash 8 Q-400 and training materials provided to the Colgan Air flight crews.

The Operations & Human Performance group continues to investigate and review documentation associated with the flight crew’s flight training history and professional development during their employment at Colgan as well as prior to joining the company.

By the way, there was some good news about the crew. Toxicology reports were negative for alcohol and illicit drugs for both pilots.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

Video tribute to the crew of Colgan Air Flight 3407

This video memorializes the crew of Colgan Air Flight 3407, who perished along with 45 others when their aircraft crashed while on approach to Buffalo on February 12, 2009. Captain Marvin Renslow, First Officer Rebecca Shaw, Flight Attendant Matilda Quintero, and Flight Attendant Donna Prisco were working the flight; off-duty Captain Joseph Zuffoletto was a passenger. The video is a nice reminder that those five crew members were real people with real lives -- not just names on an accident report.



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

Hat tips to YouTube user tdonohue and Twitter user @FoxWhisperer.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

Colgan Air addresses speculation about Flt. 3407 accident

Colgan Air and its parent company, Pinnacle Airlines Corp., appear to be losing patience with all the speculation surrounding Colgan Air Flt. 3407, the Dash-8 Q400 that crashed last week near Buffalo. They are clearly annoyed that information made public by the NTSB has spawned so much theorizing and finger pointing by the media and the public at large, long before all of the facts about the accident are known.

Over the past two days, Pinnacle and its Colgan Air subsidiary have released a press statement and a FAQ Sheet (Frequently Asked Questions) in defense of the company, its crews, and its training program. Here is the main text of the press statement, issued yesterday:

Historically, NTSB investigations are confidential and involve a thorough determination of the facts before public statements are made. Colgan Air continues to cooperate in every respect with the NTSB as it conducts the investigation. As such, we will respect the integrity of the NTSB ongoing investigation by not commenting on specifics. However, we do feel compelled to comment on public speculation about potential causes of the accident.

Here are the facts about our operations. Colgan has instilled a systemic culture of safety throughout our organization that is rooted in significant investment in crew training, systems, leadership and equipment.

Our crew training programs meet or exceed the regulatory requirements for all major airlines. Our ground and air training is designed in coordination with the aircraft manufacturer, one of the most respected providers of aviation flight training and the Federal Aviation Administration utilizing state-of the-art training devices such as full-motion simulators, among others.

In addition, Colgan has committed significant financial resources to upgrade aircraft safety, efficiency and quality in recent years. The Q400 is a sophisticated, highly capable aircraft that is designed for cold-weather operations with a long, proven history of safe operations globally.

Captain Renslow had 3,379 total hours of flight experience and was Airline Transport Pilot rated, which is the highest level of certification available. That rating, combined with 172 hours of formal training on the Q400 aircraft, qualified him fully in accordance with all applicable Federal Aviation Regulations.

We continuously review our safety policies and training procedures as part of our everyday operations. In the wake of an accident, we are even more focused on ensuring our operations remain safe and have specifically reexamined our procedures for this aircraft. We have reinforced strict adherence to all of our flight operations policies, including flying during icing conditions.

Today the company issued a 3-page document - Frequently Asked Questions – Colgan Air Flight 3407. One item on that document clearly indicates the frustration of the airline's management in the face of massive media speculation about the cause of the accident:

If the process is supposed to be private until findings are determined, why am I seeing speculation about potential causes?

• a. Historically, NTSB investigations are confidential and involve a thorough determination of the facts before public statements are made.
• b. It’s important not to jump to conclusions, and instead focus on what is factual and released by the investigating team at the NTSB. Currently, the only absolute fact is that we do not know the cause of this accident.

Among other things, the FAQ describes Colgan Air's crew training methods at some length, with examples to illustrate. Also delineated in the FAQ are the qualifications, training, and number of flying hours of the two pilots who perished in the crash of Flight 3407. The FAQ even presents a justification for why Colgan Air flies the Q400.

The airline is in a tough position -- prohibited from commenting on specifics related to the accident itself while the investigation still is underway, yet catching flak from the media and the general public meanwhile. It's no wonder that Colgan Air feels compelled to do what it can to defend itself via these media releases.

Everyone wants to know what happened to cause the accident, yet few are patient enough to wait for all of the facts to emerge from the course of the investigation. Thus, every new tidbit of information revealed by the NTSB evokes a new round of speculation by the media and the huge cadre of armchair investigators who are all too ready to decide probable cause based on fragments of information.

Clearly this situation is vexing for the airline. And one can only imagine how rough all of this must be for the families of the crew and passengers who died in the accident.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

The Flight Attendants from Colgan Air Flight 3407

On February 12, 2009, a Dash 8 Q400 aircraft operated by Colgan Air crashed into a house while on approach to Buffalo Niagara International Airport. Continental Connection Flt. CJC 3407, was arriving at Buffalo from Newark Liberty International Airport at the time of the accident. There were no survivors among the 49 people on board. One person on the ground also perished in the accident.

Among those who lost their lives in the accident were the two flight attendants: Matilda Quintero, 57, and Donna Prisco, 52. They had been flight attendants for less than a year. Both had joined Colgan Air on May 28, 2008. They trained together and had become good friends.

Matilda Quintero

Matilda Quintero, a breast cancer survivor, lived in Woodbridge, NJ with her 90 year old mother, and one of her two grown daughters. Her other daughter also lived in the area. Her husband passed away in 1998.

An article about Matilda Quintero in the Democrat and Chronicle quoted her boyfriend, Jim Ferris, who said, "She wished she had a chance to show what she could do, to save lives. She was proud of what she learned. She used to say her job was not just about serving drinks and meals."

Donna Prisco

Donna Prisco was a stay-at-home mom of four until last year when she went to work for Colgan Air, fulfilling a lifelong dream of becoming a flight attendant. She resided in Randolph, NJ with her husband, three sons and daughter. Her daughter also works for Colgan Air.

An article about Donna Prisco in the New Jersey newspaper, the Star-Ledger, quoted Ms. Prisco's sister who said, "She wanted to go back to work and do something for herself. She said, 'I'd do this job for free.' She just loved it."

A pilot from Canada told the Edmonton Sun he recalled flying with Matilda Quintero and Donna Prisco.

"I remember flying with Donna and Matilda on a flight in early November," said John, who did not want his last name used. "We were sitting on the ground for several hours in Toronto on a ground delay program into Newark. The passengers were starting to get angry with the long wait but the women did an amazing job serving the passengers and joking with them to keep them calm."

"I instantly recognized their names because these two were so exceptional. Commuting pilots don't always remember the names of flight attendants that serve on their flight. It saddens me to hear that such a good crew of flight attendants and pilots died in this crash."

Sincere condolences to the families, flying partners and friends of those who perished in the Colgan Air accident.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

NTSB Briefing on Colgan Flt 3407 Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder

A short time ago, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board presented initial factual findings obtained from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) retrieved from the wreckage of the Colgan Air Dash 8 Q400 that crashed near Buffalo last night. Speaking at a press briefing, NTSB Member Steven Chealander said that information yielded by both the FDR and the CVR was of "excellent quality."

Chealander said the last 30 minutes of the CVR recorded that the crew of the accident aircraft briefed an ILS approach to runway 23 at Buffalo; and briefed weather of three miles visibility with snow and mist. At an altitude of about 16,000 feet they reported hazy conditions and requested a descent to 12,000 ft. Soon after, they were cleared by ATC to descend to 11,000 feet.

The crew "discussed significant ice build-up" on the windshield and the leading edges of the aircraft's wings. Just prior to those comments, the FDR indicated that airframe de-ice was selected 'on'.

One minute before the recordings ended, the crew extended the landing gear, and 20 seconds after that, 'flaps 15' was selected. Within 15 seconds of the flaps command, the flight director indicated a "series of severe pitch and roll excursions." Shortly thereafter -- and just before the end of the recording -- the crew "attempted to raise the landing gear and the flaps," said Chealander.

Since this is very early in the investigation, Chealander declined to elaborate or engage in any interpretation of the factual information presented.

Here is the video of the entire press briefing, which was held earlier today at the Buffalo Marriott Niagara, Amherst, NY, courtesy of MSNBC TV.

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If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on MSNBC.com.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz.

Dash 8 crashes on approach to Buffalo, no survivors

A Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 aircraft operated by Colgan Air has crashed while on approach to Buffalo Niagara International Airport. The aircraft reportedly crashed into a house, and a fire ensued. There are no survivors among the 49 on board. One person on the ground also is reported to have been killed.

The accident happened last night, February 12, 2009, at about 22:20 local time as the aircraft, operating as Continental Connection Flt. CJC 3407, was arriving at Buffalo from Newark Liberty International Airport. The aircraft (registration N200WQ) disappeared from radar during an instrument approach to Buffalo.

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) dispatched a team of investigators to the scene early this morning.

Colgan Air has released the names of the crew members on board Flight 3407, all of whom perished:

• Marvin Renslow, Captain, joined Colgan on September 9, 2005
• Rebecca Shaw, First Officer, joined Colgan on January 16, 2008
• Matilda Quintero, Flight Attendent, joined Colgan on May 28, 2008
• Donna Prisco, Flight Attendent, joined Colgan on May 28, 2008

Capt. Joseph Zuffoletto, an off-duty crew member who joined Colgan on September 19, 2005, also was on board.

Condolences to the families, colleagues, and friends of all those who lost their lives.

[Photo Source]

UPDATE: The NTSB has retrieved the flight recorders from the accident scene, and transferred them to NTSB headquarters in Washington, DC.

UPDATE Feb. 16, 2009: Colgan Air has released the names of the passengers who were on board Flight 3407 (one page 'pdf' file).

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Colgan Air Flt 3407 on Aircrew Buzz, or choose from the list below.

• Video: NTSB Briefing on Colgan Air Flt 3407 Flight Data Recorder & Cockpit Voice Recorder - Feb. 13, 2009
• The Flight Attendants from Colgan Air Flight 3407 - Feb. 14, 2009
• Colgan Air addresses speculation about Flt. 3407 accident - Feb. 19, 2009
• Video tribute to the crew of Colgan Air Flight 3407 - Feb. 28, 2009
• Colgan Air Flt. 3407 crash near Buffalo: New info from NTSB - Mar. 25, 2009
• The Colgan Air accident: Don't draw conclusions from incomplete information - Mar. 26, 2009
• Public hearing on the crash of the Colgan Air Dash-8 near Buffalo slated for next week - May 8, 2009
• Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript from Colgan Air Flight 3407 released by the NTSB - May 13, 2009
• NTSB animation of the Colgan Air accident near Buffalo - May 19, 2009
• Highlights of the NTSB's findings on the Colgan Air accident near Buffalo in February 2009 - Feb. 3, 2010