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Happy Holidays to Aircrew Buzz readers around the world. For the New Year I wish all of you blue skies, smooth air, tailwinds, and happy landings.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:Accident Details
The senior ground agent's failure to follow written procedures and directives.
Postflight inspection of the accident airplane by an FAA inspector revealed a 12-inch by 5-inch fuselage skin tear, approximately 6 feet forward of the forward cargo door on the right side of the airplane. Further inspection revealed that a crease in the skin of the fuselage existed forward of the tear, consistent with the skin being damaged by a foreign object.So, how did this happen?
According to the NWA station manager and AWAC ground agents, at some point during the aircraft luggage off-loading or loading process in SYR, the engine of the belt loader quit operating. Three of the contractor’s ground agents attempted to manually push the belt loader away from the aircraft but were unable to do so. The senior of the three decided to use a luggage tug to push the belt loader away from the airplane by entering the “Safety Diamond/Zone” with the luggage tug from the front right-hand side of the airplane, close to, and parallel with the fuselage. The front left bumper of the tug was then positioned on the right front corner of the belt loader, and at some point during or immediately after pushing the belt loader away from the airplane, the upper right-hand side of the tug’s cab contacted the fuselage. The senior ground agent then advised “don’t say anything” to one of the other ground agents who was working the flight with him.The NTSB report dryly notes that "the senior ground agent’s actions were contrary to published guidance in the company’s training handbook and operation manual."
Emirates is the only A380 operator so far to have situated the crew-rest areas at the rear of the main deck. It did not opt for Airbus' standard option of locating the pilots' compartment behind the cockpit as it would have compromised the design of the airline's upper deck first-class cabin, while the alternative location of the cargo hold was rejected as it thought crew would find it "claustrophobic".I am wondering if, in addition, there may be safety implications for locating the crew-rest area in the aft section of the main deck, so far away from the flight deck. One can imagine an emergency arising that would urgently require the presence of a crew member who was on rest break. Imagine the poor pilot who has to make his or her way as quickly as possible from the crew-rest in the aft of the main deck, through the length of the 'super-jumbo' aircraft (possibly having to navigate around passengers, cabin crew, serving carts, and what have you), then (eventually!) into the flight deck. Now add the not inconceivable dimension of an aircraft that, in said emergency, might not be flying along smoothly in level cruise. Good luck!
We are taking these actions to secure your careers and return us to sustained profitability. In the meantime, we are analyzing the impact on staffing as it pertains to these capacity reductions and, as in the past, we will offer voluntary programs to adjust staffing needs. We will continue to make decisions that are in the long-term interest of our colleagues, customers, shareholders and the communities we serve.No word (yet) on what might happen if those 'voluntary programs' do not result in the required number of staff reductions. Stay tuned.
The first officer asked for the gear to be extended, the main landing gear extended and were locked, the flight crew received a yellow door light and a red unsafe nose gear light. The flight crew then performed a go-around maneuver, not retracting the gear, and departed the airspace to perform checklist. The flight crew performed the alternate landing gear extension; however the nose gear remained in the wheel well.The recorders and associated parts of the nose gear have been retained by the National Transportation Safety Board for further examination.
The flight crew then flew the airplane by the air traffic control tower (ATCT) in order for the ATCT personnel to attempt and see the nose gear. The ATCT personnel reported that the nose gear doors were open but the landing gear was not visible.
The flight crew stated that they then proceeded to run further checklist to try and extend the nose gear but were unsuccessful. After several attempts to extend the gear by the alternate gear extension checklist and conferring with the airlines maintenance personnel they elected to return to the airport and perform a nose gear-up landing on runway 27L. The airport rescue and fire fighters responded to the intended runway for landing and applied a foam agent.
The airplane's main landing gear touched down and according to witnesses it appeared the flight crew attempted to delay the nose from touching down until the slowest speed possible. The nose of the airplane made contact with the runway and skidded along the runway for about 525 feet and came to a stop. There was no fire reported and the passengers exited the airplane and were taken to the terminal by an airport bus.
The airplane's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) were removed and secured by the FAA inspector on-scene. Airport personnel and mechanics then utilized air bags to lift the nose of the airplane off the runway surface.
The FAA inspector then looked into the nose wheel well and found the nose gear canted at an angle wedging it in the nose wheel well, using a pry bar, the nose wheel was moved to a normal position and extended freely and locked in the down position. The airplane was then towed to a maintenance hangar and examined. The links on top of the steering column were found to have been broken and pushed upward and the nose wheel over steering pin was still intact.