Video: Two years after ditching in the Hudson River, 'Sully' reflects

by B. N. Sullivan

Tomorrow is the second anniversary of the historic, successful ditching of US Airways Flight 1549 in the Hudson River.  Now retired, Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, who was in command of that Airbus A320 on January 15, 2009, reflects on what he calls the "experience of a lifetime."



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube

Thanks to the Associated Press for posting the video on YouTube.

Click here to view all the posts about US Airways Flight 1549 on Aircrew Buzz.

Crew among fatalities in Iran Air Boeing 727 crash in Iran

by B. N. Sullivan

An Iran Air Boeing 727-200 aircraft (registration EP-IRP) has crashed in northwestern Iran, in Azerbaijan province, killing more than 70 of those on board, including all  crew members.  Iran Air Flight IR 277 from Tehran-Mehrabad (THR) reportedly crashed into mountainous terrain following a missed approach at Urmia (Orumiyeh) Airport (OMH).  The accident happened on January 9, 2011 at about 19:45 local time.

The exact number of people on board Flight IR 277 is unclear.   An accident post on the Aviation Safety Network website says, "ISNA quotes the Roads and Transportation Secretary stating there were 94 passengers and eleven crew members on board. Fars News Agency reports 93 passengers and twelve crew members."

A BBC News article about the accident, quoting Iran's Fars news agency, says there were 33 survivors.

The same BBC article quoted a Red Crescent official who said that "the plane had broken into several pieces, but there was no explosion or fire."

The weather at Urmia Airport was said to be poor at the time of the accident.

UPDATE:  The Aviation Herald reports:

Iran's Transport Ministry said, that there was no emergency.  According to tower tapes the pilot aborted the approach when he could not establish visual contact with the runway at decision height and went around indicating they wanted to return to Tehran.  33 people have been taken to hospitals, 73 have perished.

METARS (via the Aviation Herald):

OITR 091800Z 29004KT 0500 +SN SCT015 SCT020 OVC060 00/00 Q1016
OITR 091750Z 29004KT 0500 +SN SCT015 SCT020 OVC060 00/00 Q1016
OITR 091700Z 33004KT 0600 +SN SCT015 SCT020 OVC060 00/00 Q1016
OITR 091650Z 33004KT 0600 +SN SCT015 SCT020 OVC060 00/00 Q1016
OITR 091600Z 26004KT 0800 SN SCT015 SCT020 OVC060 00/00 Q1016
OITR 091550Z 26004KT 0800 SN SCT015 SCT020 OVC060 00/00 Q1016
OITR 091500Z 24006KT 0800 +SN SCT015 SCT020 OVC060 00/00 Q1015

The Associated Press posted this video clip about the Iran Air accident on YouTube.



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

Two pilots perish in business jet crash in Switzerland

by B. N. Sullivan

Earlier today, a business jet operated by Windrose Air, a German charter company, crashed and burned at Bever, Switzerland.  Both pilots perished in the accident.  The crew were believed to be the only people on board.

The accident happened on December 19, 2010 at approximately 15:00 local time.  The aircraft, a Hawker Beechcraft [Raytheon] 390 Premier IA (registration D-IAYL) was on approach to St. Moritz-Samedan Airport (LSZS), arriving from Zagreb-Pleso (LDZA) in Croatia.  It crashed into an electrical power station near the town of Bever, Switzerland.  The aircraft caught fire and broke up.  Some news reports suggest that the crew may have been attempting a go-around, but this has not been officially confirmed.  Several news stories also mentioned that the aircraft may have hit power lines.

An article about the accident (in German) on the Swiss news website Blick.ch includes still photos and a video clip of the accident site.  Another article (also in German)  on the Swiss website 20min.ch has more photos and a map indicating where the plane crashed.

Condolences to the families, colleagues and friends of the pilots who lost their lives today.

Tentative contract agreement for Air Transport International flight crews

by B. N. Sullivan

The pilots and flight engineers at Air Transport International (ATI) have reached a tentative contract agreement (TA) with the carrier's management.  The TA was reached after six years of contract negotiations, and is the first contract for ATI crew since they joined the Air line Pilots Association (ALPA) in 2009.  ALPA negotiators and ATI management had been meeting under the supervision of the National Mediation Board.

According to ALPA, the proposed four-year agreement "would include pay increases as well as improved work rules and quality-of-life enhancements for cockpit crewmembers."

A ratification vote will be held after details of the agreement are presented to the membership in a series of road shows at ATI crew hub and training centers. The road shows will begin in January, 2011.

“We will be pleased to present to our crewmembers an agreement that satisfies their needs,” said Capt. Tom Rogers, chairman of the ATI unit of ALPA. “What brought these negotiations to where they are today is the fact that ATI crewmembers take great pride in the service they provide to the Company and that they are dedicated to seeing ATI prosper. It’s been a long road, and I believe that our determination has finally paid off.”

Qantas Flight 32: Crew response to the emergency

by B. N. Sullivan

This is the third in a series of posts about Qantas Flight 32, an Airbus A380 (registration VH-OQA) that experienced an uncontained failure of one of its four Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines during flight on November 4, 2010.  The information here is based on a preliminary report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), issued On December 3, 2010.

As mentioned in the previous post, there were five flight crew on board Qantas Flight 32: the Captain (PIC); a First Officer (FO), acting as co-pilot; a Second Officer (SO); a second Captain, who was training as a Check Captain (CC); and a Supervising Check Captain (SCC), who was training the CC.  This post details how they responded to the emergency following the uncontained engine failure that damaged the aircraft and a number of its systems.

Early in the emergency, given that the aircraft was controllable, the crew decided to hold their present altitude while they processed the plethora of ECAM messages that immediately followed the engine failure.  [See previous post.]  They contacted Singapore ATC and asked for an appropriate holding position, ultimately requesting "to remain within 30 NM (56 km) of Changi Airport in case they should need to land quickly."  ATC vectored the aircraft into a holding pattern east of the airport  at 7,400 ft.

As the crew went through procedures associated with the ECAM messages, the SO went into the cabin to try to visually assess the damage to No 2 engine.

As the SO moved through the cabin a passenger, who was also a pilot for the operator, brought the SO’s attention to a view of the aircraft from the vertical fin mounted camera that was displayed on the aircraft’s in-flight entertainment system.  That display appeared to show some form of fluid leak from the left wing.

The SO then went to the left side of the aircraft's lower deck and observed the wing damage and fuel leak.  He saw a fuel trail about 0.5 m wide that appeared to be coming from underneath the wing.

Later, the SCC and SO returned to the cabin "on numerous occasions to visually assess the damage on the left side of the aircraft, and to inspect the right side of the aircraft, and to provide feedback to the cabin crew and passengers."

Meanwhile, up on the flight deck:

The flight crew reported that, during their assessment of subsequent multiple fuel system ECAM messages, they elected not to initiate further fuel transfer in response to a number of those messages, as they were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system.  In addition, the crew could not jettison fuel due to the ECAM fuel jettison fault and they were aware that there was fuel leaking from the left wing.  The crew also recalled an indication that the aircraft’s satellite communications system had failed.  They also received an aircraft communications and automatic reporting system (ACARS)message from the aircraft operator that indicated that multiple failure messages had been received by the operator from the aircraft.

It took about 50 minutes for the crew to complete procedures associated with the many ECAM messages.

They then assessed the aircraft systems to determine those that had been damaged, or that were operating in a degraded mode.  They considered that the status of each system had the potential to affect the calculation of the required parameters for the approach and landing.  The crew also believed that the failure may have damaged the No 1 engine, and they discussed a number of concerns in relation to the lateral and longitudinal fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.

The FO and the SCC performed several calculations to determine the landing distance required for their overweight landing.  They determined that landing on Changi's runway 20C  "was feasible, with 100 m of runway remaining," and advised ATC to that effect.

Approach and Landing

Prior to leaving the holding pattern, the crew carried out a number of manual handling checks at holding speed to assess the controllability of the aircraft.

As the crew started to reconfigure the aircraft for the approach by lowering flaps, they conducted further controllability checks at the approach speed and decided that the aircraft remained controllable.  As a result of the landing gear-related ECAM messages, the landing gear was lowered using the emergency extension procedure and a further controllability check was conducted.

The landing performance application indicated a required approach speed of 166 kts.  The flight crew reported being aware that: reverse thrust was only available from the No 3 engine, no leading edge slats were available, there was limited aileron and spoiler control, anti-skid braking was restricted to the body landing gear only, there was limited nosewheel steering and that the nose was likely to pitch up on touchdown.  An ECAM message indicated that they could not apply maximum braking until the nosewheel was on the runway.  The wing flaps were extended to the No 3 position.

Singapore ATC vectored the aircraft to a position 20 NM (37 km) from the threshold of runway 20C and provided for a progressive descent to 4,000 ft.  The PIC was aware that accurate speed control on final would be important to avoid either an aerodynamic stall condition, or a runway overrun. Consequently, the PIC set the thrust levers for Nos 1 and 4 engines to provide symmetric thrust, and controlled the aircraft’s speed with the thrust from No 3 engine.

The autopilot disconnected a couple of times during the early part of the approach as the speed reduced to 1 kt below the approach speed.  The PIC initially acted to reconnect the autopilot but, when it disconnected again at about 1,000 ft, he elected to leave it disconnected and to fly the aircraft manually for the remainder of the approach.  Due to the limited landing margin available, the CC reminded the PIC that the landing would have to be conducted with no flare and that there would be a slightly higher nose attitude on touchdown.

Cabin crew were briefed to prepare the cabin for a possible runway overrun and emergency evacuation.

The aircraft touched down, the PIC applied maximum braking and selected reverse thrust on the No 3 engine.  The aircraft came to a stop with about 150 meters of runway remaining.

After Landing

The crew shut down the remaining engines, however the No 1 engine continued to run.  The crew recycled the engine master switch to OFF, but the engine still did not shut down.  The crew then tried using the emergency shutoff and fire extinguisher bottles to shut down No 1 engine, but to no avail.  Activating a series of circuit breakers in the aircraft's equipment bay, and efforts to starve the No 1 engine of fuel also were unsuccessful.  Ultimately, "the decision was taken to drown the engine with fire-fighting foam from the emergency services fire vehicles," but this did not happen until about 2 hours and 7 minutes after the aircraft landed!

Meanwhile, passengers disembarked on the right side of the aircraft via stairs.

The crew elected to use a single door so that the passengers could be accounted for as they left the aircraft and because they wanted the remainder of the right side of the aircraft to be kept clear in case of the need to deploy the escape slides. They also decided to have the other doors remain armed, with crew members in their positions at those doors ready to activate the escape slides if necessary, until all of the passengers were off the aircraft.

It took about an hour for all passengers and crew to leave the aircraft. There were no injuries reported among the five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers on board Qantas Flight 32.

[Photo Source]

Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flight 32 on Aircrew Buzz.

Qantas Flight 32: Uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft

by B. N. Sullivan

This is the second in a series of posts about the events on board Qantas Flight 32, an Airbus A380 (registration VH-OQA) that experienced an uncontained failure of one of its four Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines during flight on November 4, 2010.  The information here is based on a preliminary report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), issued On December 3, 2010.

There were five flight crew on board Qantas Flight 32: the Captain (PIC); a First Officer (FO), acting as co-pilot; a Second Officer (SO); a second Captain, who was training as a Check Captain (CC); and a Supervising Check Captain (SCC), who was training the CC.

In a media briefing on the day the preliminary report was released, ATSB Chief Commissioner Martin Dolan praised the crew of Qantas Flight 32, stating that the A380 "would not have arrived safely in Singapore" were it not for the actions of the flight crew.   Reading through the ATSB report, it is clear that the entire crew really had their hands full.

Engine Failure

The ATSB report says that the first sign of trouble came during the climb out of Singapore when the crew heard two "almost coincident" loud bangs.  The PIC immediately selected altitude and heading hold on the autopilot control panel, and the aircraft leveled off, however the autothrust system did not reduce power to the engines as expected.  When it became clear that the autothrust system was no longer active, the PIC manually retarded the thrust levels to control the aircraft's speed.

The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) system displayed an "overheat" warning message for the No 2 engine.  Then all hell broke loose on the flight deck.

Within seconds, the overheat warning changed to a fire for the No 2 engine.  The crew decided to shut down No 2 engine, and "after they had selected the ENG 2 master switch OFF, the ECAM displayed a message indicating that the No 2 engine had failed."

The crew discharged one of the engine's two fire extinguisher bottles, but did not receive a confirmation that it had discharged.  They repeated the procedure and again did not receive the expected confirmation.  They attempted to discharged the second bottle; again they did not receive confirmation that the second bottle had discharged.

The crew reported that they then elected to continue the engine failure procedure, which included initiating an automated process of fuel transfer from the aircraft’s outer wing tanks to the inner tanks.

The crew also noticed that the engine display for the No 2 engine had changed to a failed mode, and that the engine display for Nos 1 and 4 engines had reverted to a degraded mode.  The display for the No 3 engine indicated that the engine was operating in an alternate mode as a result of the crew actioning an ECAM procedure.

Shortly afterward, a flood of ECAM messages began to display.  Quoting from the ATSB report:

The flight crew recalled the following system warnings on the ECAM after the failure of No. 2 engine.

• engines No 1 and 4 operating in a degraded mode
• GREEN hydraulic system -- low system pressure and low fluid level
• YELLOW hydraulic system -- engine No. 4 pump errors
• failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No. 1 and 2 bus systems
• flight controls operating in alternate law
• wing slats inoperative
• flight controls -- ailerons partial control only
• flight controls -- reduced spoiler control
• landing gear control and indicator warnings
• multiple brake system messages
• engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
• multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault
• center of gravity messages
• autothrust and autoland inoperative
• No. 1 engine generator drive disconnected
• left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
• avionics system overheat

Damage to the Aircraft

Unbeknown to the crew at that time, the No 2 engine's intermediate pressure (IP) turbine had failed.  The turbine disc, blade and nozzle guide vanes separated, ruptured the surrounding casing, and damaged the engine's thrust reverser.  A number of components were ejected, which struck the aircraft.

The leading edge of the left wing was penetrated, resulting in "damage to the leading edge structure, the front wing spar and the upper surface of the wing."

The left wing-to-fuselage fairing also was penetrated, "resulting in damage to numerous system components, the fuselage structure and elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring."

Damaged were "elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring that affected the operation of the hydraulic system, landing gear and flight controls; a number of fuel system components; and the leading edge slat system."

The left wing's lower surface was impacted, "resulting in a fuel leak from the Number 2 engine fuel feed tank and the left wing inner fuel tank."

[Photo Source]

Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flight 32 on Aircrew Buzz.

Qantas Airbus A380 uncontained engine failure: ATSB preliminary report

by B. N. Sullivan

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released its preliminary report regarding its investigation of the November 4, 2010 uncontained failure of a Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine on a Qantas Airbus A380 aircraft over Batam Island, Indonesia.  The aircraft (registration VH-OQA), operating as Qantas Flight QF32, was en route from Changi Airport, Singapore to Sydney with five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers on board.  No one on board was injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage.  Two people on the ground sustained minor injuries due to falling debris.

The abstract of the ATSB report provides this brief summary of what happened:

Following a normal takeoff, the crew retracted the landing gear and flaps.  The crew reported that, while maintaining 250 kts in the climb and passing 7,000 ft above mean sea level, they heard two almost coincident ‘loud bangs’, followed shortly after by indications of a failure of the No 2 engine.

The crew advised Singapore Air Traffic Control of the situation and were provided with radar vectors to a holding pattern.  The crew undertook a series of actions before returning the aircraft to land at Singapore.  There were no reported injuries to the crew or passengers on the aircraft.  There were reports of minor injuries to two persons on Batam Island, Indonesia.

A subsequent examination of the aircraft indicated that the No 2 engine had sustained an uncontained failure of the Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc.  Sections of the liberated disc penetrated the left wing and the left wing-to-fuselage fairing, resulting in structural and systems damage to the aircraft.

As a result of this occurrence, a number of safety actions were immediately undertaken by Qantas, Airbus, Rolls-Royce plc and the European Aviation Safety Agency.  On 1 December 2010, the ATSB issued a safety recommendation to Rolls-Royce plc in respect of the Trent 900 series engine high pressure/intermediate pressure bearing structure oil feed stub pipes.  In addition, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority issued a Regulation 38 maintenance direction that addressed the immediate safety of flight concerns in respect of Qantas A380 operations with the Trent 900 series engine.  On 2 December 2010, Qantas advised that the requirements of Rolls-Royce plc Service Bulletin RB211 72 G595 would take place within the next 24 hours on engines in place on A380 aircraft currently in service, and before further flight on engines on aircraft not yet returned to service.

The ATSB report, which was issued today, is lengthy and detailed.  I will present some of the details of particular interest to crew members in the next two posts on Aircrew Buzz.  Stay tuned for that.

Meanwhile, here is the link to the landing page on the ATSB website where you can find links to the full text reports; photos; and safety recommendations pertaining to this accident: ATSB Investigation Number:AO-2010-089

[Photo Source]

Horizon Air pilots approve new five-year contract

by B. N. Sullivan

The pilots at Horizon Air have approved a new five-year collective bargaining agreement.  Their union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters APA Local 1224, announced today that the tentative agreement  reached in September of this year  was ratified by the membership.  Ballots were tallied yesterday and the vote passed the membership by 60 percent, according to the union.

A press statement by Teamsters Local 1224 offered these details:

The new contract includes dramatic improvements in work conditions where the pilots will be writing their own schedules and trips.  Also, a progressive scheduling process was agreed to whereby pilots can trade and manage their schedules among each other to accommodate their personal wishes, with improved pay protections for Horizon pilots.  Significant ratification bonuses also were included in the agreement.  The pay rates will be submitted in two separate 'baseball style' arbitrations; a method agreed upon to avoid an impasse on the subject.

Most notable of these is, perhaps, the scheduling improvements in this agreement which demonstrate that Horizon has entrusted the pilot group to build safe, cost-efficient schedules.

"We look forward to implementing this new contract, especially the scheduling portion," says Captain Trevor Bulger. "The scheduling section in and of itself is a major industry improvement in that our pilots now have the ability to essentially build their own schedules. We envision this will provide for a vast improvement in our quality of life."

The new agreement was reached following more than four years of negotiations, and months of federal mediation.

American Airlines Boeing 737-800 runway excursion at Montréal

by B. N. Sullivan

On Tuesday evening, November 30, 2010, an American Airlines Boeing 737-800 aircraft went off the runway at Montréal-Trudeau Airport.  The aircraft, operating as American Airlines Flight AA802, had just arrived at Montréal after a scheduled passenger flight from Dallas-Fort Worth.  No one was injured.

WFAA-TV quoted an American Airlines spokesman, who said that after landing, the plane went off the runway into the grass.  He said only the nose wheel tires went off the runway into the grass and mud.

The American Airlines spokesman said there were six crew members and 105 passengers on board.  They deplaned using stairs.

It was raining at Montréal at the time of the incident.

UPDATE Dec 2, 2010:  The Aviation Herald, quoting NAV Canada, reports that "the airplane exited the runway at a speed of about 70 knots and came to a stop between taxiways E and B2 with all gear off the southern edge of the paved surface. At the time of occurrence there was heavy rain and winds from the south at 15 knots gusting 20 knots."

The incident aircraft's registration number is N901AN.

Ilyushin IL-76 freighter crash at Karachi

by B. N. Sullivan

An Ilyushin IL-76 freighter has crashed shortly after takeoff from Karachi, Pakistan.   The aircraft, operating as Sun Way  flight MGC-4412, had just departed Karachi, bound for Khartoum, Sudan.  It crashed into a residential area and burned. Local authorities say that there were no survivors among the eight crew members on board.  Fatalities and injuries on the ground also have been reported, although the number of casualties has not been determined.

The accident happened just before 02:00 AM local time, on November 28, 2010.  Eyewitness reports suggest an engine may have been on fire prior to the crash, and that the aircraft may have been attempting to return to the airport.   The engine fire has not been confirmed by official sources.

Geo News reports that the accident site is "near Dalmia area in Gulistan-e-Johar locality."  News media say that the aircraft crashed into a building that was under construction, near residential apartments housing Pakistani Navy officers.  The crash sparked what has been described as a massive blaze.

A dramatic photo of the crash site has been posted to the MSNBC.com Photo Blog.  Geo TV aired live streaming video of the burning accident site, some of which was also broadcast by CNN.  RTVCHD posted this video on YouTube:



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

Strike ballot scheduled for Evergreen International Airlines crews

by B. N. Sullivan

Frustrated after six years of contract negotiations, the pilots and flight engineers at Evergreen International Airlines (EIA) have scheduled a strike authorization ballot, to begin on December 1, 2010.  Their union, the Air line Pilots Association (ALPA), says that they are conducting a strike ballot of the membership "to be prepared for all possible contingencies should negotiations fail."

This past April, ALPA reached a tentative contract agreement (TA) with management, but it was voted down by the crews in August.  At that time, ALPA reported that 92% of eligible Evergreen crew members participated in the ratification balloting, and 96% of those voted against accepting the TA.

According to ALPA, Evergreen crew members overwhelmingly turned down the TA in August because it fell substantially short of their goals.

The failed agreement was largely a renewal of the current collective bargaining agreement, which has been in place since 1999.  The crew members concluded that the tentative agreement was not acceptable after more than 10 years without improvements in some areas of working conditions, six years without a pay raise, and no per diem increase since the late ’90s.  After months of waiting to come back to the negotiating table since the crew members voted down a tentative agreement in August, the MEC is taking the necessary measures to secure a fair contract, including sending the ballot to authorize a strike.  The strike ballot will open on December 1 and close January 7.  If it passes, it would authorize the EIA MEC to declare a strike once the pilot group is given permission to do so by the National Mediation Board (NMB).

William Fink, MEC chairman of the Evergreen ALPA unit, said, “We certainly want a contract, not a strike.  That has been our goal since day one more than six years ago — but the new agreement must provide our members with industry-standard wages, work rules, and benefits.  We deserve no less.  This strike authorization vote will give us the means to take all legal actions to attain the goal of a fair contract.”

The union can ask the U.S. National Mediation Board (NMB) for arbitration at any time.  If the NMB issues a proffer of arbitration, either party can reject it.  Should that happen, a 30-day cooling-off period would begin, after which the Evergreen crews would be legally free to call the first-ever pilot strike against the carrier.

ATSB Final Report: July 2008 Qantas Boeing 747 depressurization accident

by B. N. Sullivan

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a final report on the sudden decompression in flight of a Qantas Boeing 747-400 on July 25, 2008.  The accident happened during the cruise phase of Qantas Flight QF30, which was en route from Hong Kong to Melbourne.  The flight diverted to Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila where it landed safely.  There were no serious serious injuries to those on board, however the aircraft's fuselage ruptured over an area measuring approximately 2 x 1.5 m (6.6 x 4.9 ft).

The ATSB investigation determined that the fuselage rupture "had been induced by the forceful bursting of one of a bank of seven oxygen cylinders located along the right side of the cargo hold," i.e.one of the oxygen cylinders that provide the emergency supplementary oxygen supply for passengers.

An analysis of the damage produced by the ruptured cylinder showed that the force of the failure had projected the cylinder vertically upward into the aircraft's cabin, where it had impacted the R2 door frame, handle and the overhead panelling and structure, before presumably falling to the cabin floor and being swept out of the aircraft during the depressurisation. No part of the cylinder body was located within the aircraft, despite a thorough search.

The ATSB investigation "was unable to identify any particular factor or factors that could, with any degree of probability, be associated with the cylinder failure event."

Despite the inconclusive outcome of the investigation as to contributing factors, the associated engineering study did confirm that the cylinder type was fit-for-purpose.  There was no individual or broad characteristic of the cylinders that was felt to be a threat to the safety or airworthiness of the design.  Similarly, there was no aspect of the batch of cylinders produced with the failed item, which deviated from the type specification, or provided any indication of the increased potential for the existence of an injurious flaw or defect within that particular production lot.

In other words, in the opinion of the ATSB investigators, the rupture of the oxygen cylinder on Qantas Flight 30 was "a unique event and highly unlikely to happen again."

Here is the link to the full report: ATSB: Oxygen cylinder failure and depressurisation - 475 km north-west of Manila, Philippines, 25 July 2008, Boeing 747-438, VH-OJK

The report includes a number of photos showing the extent of the damage to the aircraft.


RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flt 30 on Aircrew Buzz.

AirTran crew contracts: One down, still one to go

by B. N. Sullivan

AirTran Airways pilots and flight attendants have been negotiating for years with the airline's management, hoping to achieve agreements for work contracts.  After nearly six years of negotiations, the pilots have a new labor agreement in hand, however contract talks between AirTran and its flight attendants seem to be going nowhere.

Pilots

The pilots at AirTran Airways have ratified the tentative contract agreement reached last month with the airline's management.  The pilots' union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), announced the results of the ratification vote today, noting that 86.93 percent of those who cast ballots voted in favor of the agreement.  ALPA said 93.28 percent of eligible AirTran pilots participated in the ratification vote. 

According to a statement issued by ALPA, the new pilot contract enhances pay rates, quality of life, and career protections.  Most elements of the contract will take effect on December 1, 2010.

“By approving this contract, our members have signaled that they are focused on the future and ready to close a contentious chapter in our airline’s history,” said Linden Hillman, chairman of the AirTran chapter of ALPA.  “This deal will provide real improvements in our members’ lives and allow us to concentrate on the important work of merging two great companies.”

Flight Attendants

Last month -- around the same time that the pilots announced their tentative contract agreement -- AirTran's flight attendants filed for mediation of their contract talks by the National Mediation Board (NMB).  The flight attendants, represented by the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA (AFA-CWA), commenced collective bargaining for a new contract in December of 2007.

AFA-CWA says that shortly after Southwest Airlines announced in September that it would acquire AirTran, AirTran management approached the union requesting an abbreviated list of the flight attendants' greatest concerns in order to expedite negotiations.

AFA-CWA explains:

When presented with the union's "short list" proposal, company management responded with a counterproposal consisting mostly of existing contract language and minimal pay increases.  In addition, they failed to address the most basic work, duty and rest provisions.  AFA-CWA rejected management's proposal and filed for mediation services from the National Mediation Board the following day.

Despite AirTran's acquisition by Southwest, AirTran flight attendants will continue to work under the AirTran contract for at least another two years.  AFA-CWA points out that under the Railway Labor Act, "this future change in ownership does not negate the carrier's obligation to negotiate now with its flight attendants in good faith."

"It is incomprehensible that our flight attendants are subjected to the worst work rules of any major airline, while it is those same flight attendants' hard work that has earned AirTran numerous awards and accolades," said Alison Head, AFA-CWA AirTran President.

"Management has worked with its pilots to negotiate an acceptable contract to work under through the Southwest merger process - but refuses to offer some of the same fair work rules to its flight attendants., Ms. Head continued.  "Why would you extend fair work rules to one group of safety professionals and not to the other?"

In order to publicly demonstrate their frustrations over the stalled contract negotiations, AirTran flight attendants plan to picket outside Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport this coming Wednesday, November 24, 2010.

Crew fatigue cited in Delta Air Lines Boeing 767 taxiway landing at Atlanta

by B. N. Sullivan

A final report has been issued by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding its investigation of a 2009 incident in which a Delta Air Lines Boeing 767-332ER aircraft landed on a taxiway at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL).  According to the report, crew fatigue was a major cause of the incident.

At the time of the incident, on October 19, 2009, the aircraft (registration N185DN) was arriving at Atlanta.  The aircraft was operating as Delta Flight 60, a scheduled passenger service from Rio de Janeiro (GIG) to ATL.  The NTSB report summary gives this account of what happened:

During the flight one of the three required flight deck crew members became ill and was considered to be incapacitated.  The remaining two crew members conducted the entire night flight without the benefit of a customary break period.  Throughout the flight the crew made comments indicating that they were fatigued and identified fatigue as their highest threat for the approach, but did not discuss strategies to mitigate the consequences of fatigue.  At the time of the incident, the crew had been on duty for about 12 hours and the captain had been awake for over 22 hours, while the first officer had been awake for at least 14 hours.

During the descent and approach, the flight crew was assigned a number of runway changes; the last of which occurred near the final approach fix for runway 27L While the flight was on final approach, the crew was offered and accepted a clearance to sidestep to runway 27R for landing.  Although the flight crew had previously conducted an approach briefing for two different runways, they had not briefed the approach for runway 27R and were not aware that the approach light system and the instrument landing system (ILS) were not available to aid in identifying that runway.  When the crew accepted the sidestep to runway 27R, the captain, who was the flying pilot, saw the precision approach path indicator and lined the airplane up on what he said were the brightest set of lights he could see.  During the final approach, the first officer was preoccupied with attempting to tune and identify the ILS frequency for runway 27R.  Just prior to the airplane touching down, the captain realized they were landing on a taxiway.  The airplane landed on taxiway M, 200 feet north of, and parallel to, runway 27R.

Postincident flight evaluations of the airport lighting indicated that there were a number of visual cues that could have misguided the captain to align with taxiway M instead of runway 27R while on final approach.  These cues included numerous taxiways signs along the sides of taxiway M which, from the air, appeared to be white and could be perceived as runway edge lights.  In addition, the blue light emitting diode (LED) lights used on the eastern end of taxiway M were perceived to be brighter than the adjacent incandescent lights on the airfield and the alternating yellow and green lights in the ILS critical area provided the appearance of a runway centerline.  The postincident flight evaluations indicated that when the approach lights or the ILS for runway 27R were available and used, it was clearly evident when the airplane was not aligned with the runway.

The NTSB determined the probable cause of this incident to be, "The flight crew’s failure to identify the correct landing surface due to fatigue."

Contributing causes were:

• the flight crew’s decision to accept a late runway change,
• the unavailability of the approach light system and the instrument landing system for the runway of intended landing,
• the combination of numerous taxiway signs and intermixing of light technologies on the taxiway.

No one was injured in the incident.

Here are the links to the NTSB's final report:

• NTSB ID OPS10IA001 - Summary
• NTSB ID OPS10IA001 - Full Narrative

RELATED:  NTSB investigating Delta Air Lines Boeing 767 taxiway landing at Atlanta - AircrewBuzz.com, Oct 21, 2009

Flight crew's unprofessional behavior caused PSA Airlines CRJ-200 runway overrun at Charleston, WV

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued its final report on the PSA Airlines CRJ-200 runway overrun at Charleston, WV, in January of this year.  The aircraft (registration N246PS) overran a runway at Yeager Airport (CRW), Charleston, WV, following a rejected takeoff.  The NTSB report attributes the incident to the flight crew's "unprofessional behavior."

The incident flight, operating as US Airways Express Flight 2495, was departing Charleston for Charlotte Douglas International Airport, NC.  After noticing that the flaps were incorrectly configured for takeoff, the crew rejected takeoff at high speed -- well above V1.  The aircraft overran the end of the runway and came to a stop in the engineered materials arresting system (EMAS) in the runway end safety area.

There were no injuries among the three crew members and 31 passengers on board.  The aircraft's flaps, landing gear, and landing gear doors "received minor damage," according to the NTSB.

The NTSB's statement of probable cause is as follows:

(1) The flight crewmembers’ unprofessional behavior, including their nonadherence to sterile cockpit procedures by engaging in nonpertinent conversation, which distracted them from their primary flight-related duties and led to their failure to correctly set and verify the flaps;

(2) the captain’s decision to reconfigure the flaps during the takeoff roll instead of rejecting the takeoff when he first identified the misconfiguration, which resulted in the rejected takeoff beginning when the airplane was about 13 knots above the takeoff decision speed and the subsequent runway overrun; and

(3) the flight crewmembers’ lack of checklist discipline, which contributed to their failure to detect the incorrect flap setting before initiating the takeoff roll.

Contributing to the survivability of this incident was the presence of an engineered materials arresting system beyond the runway end.

Here are the links to the NTSB's final report:

• NTSB ID DCA10IA022: Summary
• NTSB ID DCA10IA022: Full Narrative

RELATED: PSA Airlines CRJ-200 runway overrun at Charleston, WV - AircrewBuzz.com, Jan 19, 2010

[Photo Source]

US Airways recalling furloughees, possibly hiring new crew for 2011

by B. N. Sullivan

US Airways has announced plans to add 500 crew members to its active work force in 2011.  The carrier will expand its flight attendant work group by 420, and will add 80 pilots to its ranks.

The expansion will begin with the recall of furloughees.  If the positions are not filled by those currently on furlough, US Airways plans to recruit new crew members.

Following the recall, US Airways expects to have no more flight attendants on furlough.  Up to 100 pilots may remain on furlough.

In a statement to the press, US Airways President Scott Kirby said, "This is great news for our workforce and the communities we serve.  We look forward to welcoming our colleagues back to US Airways, and bringing new crew members onto the team."

US Airways plans to have both the new hires and those who are recalled flying the line by July of 2011.

[Photo Source]

Music video: 'Ooo I wanna get you out of Teterboro...'

by B. N. Sullivan

A pilot in my family turned me on to this terrific music video -- written, performed and produced by his friend,  Mike Wagner.  The catchy lyrics are set to an old Beach Boys song, and the video is very entertaining.

Out in New Jersey(s)
There’s a place called Teterboro
That’s where everybody goes
To be a part of it all

Lots of jets on the ramp
Loaded up waiting to start engines
They’ll be there for an hour
Before they even have the chance
Down in Teterboro

You can find the rest of the Teterboro lyrics on Mike's blog, and you can find a link to download an audio-only version there, too.



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

Kudos to Mike Wagner for doing such a great job with the video, and thanks to Pat Sullivan for sending it to me.

Flight attendant union calls on TSA to fully implement CrewPASS

by B. N. Sullivan

The Association of Flight Attendants-CWA (AFA-CWA) has once again called upon the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to fully implement CrewPASS, an identification credential for aviation workers that promotes expedited screening of those who most frequently pass through airport security.

In a press statement issued yesterday, Patricia Friend, AFA-CWA International President, said, “TSA has devoted many resources to enhancing aviation security but, as recently announced screening procedures take effect, it is flight attendants who are adversely affected by lengthy airport security lines.

“Flight attendants are subject to extensive background checks so there is no reasonable explanation why this highly vetted group of aviation employees continues to be exposed to lengthy airport security lines which may affect their ability to report to the aircraft on time.  AFA-CWA supports a multi-layered aviation security system and we urge the TSA to continue work on improving airport security screening effectiveness.”

For years, AFA-CWA has been urging TSA to devote serious resources to the appropriate development and full implementation of an aviation workers’ identification credential that will promote expedited screening of those who most frequently must pass through airport security.  This credential could employ biometrics, such as fingerprints, to quickly screen flight attendants and others.  This would ultimately allow TSA to focus on more effective screening of the hundreds of airport vendors and thousands of aircraft passengers who daily pass through the screening checkpoints.

RELATED:

• Legislation will expedite crew access at U.S. airports
• TSA launches expedited security screening for flight deck crews

Pilots at Air Wisconsin begin contract negotiations

by B. N. Sullivan

Contract negotiations have begun between the Air Wisconsin pilots' union and the management of Air Wisconsin Airlines Company (AWAC).  Air Wisconsin pilots are represented by the Air line pilots Association (ALPA).

According to ALPA:

After more than two years of meticulous planning that included the development of a comprehensive strategic plan and a multifaceted communications program, the Air Wisconsin pilots exchanged openers with management as outlined in the Railway Labor Act (RLA)—the federal statute that governs contract negotiations in the airline industry. The RLA sets the rules for collective bargaining, representation, and grievance processing in the airline and railroad industries. Section 6 is the provision of the RLA that defines how airline management and the union can start and continue collective bargaining to amend applicable working conditions.

“Our opener is very extensive and includes improvements to nearly every section of the contract,” said Capt. Mark Lockwood, chairman of the Air Wisconsin pilots’ Negotiating Committee. “We have surveyed the pilot group twice and spent countless hours speaking with our fellow pilots. The overwhelming sentiment that we have heard is that the pilots want more of Air Wisconsin’s earnings, not less.” As a result, the Master Executive Council recently launched the “MORE” campaign to kick off the start of negotiations.

“We are very optimistic about achieving a quality contract that compensates our pilots for the high level of productivity that has supported Air Wisconsin’s growth,” said Capt. Joe Ellis, chairman of the Air Wisconsin pilots’ chapter of ALPA.

ALPA notes that despite the recession and current economic climate, AWAC continues to make money, has recalled furloughed pilots, and has begun hiring new pilots.

“Air Wisconsin has long been the ‘go-to’ airline, the airline of choice, and the airline that set the bar for our sector of the industry,” said Capt. Ellis. “It’s no secret that even though our pilots provided deep concessions nearly eight years ago, through the subsequent mismanagement of our airline, Air Wisconsin’s reputation has plummeted. Our pilots have made a clear statement that they expect real change—change that will restore our company as a place where employees are proud to answer the question, ‘Who do you fly for?’”

American Airlines Boeing 757 with hole in fuselage lands safely at Miami

by B. N. Sullivan

Earlier this week, an American Airlines Boeing 757-200 aircraft made an emergency landing at Miami International Airport after experiencing a rapid decompression.  The incident occurred late on the evening of October 26, 2010 not long after the aircraft had departed Miami en route to Boston.  After the aircraft landed safely, it was discovered to have a hole in the fuselage. No one was injured.

The Aviation Herald published this brief description of the incident:

An American Airlines Boeing 757-200, registration N626AA performing flight AA-1640 from Miami,FL to Boston,MA (USA) with 154 passengers and 6 crew, had been cleared to climb to FL310 when the airplane suffered a rapid decompression.  The crew donned their oxygen masks and initiated an emergency descent, the passenger oxygen masks were deployed.  After reaching 10,000 feet the crew requested even lower and descended further to 8000 feet and returned to Miami for a safe landing on Miami's runway 08R about 40 minutes after departure.

A post flight inspection revealed a hole of about 1 foot by 2 feet (33 by 66cm) just above and aft of the L1 door and just above the "A" of the American Airlines Logo.

Visit the Aviation Herald to view photos of the damaged aircraft. Pretty sobering stuff!

If you are thinking this incident sounds vaguely familiar, you are not alone.  When I heard about it, the first thing that came to mind was a similar incident in 2009 involving a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-300.  In that case, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the probably cause to be: "Fuselage skin failure due to pre-existing fatigue at a chemically milled step."

To refresh your memory, you can click here to read about the Southwest B737 incident.