
Happy Holidays to Aircrew Buzz readers around the world. For the New Year I wish all of you blue skies, smooth air, tailwinds, and happy landings.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:Accident Details
The senior ground agent's failure to follow written procedures and directives.
Postflight inspection of the accident airplane by an FAA inspector revealed a 12-inch by 5-inch fuselage skin tear, approximately 6 feet forward of the forward cargo door on the right side of the airplane. Further inspection revealed that a crease in the skin of the fuselage existed forward of the tear, consistent with the skin being damaged by a foreign object.So, how did this happen?
According to the NWA station manager and AWAC ground agents, at some point during the aircraft luggage off-loading or loading process in SYR, the engine of the belt loader quit operating. Three of the contractor’s ground agents attempted to manually push the belt loader away from the aircraft but were unable to do so. The senior of the three decided to use a luggage tug to push the belt loader away from the airplane by entering the “Safety Diamond/Zone” with the luggage tug from the front right-hand side of the airplane, close to, and parallel with the fuselage. The front left bumper of the tug was then positioned on the right front corner of the belt loader, and at some point during or immediately after pushing the belt loader away from the airplane, the upper right-hand side of the tug’s cab contacted the fuselage. The senior ground agent then advised “don’t say anything” to one of the other ground agents who was working the flight with him.The NTSB report dryly notes that "the senior ground agent’s actions were contrary to published guidance in the company’s training handbook and operation manual."
Emirates is the only A380 operator so far to have situated the crew-rest areas at the rear of the main deck. It did not opt for Airbus' standard option of locating the pilots' compartment behind the cockpit as it would have compromised the design of the airline's upper deck first-class cabin, while the alternative location of the cargo hold was rejected as it thought crew would find it "claustrophobic".I am wondering if, in addition, there may be safety implications for locating the crew-rest area in the aft section of the main deck, so far away from the flight deck. One can imagine an emergency arising that would urgently require the presence of a crew member who was on rest break. Imagine the poor pilot who has to make his or her way as quickly as possible from the crew-rest in the aft of the main deck, through the length of the 'super-jumbo' aircraft (possibly having to navigate around passengers, cabin crew, serving carts, and what have you), then (eventually!) into the flight deck. Now add the not inconceivable dimension of an aircraft that, in said emergency, might not be flying along smoothly in level cruise. Good luck!
We are taking these actions to secure your careers and return us to sustained profitability. In the meantime, we are analyzing the impact on staffing as it pertains to these capacity reductions and, as in the past, we will offer voluntary programs to adjust staffing needs. We will continue to make decisions that are in the long-term interest of our colleagues, customers, shareholders and the communities we serve.No word (yet) on what might happen if those 'voluntary programs' do not result in the required number of staff reductions. Stay tuned.
The first officer asked for the gear to be extended, the main landing gear extended and were locked, the flight crew received a yellow door light and a red unsafe nose gear light. The flight crew then performed a go-around maneuver, not retracting the gear, and departed the airspace to perform checklist. The flight crew performed the alternate landing gear extension; however the nose gear remained in the wheel well.The recorders and associated parts of the nose gear have been retained by the National Transportation Safety Board for further examination.
The flight crew then flew the airplane by the air traffic control tower (ATCT) in order for the ATCT personnel to attempt and see the nose gear. The ATCT personnel reported that the nose gear doors were open but the landing gear was not visible.
The flight crew stated that they then proceeded to run further checklist to try and extend the nose gear but were unsuccessful. After several attempts to extend the gear by the alternate gear extension checklist and conferring with the airlines maintenance personnel they elected to return to the airport and perform a nose gear-up landing on runway 27L. The airport rescue and fire fighters responded to the intended runway for landing and applied a foam agent.
The airplane's main landing gear touched down and according to witnesses it appeared the flight crew attempted to delay the nose from touching down until the slowest speed possible. The nose of the airplane made contact with the runway and skidded along the runway for about 525 feet and came to a stop. There was no fire reported and the passengers exited the airplane and were taken to the terminal by an airport bus.
The airplane's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) were removed and secured by the FAA inspector on-scene. Airport personnel and mechanics then utilized air bags to lift the nose of the airplane off the runway surface.
The FAA inspector then looked into the nose wheel well and found the nose gear canted at an angle wedging it in the nose wheel well, using a pry bar, the nose wheel was moved to a normal position and extended freely and locked in the down position. The airplane was then towed to a maintenance hangar and examined. The links on top of the steering column were found to have been broken and pushed upward and the nose wheel over steering pin was still intact.
The maiden flight began at 12:23 p.m. and lasted for about an hour at Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Factory, where the jet rolled out the general assembly line at the end of last year.Six ARJ21 aircraft already have rolled off the assembly line and are undergoing flight tests. The manufacturer expects to produce about 20 of these new regional jets per year. More than 200 ARJ21s are said to have been ordered so far, and it is the first Chinese airliner to be sold in Europe and America.
"The jet was normal and the flight was smooth," said Zhao Peng, one of the three pilots aboard the jet, at the end of the maiden flight.
The white 90-seat ARJ21-700 jet with three curved blue stripes on the fuselage, named "Xiang Feng" or "Flying Phoenix", is about 33 meters long and 27 meters in wing span.
Its maximum flight range is 3,700 kilometers and maximum altitude, 11,900 meters, said COMAC's General Manager Jin Zhuanglong.
But the jet flew at only 900 meters during the maiden flight.
French authorities have now advised Air New Zealand that it should not expect there to be any survivors after its Airbus A320 that was on lease to XL Airways of Germany was lost in the Mediterranean yesterday.Earlier today, French search and rescue authorities advised Air New Zealand that they had identified locator signals from the two 'black box' flight recorders from accident aircraft. They are not expected to be recovered until tomorrow due to deteriorating weather conditions.
Group General Manager International Airline Ed Sims says rescue authorities have told the airline it appears the aircraft broke up on impact and there was no realistic chance of survivors.
"This is devastating news for the families and all Air New Zealanders as we had all been clinging on to hope. Sadly, rescue authorities have told us that all evidence on site indicates that given the nature of the impact there is no chance of survivors. Debris is spread over a large area and it appears the aircraft is not in large pieces as originally indicated by those who saw the impact," Mr Sims says.
After making a PAN (distress) call, Shannon ATC were informed that the medical emergency was due to a pilot incapacitation (the First Officer) and the flight was now a single pilot (Captain only) flight for descent, approach and landing.The AAIU report concluded that the Captain and the entire crew handled the incident very well. The Analysis section of the AAIU report ends with this paragraph:
Prior to descent, the Commander asked the Incharge Flight Attendant to go [through] the Passenger Information List (PIL) to see if there were any flight crew on board who might be available to assist on the Flight deck for the remainder of the flight.
In the event no line pilots were on board, but one of the Cabin attendants held a Commercial Pilot’s Licence, with a Multi-engine Rating, and a non-current Instrument Rating. The Commander requested that the Flight Attendant occupy the right-hand (First Officers) seat for the remainder of the flight to assist as necessary.
The Flight Attendant provided useful assistance to the Commander, who remarked in a statement to the Investigation that she was ‘not out of place’ while occupying the right-hand seat.
As the descent was commenced the Passengers were informed that an early descent was to be made and diversion to Shannon due to a medical emergency. The descent, approach and landing were uneventful. The aircraft landed at 07.19 hrs and parked on Stand 39 at Shannon at 07.23 hrs.
Incapacitation of a member of flight crew is a serious incident. The onset of subtle incapacitation is sometimes difficult to detect, and then in all probability more difficult to deal with. The Commander realising he was faced with a difficult and serious situation used tact and understanding and kept control of the situation at all times. The situation was dealt with in a professional manner, employing the principles of Crew Resource Management (CRM). As such the Commander and Flight Attendants should be commended for their professionalism in the handling of this event.Congratulations to the crew for their expert handling of what must have been a very stressful situation. Special applause to the Flight Attendant who temporarily took over the First Officer's position and apparently did a fine job.
7:29:28 - Cessna contacts Allentown tower while about 8 miles east of the airport.Today's report included the photo above, showing tire marks created on the left side of the centerline by the Mesa Air regional jet as it veered around the Cessna.
7:33:30 - Cessna, in landing pattern for runway, is cleared to land on runway 6.
7:34:50 - Mesa Air regional jet contacts tower and reports ready for takeoff and holding short of runway 6. Controller instructs pilot to hold short of runway 6 for landing traffic.
7:36:15 - Cessna crosses threshold of runway 6 and lands.
7:36:27 - Mesa Air instructed by tower controller to taxi into position on runway 6 and hold.
7:36:36 - Tower controller asks pilot of Cessna where he intends to park. Following pilot response, controller provides taxi directions, instructing pilot to exit runway
at taxiway A4.
7:37:11 - Mesa Air cleared for takeoff.
7:37:18 to 7:37:32 - Controller turns attention to an inbound aircraft and issues landing instructions.
7:37:34 - Cessna pilot informs tower controller that he had missed the A4 taxiway and asks for permission to exit at taxiway B.
7:37:42 - Controller replies, "...no delay, turn immediately," which Cessna pilot acknowledges.
7:38:16 - Mesa Air radios tower controller: "We got it, tower - we're going to need to go back to the gate."
Following the incident, both aircraft taxied to parking. The Mesa Air crew elected to cancel the flight and have the aircraft inspected. The Cessna taxied to general aviation parking and concluded the flight.
"This is a pretty emotional time for everybody right now and the trauma of this is pretty significant, so we want to make sure everyone is OK and in a comfortable position to get into an airplane again," he said.Condolences to the families, colleagues and friends of those who perished in this accident. Best wishes to the survivor for a full and speedy recovery.
Smith said the pilot was extremely experienced and while the weather was low visibility it wasn't considered unsafe to fly.
The captain announced to the cabin for passengers and crew to remain seated with seatbelts fastened. The second officer made another call on the cabin interphone to get the first officer back to the flight deck. The first officer returned to the flight deck at 1248. After discussing the situation, the crew decided that they needed to land the aircraft as soon as possible. They were not confident that further pitch-down events would not occur. They were also aware that there had been some injuries in the cabin, but at that stage they were not aware of the extent of the injuries.After the cabin crew advised the flight deck of several serious injuries, the crew declared a MAYDAY and made a emergency landing at Learmonth.
[The crew then made an] emergency broadcast to air traffic control, advising that they had experienced ‘flight control computer problems’ and that some people had been injured. They requested a clearance to divert to and track direct to Learmonth, WA. Clearance to divert and commence descent was received from air traffic control.
...The flight crew spoke to a flight attendant by interphone to get further information on the extent of the injuries. The flight crew advised the cabin crew that, due to the nature of the situation, they did not want them to get out of their seats, but to use the cabin interphones to gather the information.
Initial information provided to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) was that 14 people were taken by air ambulance to Perth. Injuries were considered serious, but not life threatening, and included concussion and broken bones. In addition, up to 30 other people attended hospital with possible concussion, minor lacerations and fractures, with up to a further 30 or so people with minor bruises and stiff necks who did not need to attend hospital.Damage
Subsequent information indicates that one flight attendant and at least 13 passengers were admitted to hospital. The nature and extent of the injuries varied considerably, including injuries listed above and spinal injuries.
At the time of the first in-flight upset event, three flight attendants and the first officer were standing in the forward galley and one flight attendant had just left that galley. The first officer and two of the attendants received minor injuries and the other was uninjured. Four of the flight attendants were preparing to leave the crew rest area (four seats located near the Left 3 door), and all received minor injuries. A flight attendant standing in the rear galley received serious injuries.
Information has been obtained from over 10 per cent of the passengers to date. Based on this information, almost all of the passengers who were seated without seatbelts fastened received either serious or minor injuries during the first in-flight upset. Many of these passengers impacted the ceiling panels. Most of the passengers who had their seatbelts fastened were uninjured, although some received minor injuries. Passengers who were standing at the time of the first in-flight upset received either serious or minor injuries.
Inspection of the aircraft interior revealed damage mainly in the centre and rear sections of the passenger cabin. The level of damage varied significantly. Much of the damage was in the area of the personal service units above each passenger seat, and adjacent panels. The damage was typically consistent with that resulting from an impact by a person or object. There was evidence of damage above approximately 10 per cent of the seats in the centre section of the cabin, and above approximately 20 per cent of the seats in the rear section of the cabin. In addition, some ceiling panels above the cabin aisle-ways had evidence of impact damage, and many had been dislodged from their fixed position.The report includes photos of damage to the ceiling panels above passenger seats, and in the aisle.
Oxygen masks had deployed from above nine of the seats where there had been damage to overhead personal service units or adjacent panels. Some of the cabin portable oxygen cylinders and some of the aircraft first aid kits had been deployed.