Rapper Coolio busted for drugs at LAX

The Los Angeles District Attorney's office announced today that Grammy-winning rapper Artis Leon Ivey -- AKA 'Coolio' -- has been charged with one felony count of drug possession, plus two misdemeanors arising from his arrest last week at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).  

This past Friday, screeners at LAX allegedly discovered crack cocaine and a crack pipe in Coolio's luggage as he was preparing to board a Southwest Airlines flight, according to Reuters.  He was charged today with one felony count for possession of the drug, and a misdemeador charge for the pipe.

According to Reuters, the performer also was charged with misdemeanor battery because he allegedly "grabbed an airport screener's arm to prevent the search of his luggage."

Coolio is slated to be arraigned on April 3, 2009. If convicted, he faces a maximum sentence of three years in state prison.

UPDATE Apr. 3, 2009:  Coolio pleaded not guilty to the charges against when he appeared at  court today for arraignment.  He is free on bail, and will appear before a judge on April 20, in Los Angeles.

CommutAir pilots negotiating first union contract

Pilots at CommutAir have opened negotiations for their first union contract. Officials at the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which represents CommutAir's 120 pilots, said that the talks are off to a good start, with both the union and the airline's management coming to the negotiating table well-prepared, and with a positive attitude.

ALPA describes the initial meetings favorably:

The two parties reached a protocol letter of agreement, setting rules for the collective bargaining process and establishing an aggressive six-month negotiating schedule. ALPA’s team, including Contract Administrator Jeff Loesel and Manager of Representation Jeff MacDonald from the Association’s Representation Department, then presented contract openers on five sections and were able to reach a tentative agreement on one by the end of the second day of talks.

A survey of CommutAir's pilots determined that their priorities are better pay and scheduling. Negotiations are to resume in early April.

“Being able to tentatively agree to a small part of the contract was a very satisfying conclusion to two hard days of work by both sides,” said Negotiating Committee Chairman Capt. Chris Roney. “We’re on our way.”

CommutAir's pilots fly Dash 8 Q200 aircraft under the Continental Connection livery.

Etihad Airways: A bright spot amidst the gloom?

For the better part of a year, a continuing theme in aviation news stories has been capacity reduction, with concomitant reductions in staff, but it looks as though Etihad Airways may be bucking that trend. Etihad, which currently employs about 7,000 people, plans to increase its work force by 5% this year.

A story about Etihad Airways on the Emirates Business 24/7 website quoted airline official Dr. Salwa Al Nuaimi, who said, "We are not firing anybody and we also didn't freeze our recruitment. We are taking care of our people and we are trying to utilise them more." Dr. Al Nuaimi is Etihad's Vice-President, Talent Acquisition, Human Resources.

Etihad is actively seeking to increase the number of Emerati nationals it employs. Currently Emiratis comprise only 3% of Etihad's work force, however the airline is providing training in technical, engineering, cadet pilot and managerial programs in order attract more local citizens into the business.

In 2007, Etihad's pilot training program made history by accepting two women as cadets. They will graduate in April of this year.

Etihad also encourages Emiratis to join the airline's award-winning cabin crew team, according to Dr. Al Nuaimi.

"Hopefully in the next two to three years we can see local cabin crew on Etihad," she said. "You see, the UAE is changing all the time. Nobody thought that we would have two female pilots."

Etihad Airways is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and is backed financially by the government of Abu Dhabi.

Interim report on the July 2008 Qantas B-747 depressurization accident

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has just released an Interim Factual Report regarding the sudden decompression in flight of a Qantas Boeing 747-400 on July 25, 2008. The accident happened during the cruise phase of Qantas Flight QF30, which was en route from Hong Kong to Melbourne. The flight diverted to Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila where it landed safely, with no serious injuries to the 365 people on board.

After the aircraft landed, a large rupture in the fuselage was discovered.  The ATSB's preliminary factual report about the accident, issued in August of 2008,  stated that one of the cylinders that supplied emergency oxygen to the passenger cabin had "sustained a failure that allowed a sudden and complete release of the pressurised contents," and that "damage to the aircraft's fuselage was consistent with being produced by the energy associated with that release of pressure" from the oxygen cylinder.

Today's interim report elaborated on damage to the aircraft and its systems, with many photos to illustrate. The report also provided detailed descriptions of the engineering tests carried out (and still underway) on components of the accident aircraft's emergency oxygen system, and on similar oxygen cylinders and fittings.

Among the points included in this lengthy interim report:

• there was no evidence of an external explosive event or the use of explosive materials around the rupture area
• no significant maintenance difficulties had been experienced with the passenger oxygen system prior to the accident
• no anomalies in samples of the oxygen gas used to fill the cylinders were identified that would have contributed to this event

Regarding survivability issues, the ATSB said in a media release accompanying the report:

The investigation has determined that, despite the damage to the aircraft's passenger oxygen system caused by the oxygen cylinder failure, the system would have continued to operate for approximately 65 minutes following the depressurisation event. Passenger oxygen was only required for about 5 ½ minutes during the period between the depressurisation event and when the aircraft reached an altitude of 10,000 ft.

The ATSB expects to issue a final report on this accident investigation by the end of 2009.

Here is the link to the report: ATSB Transport Safety Report: Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2008-053, Interim Factual - 62-page 'pdf' file

[Photo Source]

Related:

• Qantas Flight QF30 -- Sudden decompression in flight - AircrewBuzz.com, July 25, 2008
• ATSB update on Qantas Flight QF30 accident investigation - AircrewBuzz.com, July 28, 2008
• More information released about the Qantas B747 decompression incident - AircrewBuzz.com, July 30, 2008
• Preliminary factual report issued for Qantas Boeing 747 decompression incident - AircrewBuzz.com, Aug. 29, 2008

...or click here to view all posts about Qantas Flt 30 on Aircrew Buzz.

Preliminary factual report on the easyJet B737-700 upset incident

Back in January of this year, a Boeing 737-700 aircraft operated by British carrier easyJet experienced a 'violent pitch down' during which it exceeded Vmo (maximum operating speed) by 100 knots, and dropped 10,000 feet. Fortunately the incident happened during a non-revenue flight, and no one was injured -- although I think it's safe to bet that it scared the bejeezus out of the four crew members on board.

Earlier this week, the UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)  issued a preliminary factual report about this serious incident, in the form of a Special Bulletin.  From that report we learn that the aircraft, which was at the end of its lease, had just undergone maintenance, prior to it being handed over to another operator. The incident flight was a combined maintenance check and customer demonstration flight, designed to confirm the aircraft’s serviceability.

The incident occurred during a flight control manual reversion check at FL150. Here is what happened, according to the AAIB report (reparagraphed for easier reading):

This required the aircraft to be flown at FL150, at 250 kt IAS with the fuel balanced, the AUTOPILOT and AUTOTHRUST selected OFF, the STAB TRIM MAIN ELEC and AUTOPILOT switches set to CUTOUT and the aircraft in trim.

The ‘customer demonstration flight schedule’ also required SPOILER A and B switches to be selected OFF. All these checks were conducted using the operator’s ‘customer demonstration flight schedule’ and not the maintenance manual extracts as the guiding reference.

Before the manual reversion check commenced, the individual hydraulic systems were isolated by placing the FLT CONTROL switches A and B to the OFF position individually and reinstating in turn enabling the flight controls to be checked for normal operation on a single hydraulic system. Operation was confirmed as satisfactory on both systems.

Then, with the commander having released the controls, the co-pilot selected FLT CONTROL switches A and B to the OFF position, removing all hydraulic assistance from the primary flying controls. As he did so the aircraft suddenly pitched nose down.

The commander pulled back on the control column with considerable force but was unable to prevent the aircraft from maintaining a nose down pitch attitude of ‑2.81° and descending at up to 3,100 fpm. The commander, therefore, decided to abandon the check but did not wish to re-engage the hydraulics whilst applying significant backpressure to the controls.

The commander stated that, should the aircraft pitch up or down uncontrollably during a manual reversion check, he had been trained to roll the aircraft to unload the pressure on the elevator and release the controls before reinstating the hydraulics. The commander therefore, rolled the aircraft left 91.2° and believes he released the controls before calling for the co-pilot to re-engage the FLT CONTROL switches.

The recording from the Cockpit Voice Recording (CVR) indicated that at this point there was confusion between the two pilots. This resulted in the commander thinking that hydraulic power had been restored to the flight controls although there is no evidence that the FLT CONTROL switches had been moved from the OFF position.

The commander rolled the wings level and attempted to arrest the rate of descent which had increased considerably, peaking at 21,000 fpm; the aircraft had pitched 30° nose down after the aircraft had been rolled to the left.

The control forces remained high but the commander considered this to be due to the aircraft’s speed, which both pilots observed to be indicating above 440 kt. He retarded the thrust levers and selected the speed brakes, however, the spoilers had been switched OFF as part of the test procedure.

The commander continued to maintain backpressure on the controls and made a PAN call to ATC. The aircraft eventually recovered from the dive at about 5,600 ft, having entered a layer of cloud. The pilots reviewed the situation and selected the FLT CONTROL switches, which had remained OFF throughout the flight excursion, to the ON position. The control forces returned to normal.

.. and shortly thereafter they landed that puppy back at Southend, where it had originated, without further incident. (One can only imagine the state of their underlinens!)

So why did this dramatic excursion happen? Since the purpose of this AAIB report was to provide preliminary factual information, not analysis, there was no 'probable cause' stated. Nevertheless, there are some clues to where the ongoing investigation may be headed.

The pilot in command during the incident had earlier ferried the aircraft to the contract maintenance facility. During that earlier ferry flight, a 'shakedown' test was performed to identify any existing defects so that they could be brought to the attention of the maintenance provider, and rectified.

One of the items in the 'shakedown' was the manual reversion test to assess the trim of the aircraft. Quoting again from the AAIB report:

...This involved switching off both hydraulic systems powering the aircraft flight controls and assessing the amount of manual stabiliser trim wheel adjustment required to balance the aircraft in level flight.

The results of this test identified that the aircraft was within, but very close to, the approved maintenance manual limits.

Following the flight, the commander verbally requested that this be addressed during the subsequent maintenance input, but elected not to enter it in the tech log, as the level of stabiliser trim required during the test had been within limits.

The absence of a formal post‑flight debrief and formal written record resulted in the balance tabs, attached to the elevators of the aircraft, being adjusted in the opposite sense to that identified as necessary by the flight test. The aircraft was therefore significantly out of trim during the post-maintenance test flight, and it was that which initiated the pitch-down incident during the manual reversion test.

Here is the link to the AAIB report: AAIB Special Bulletin S2/2009 - 4-page 'pdf' file

[Photo Source]

Boeing issues warning to B-737 operators, due to accident investigation findings

The following is the text of a memo issued by Boeing to operators of Boeing 737 airplanes. The information reflects preliminary findings by the Dutch Safety Board regarding their investigation of the crash of a Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 aircraft at Amsterdam on February 25, 2009:

FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY

TO: MOM [MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-MOM-09-0063-01B] 04-Mar-2009 05:29:01 AM US PACIFIC TIME Multi Operator Message

This message is sent to all 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-500,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ customers and to respective Boeing Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.

SERVICE REQUEST ID: 1-1228079803 

ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM) DUE DATE: 10-Mar-2009 PRODUCT TYPE: Airplane

PRODUCT LINE: 737 PRODUCT: 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-500,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ ATA: 3400-00

SUBJECT: 737-800 TC-JGE Accident at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam - 25 February 2009

REFERENCES: /A/ 1-1222489391 Dated 25 February 2009

Reference /A/ provides Boeing's previous fleet communication on the subject event.

The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch Safety Board's (DSB) investigation of this accident. 

The DSB has released a statement on the progress of the investigation and has approved the release of the following information.

While the complex investigation is just beginning, certain facts have emerged from work completed thus far:

- To date, no evidence has been found of bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear.

- There was adequate fuel on board the airplane during the entire flight.

- Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during the entire flight.

- The airplane responded normally to flight control inputs throughout the flight.

The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using autopilot B and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport.

During the approach, the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to -8 feet.

When descending through approximately 2000 feet the autothrottle, which uses the left radio altimeter data, transitioned to landing flare mode and retarded the throttles to the idle stop. The throttles remained at the idle stop for approximately 100 seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed.

The two LRRA systems provide height above ground readings to several aircraft systems including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which require flight crew intervention whether or not accompanied by an LRRA fault flag, include:

- Large differences between displayed radio altitudes, including radio altitude readings of -8 feet in flight.

- Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP (Approach) mode

- Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach

- Unexpected Configuration Warnings during approach, go-around and initial climb after takeoff

- Premature FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL. There will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop.  Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the throttles have reached the idle stop

Boeing Recommended Action 

- Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes.

More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual. Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described above should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may wish to review 737NG-FTD-34-09001 which provides information specific for the 737-NG installation.  Initial investigations suggest that a similar sequence of events and flight deck indications are theoretically possible on the 737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500. Consequently the above recommendations also apply to earlier 737 models.

Thanks to the reader who passed this memo along to me.

Dutch Safety Board's preliminary report on the Turkish Airlines crash at Amsterdam

The Dutch Safety Board has issued a preliminary report regarding the Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 accident at Amsterdam last month.  Turkish Airlines Flight TK 1951, which was arriving from Istanbul,  was on approach to runway 18R (AKA 'the Polderbaan') at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport on February 25, 2009 when it crashed into a field short of the runway threshold. Four crew members and five passengers were killed in the accident. Twenty-eight of the 80 people who were injured remain hospitalized, according to the Dutch report.

The Dutch Safty Board's preliminary report states that the flight experienced no problems "until just before the approach." According to information obtained by investigators from the aircraft's cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, the aircraft was descending, with the auto-pilot engaged, when "an irregularity occurred" at 1950 feet.

Quoting from the English version of the Dutch Safety Board report posted on the Board's website:

At a height of 1950 feet the left radio altimeter suddenly indicated a change in altitude -- from 1950 feet to -8 feet -- and passed this onto the automatic pilot. This change had a particular impact upon the automatic throttle system which provides more or less engine power.

The radio altimeter normally measures the altitude of the plane above the ground very accurately and can start registering this from 2500 feet. As already mentioned, this radio altimeter is very significant for providing the appropriate power for an automatic landing.

A Boeing is fitted with two radio altimeters, a left one and a right one. The black box has shown that this deviation only occurred in the left radio altimeter.

The voice recorder has shown that the crew were notified that the left radio altimeter was not working correctly (via the warning signal “landing gear must go down”).

Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem.

In practice, the plane responded to this sudden change as though it was at an altitude of just a few meters above the Polderbaan and engine power was reduced.

It seems that the automatic system -- with its engines at reduced power -- assumed it was in the final stages of the flight.

As a result, the aircraft lost speed.

Initially the crew did not react to the issues at hand.

As a result of the deceleration, the aircraft's speed was reduced to minimum flying speed (stalling situation) and warning signals (the steering column buzzes at an altitude of 150 metres) were given.

The black box shows that full power was then applied immediately. However, this was too late to recover the flight, the aircraft was too low and, consequently, the
Boeing crashed 1 kilometre short of the runway.

The black box -- which can register 25 hours of flying time and which, in this case, covered 8 flights -- showed that this problem had occurred twice previously in a similar situation, before landing.

The aircraft initially hit the ground with its tail and then the undercarriage followed.

The forward speed was about 175 km per hour upon impact. An aircraft of this weight should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing.

The aircraft came to a rapid halt (after about 150 m) as a result of the arable land being made up of boggy clay.

The braking caused by the ground meant that the aircraft broke into two pieces; the tail broke off and the aircraft’s hull ruptured at business class.

The landing gear broke off, in accordance with its design.

This also applied to the two engines.

The full power and the sudden braking resulted in both engines continuing forwards for a further 250 meters.

The report goes on to note that the Board's investigation "will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system)."

Separately, the Dutch Safety Board announced that it has issued a warning to Boeing as a result of the initial findings of the Turkish Airlines accident investigation. Boeing, in turn, has given notice that a warning will be issued to all users of this type of plane to make them aware of this possible risk.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about THY Flt 1951 on Aircrew Buzz.

Chicago-O'Hare air traffic controller blamed for near mid-air collision

This past July, there was a near mid-air collision at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport between a departing American Eagle ERJ-145, and a Learjet LR60 that was arriving on an intersecting runway. No one was injured, and neither aircraft was damaged in the July 22, 2008 incident, but it was a very close call: according to ground radar (ASDE-X) analysis and radar replay, the LJ60 passed 325 feet above and slightly behind the departing E145. 

A 'probable cause' report issued recently by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) cites "[t]he LC-10 [Local Control] controller's failure to ensure the appropriate separation between two airplanes operating on runways where flight paths intersect" as the cause the incident.

Here is the timeline of events, from the NTSB report:

At 1243:09, the ORD tower local control 10 (LC-10) controller instructed the E145 pilots to taxi into position and hold on runway 32L at taxiway M. The LC-10 controller issued a wake turbulence advisory to the pilots and advised them to expect about a 2 1/2 minute delay before "we can getcha rollin". The E145 pilots acknowledged the clearance. The runway 32L/taxiway M intersection is approximately 8,800 feet from the runway 9R final approach path.

At 1244:57, the LJ60 pilot contacted the north local controller (NLC) and reported over Lance, the runway 9R outer marker, located about 4.1 nautical miles from the approach end of the runway. The NLC cleared the LJ60 pilots to land on runway 9R and advised them to "plan a left turn on runway 32R" during their landing roll. The LJ60 pilots acknowledged the clearance and repeated the exit information.

At 1245:27, the LC-10 controller cleared the E145 for takeoff stating, "...runway 32L at [taxiway] M, cleared for takeoff, turn right heading 330 [degrees]." The controller did not provide any information regarding the LJ60 that was about 2.5 miles from the runway 9R runway threshold. The E145 pilot acknowledged the takeoff clearance. At 1245:45, EGF298 commenced its takeoff roll.

According to the local monitor's statement, he recognized the potential conflict between the E145 and LJ60 and told the LC10 controller to advise the departing aircraft to stay low.

About 1246:13, when the LJ60 was about 3/4 of a mile from runway 9R, the NLC instructed the LJ60 pilots to "...go around maintain 4,000 [feet msl]." According to the LJ60 pilot-flying's (PF) statement, the pilot not flying observed the E145 on runway 32L and told the LJ60 pilot flying (PF) "Climb, climb, there is an MD80 on takeoff roll on [runway] 32R."

At 1246:19, the LC-10 controller advised the E145 pilots to "...stay low...stay low traffics above you."

At 1246:26, the ASDE-X data revealed that the closest recorded proximity occurred as the LJ60 passed about 150 feet laterally and about 325 feet above the E145. About 13 seconds later, the NLC instructed LJ60 pilots to "Turn right heading 140 [degrees], contact Chicago departure control on 127.4." The pilots acknowledged the clearance.

At 1246:27, the LC-10 controller instructed E145 pilots to "Climb and maintain 5 [thousand feet], sorry about that." A few seconds later, the pilots acknowledge the clearance.

At 1246:43, the E145 pilots said, "...it was interesting." About 19 seconds later, the LC-10 controller instructed the E145 pilots, "Contact Chicago departure 125.4." [NTSB ID: OPS08IA011A]

The report also includes statements from the pilots on both aircraft. The crew on the Lear spotted the ERJ nearly concurrently with the controller's go-around instruction. The PNF (pilot not flying) told the NTSB "...We never received a TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) advisory - either alert or resolution - during the go-around."

Meanwhile, the ERJ captain, who was the PF, said, "...As I called gear up after rotating, I see a Learjet at 11 o'clock converging directly with our flight path. I immediately leveled the aircraft at 200 feet above the runway to avoid a collision and maintained runway heading. The tower issued an alert to level off two seconds later, as the Lear [jet] passed directly over our cockpit. I am estimating 600 feet separation. The controller apologized."

The American Eagle first officer, who was the PNF, said, "...From my vantage point, all I saw was an aircraft directly above us moving left to right at no more than 200 feet of separation vertically. The Captain immediately initiated a level off at no more than 200 feet AGL until we were instructed to continue the climb. The tower apologized and continued working aircraft, handed us off to departure where the flight continued without further incident."

The NTSB report notes that "The LC10 position, located on the south side of the tower cab that has an external view of the runway 32L/9R intersections. The tower was equipped with digital radar and ASDE-X displays. ORD managers reported that the ASDE- X did not have crossing runway logic installed, and the ASDE-X did not alarm during the incident.