Delta Air Lines planning to purchase hundreds of new aircraft

by B. N. Sullivan

Big news today: Delta Air Lines plans to acquire hundreds of new aircraft.  According to a Bloomberg article about the planned aircraft purchase, Delta "plans to order 100 to 200 narrow-body jets and seek options for 200 more, a possible record purchase."

Presumably the new planes will replace Delta's older DC-9, Boeing 757-200, and Airbus A320 aircraft.  The new planes would be used on domestic routes.

From the Bloomberg article:

Delta will consider “large, medium and small” narrow-body jets, Chief Executive Officer Richard Anderson said yesterday in a separate weekly recorded message to employees.

“It’s important we take a very long-term view of our fleet,” Anderson said.

Speculation is that Boeing, Airbus, and Bombardier all may be asked to submit proposals for the order.  This could be the largest single aircraft purchase to date by any commercial airline.

Qantas Flight 32: Crew response to the emergency

by B. N. Sullivan

This is the third in a series of posts about Qantas Flight 32, an Airbus A380 (registration VH-OQA) that experienced an uncontained failure of one of its four Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines during flight on November 4, 2010.  The information here is based on a preliminary report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), issued On December 3, 2010.

As mentioned in the previous post, there were five flight crew on board Qantas Flight 32: the Captain (PIC); a First Officer (FO), acting as co-pilot; a Second Officer (SO); a second Captain, who was training as a Check Captain (CC); and a Supervising Check Captain (SCC), who was training the CC.  This post details how they responded to the emergency following the uncontained engine failure that damaged the aircraft and a number of its systems.

Early in the emergency, given that the aircraft was controllable, the crew decided to hold their present altitude while they processed the plethora of ECAM messages that immediately followed the engine failure.  [See previous post.]  They contacted Singapore ATC and asked for an appropriate holding position, ultimately requesting "to remain within 30 NM (56 km) of Changi Airport in case they should need to land quickly."  ATC vectored the aircraft into a holding pattern east of the airport  at 7,400 ft.

As the crew went through procedures associated with the ECAM messages, the SO went into the cabin to try to visually assess the damage to No 2 engine.

As the SO moved through the cabin a passenger, who was also a pilot for the operator, brought the SO’s attention to a view of the aircraft from the vertical fin mounted camera that was displayed on the aircraft’s in-flight entertainment system.  That display appeared to show some form of fluid leak from the left wing.

The SO then went to the left side of the aircraft's lower deck and observed the wing damage and fuel leak.  He saw a fuel trail about 0.5 m wide that appeared to be coming from underneath the wing.

Later, the SCC and SO returned to the cabin "on numerous occasions to visually assess the damage on the left side of the aircraft, and to inspect the right side of the aircraft, and to provide feedback to the cabin crew and passengers."

Meanwhile, up on the flight deck:

The flight crew reported that, during their assessment of subsequent multiple fuel system ECAM messages, they elected not to initiate further fuel transfer in response to a number of those messages, as they were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system.  In addition, the crew could not jettison fuel due to the ECAM fuel jettison fault and they were aware that there was fuel leaking from the left wing.  The crew also recalled an indication that the aircraft’s satellite communications system had failed.  They also received an aircraft communications and automatic reporting system (ACARS)message from the aircraft operator that indicated that multiple failure messages had been received by the operator from the aircraft.

It took about 50 minutes for the crew to complete procedures associated with the many ECAM messages.

They then assessed the aircraft systems to determine those that had been damaged, or that were operating in a degraded mode.  They considered that the status of each system had the potential to affect the calculation of the required parameters for the approach and landing.  The crew also believed that the failure may have damaged the No 1 engine, and they discussed a number of concerns in relation to the lateral and longitudinal fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.

The FO and the SCC performed several calculations to determine the landing distance required for their overweight landing.  They determined that landing on Changi's runway 20C  "was feasible, with 100 m of runway remaining," and advised ATC to that effect.

Approach and Landing

Prior to leaving the holding pattern, the crew carried out a number of manual handling checks at holding speed to assess the controllability of the aircraft.

As the crew started to reconfigure the aircraft for the approach by lowering flaps, they conducted further controllability checks at the approach speed and decided that the aircraft remained controllable.  As a result of the landing gear-related ECAM messages, the landing gear was lowered using the emergency extension procedure and a further controllability check was conducted.

The landing performance application indicated a required approach speed of 166 kts.  The flight crew reported being aware that: reverse thrust was only available from the No 3 engine, no leading edge slats were available, there was limited aileron and spoiler control, anti-skid braking was restricted to the body landing gear only, there was limited nosewheel steering and that the nose was likely to pitch up on touchdown.  An ECAM message indicated that they could not apply maximum braking until the nosewheel was on the runway.  The wing flaps were extended to the No 3 position.

Singapore ATC vectored the aircraft to a position 20 NM (37 km) from the threshold of runway 20C and provided for a progressive descent to 4,000 ft.  The PIC was aware that accurate speed control on final would be important to avoid either an aerodynamic stall condition, or a runway overrun. Consequently, the PIC set the thrust levers for Nos 1 and 4 engines to provide symmetric thrust, and controlled the aircraft’s speed with the thrust from No 3 engine.

The autopilot disconnected a couple of times during the early part of the approach as the speed reduced to 1 kt below the approach speed.  The PIC initially acted to reconnect the autopilot but, when it disconnected again at about 1,000 ft, he elected to leave it disconnected and to fly the aircraft manually for the remainder of the approach.  Due to the limited landing margin available, the CC reminded the PIC that the landing would have to be conducted with no flare and that there would be a slightly higher nose attitude on touchdown.

Cabin crew were briefed to prepare the cabin for a possible runway overrun and emergency evacuation.

The aircraft touched down, the PIC applied maximum braking and selected reverse thrust on the No 3 engine.  The aircraft came to a stop with about 150 meters of runway remaining.

After Landing

The crew shut down the remaining engines, however the No 1 engine continued to run.  The crew recycled the engine master switch to OFF, but the engine still did not shut down.  The crew then tried using the emergency shutoff and fire extinguisher bottles to shut down No 1 engine, but to no avail.  Activating a series of circuit breakers in the aircraft's equipment bay, and efforts to starve the No 1 engine of fuel also were unsuccessful.  Ultimately, "the decision was taken to drown the engine with fire-fighting foam from the emergency services fire vehicles," but this did not happen until about 2 hours and 7 minutes after the aircraft landed!

Meanwhile, passengers disembarked on the right side of the aircraft via stairs.

The crew elected to use a single door so that the passengers could be accounted for as they left the aircraft and because they wanted the remainder of the right side of the aircraft to be kept clear in case of the need to deploy the escape slides. They also decided to have the other doors remain armed, with crew members in their positions at those doors ready to activate the escape slides if necessary, until all of the passengers were off the aircraft.

It took about an hour for all passengers and crew to leave the aircraft. There were no injuries reported among the five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers on board Qantas Flight 32.

[Photo Source]

Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flight 32 on Aircrew Buzz.

Qantas Flight 32: Uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft

by B. N. Sullivan

This is the second in a series of posts about the events on board Qantas Flight 32, an Airbus A380 (registration VH-OQA) that experienced an uncontained failure of one of its four Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines during flight on November 4, 2010.  The information here is based on a preliminary report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), issued On December 3, 2010.

There were five flight crew on board Qantas Flight 32: the Captain (PIC); a First Officer (FO), acting as co-pilot; a Second Officer (SO); a second Captain, who was training as a Check Captain (CC); and a Supervising Check Captain (SCC), who was training the CC.

In a media briefing on the day the preliminary report was released, ATSB Chief Commissioner Martin Dolan praised the crew of Qantas Flight 32, stating that the A380 "would not have arrived safely in Singapore" were it not for the actions of the flight crew.   Reading through the ATSB report, it is clear that the entire crew really had their hands full.

Engine Failure

The ATSB report says that the first sign of trouble came during the climb out of Singapore when the crew heard two "almost coincident" loud bangs.  The PIC immediately selected altitude and heading hold on the autopilot control panel, and the aircraft leveled off, however the autothrust system did not reduce power to the engines as expected.  When it became clear that the autothrust system was no longer active, the PIC manually retarded the thrust levels to control the aircraft's speed.

The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) system displayed an "overheat" warning message for the No 2 engine.  Then all hell broke loose on the flight deck.

Within seconds, the overheat warning changed to a fire for the No 2 engine.  The crew decided to shut down No 2 engine, and "after they had selected the ENG 2 master switch OFF, the ECAM displayed a message indicating that the No 2 engine had failed."

The crew discharged one of the engine's two fire extinguisher bottles, but did not receive a confirmation that it had discharged.  They repeated the procedure and again did not receive the expected confirmation.  They attempted to discharged the second bottle; again they did not receive confirmation that the second bottle had discharged.

The crew reported that they then elected to continue the engine failure procedure, which included initiating an automated process of fuel transfer from the aircraft’s outer wing tanks to the inner tanks.

The crew also noticed that the engine display for the No 2 engine had changed to a failed mode, and that the engine display for Nos 1 and 4 engines had reverted to a degraded mode.  The display for the No 3 engine indicated that the engine was operating in an alternate mode as a result of the crew actioning an ECAM procedure.

Shortly afterward, a flood of ECAM messages began to display.  Quoting from the ATSB report:

The flight crew recalled the following system warnings on the ECAM after the failure of No. 2 engine.

• engines No 1 and 4 operating in a degraded mode
• GREEN hydraulic system -- low system pressure and low fluid level
• YELLOW hydraulic system -- engine No. 4 pump errors
• failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No. 1 and 2 bus systems
• flight controls operating in alternate law
• wing slats inoperative
• flight controls -- ailerons partial control only
• flight controls -- reduced spoiler control
• landing gear control and indicator warnings
• multiple brake system messages
• engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
• multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault
• center of gravity messages
• autothrust and autoland inoperative
• No. 1 engine generator drive disconnected
• left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
• avionics system overheat

Damage to the Aircraft

Unbeknown to the crew at that time, the No 2 engine's intermediate pressure (IP) turbine had failed.  The turbine disc, blade and nozzle guide vanes separated, ruptured the surrounding casing, and damaged the engine's thrust reverser.  A number of components were ejected, which struck the aircraft.

The leading edge of the left wing was penetrated, resulting in "damage to the leading edge structure, the front wing spar and the upper surface of the wing."

The left wing-to-fuselage fairing also was penetrated, "resulting in damage to numerous system components, the fuselage structure and elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring."

Damaged were "elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring that affected the operation of the hydraulic system, landing gear and flight controls; a number of fuel system components; and the leading edge slat system."

The left wing's lower surface was impacted, "resulting in a fuel leak from the Number 2 engine fuel feed tank and the left wing inner fuel tank."

[Photo Source]

Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flight 32 on Aircrew Buzz.

Qantas Airbus A380 uncontained engine failure: ATSB preliminary report

by B. N. Sullivan

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released its preliminary report regarding its investigation of the November 4, 2010 uncontained failure of a Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine on a Qantas Airbus A380 aircraft over Batam Island, Indonesia.  The aircraft (registration VH-OQA), operating as Qantas Flight QF32, was en route from Changi Airport, Singapore to Sydney with five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers on board.  No one on board was injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage.  Two people on the ground sustained minor injuries due to falling debris.

The abstract of the ATSB report provides this brief summary of what happened:

Following a normal takeoff, the crew retracted the landing gear and flaps.  The crew reported that, while maintaining 250 kts in the climb and passing 7,000 ft above mean sea level, they heard two almost coincident ‘loud bangs’, followed shortly after by indications of a failure of the No 2 engine.

The crew advised Singapore Air Traffic Control of the situation and were provided with radar vectors to a holding pattern.  The crew undertook a series of actions before returning the aircraft to land at Singapore.  There were no reported injuries to the crew or passengers on the aircraft.  There were reports of minor injuries to two persons on Batam Island, Indonesia.

A subsequent examination of the aircraft indicated that the No 2 engine had sustained an uncontained failure of the Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc.  Sections of the liberated disc penetrated the left wing and the left wing-to-fuselage fairing, resulting in structural and systems damage to the aircraft.

As a result of this occurrence, a number of safety actions were immediately undertaken by Qantas, Airbus, Rolls-Royce plc and the European Aviation Safety Agency.  On 1 December 2010, the ATSB issued a safety recommendation to Rolls-Royce plc in respect of the Trent 900 series engine high pressure/intermediate pressure bearing structure oil feed stub pipes.  In addition, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority issued a Regulation 38 maintenance direction that addressed the immediate safety of flight concerns in respect of Qantas A380 operations with the Trent 900 series engine.  On 2 December 2010, Qantas advised that the requirements of Rolls-Royce plc Service Bulletin RB211 72 G595 would take place within the next 24 hours on engines in place on A380 aircraft currently in service, and before further flight on engines on aircraft not yet returned to service.

The ATSB report, which was issued today, is lengthy and detailed.  I will present some of the details of particular interest to crew members in the next two posts on Aircrew Buzz.  Stay tuned for that.

Meanwhile, here is the link to the landing page on the ATSB website where you can find links to the full text reports; photos; and safety recommendations pertaining to this accident: ATSB Investigation Number:AO-2010-089

[Photo Source]

Airbus A320 demo ride for Iron Maiden singer Bruce Dickinson

The YouTube blurb for this video says:

Bruce Dickinson (Iron Maiden vocalist), is taken for a demo ride of the A320 for a Discovery Channel documentary. Bruce shows off the computerized FLCS of the aircraft and how these protect the aircraft from control errors.

By the way, Bruce Dickinson also happens to fly Boeing 757 aircraft for charter carrier Astraeus.

If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

Yikes! Airbus A380 hard landing at Oshkosh

The folks at AVweb.com produced this video of the arrival of the Airbus A380 at Oshkosh for the 2009 AirVenture event. The video was shot earlier today as the A380 crabbed its way onto the runway at Oshkosh. AVweb explains:

The Airbus A380, the world's largest airliner, made quite a dramatic arrival at Oshkosh on Tuesday. Dan Gryder, a Boeing 777 pilot, analyzes what went wrong.

The video includes a slow motion replay of the landing.



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

Check out AVweb's YouTube channel for more great aviation videos.

NTSB investigating two recent Airbus A330 'speed and altitude indication anomalies'

by B. N. Sullivan

The afternoon, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued an advisory announcing the investigation of "two recent incidents in which airspeed and altitude indications in the cockpits of Airbus A-330 aircraft may have malfunctioned."

The NTSB advisory describes the incidents as follows:

The first incident occurred May 21, 2009, when TAM Airlines flight 8091 (Brazilian registration PT-MVB) flying from Miami, Florida to Sao Paulo, Brazil, experienced a loss of primary speed and altitude information while in cruise flight. Initial reports indicate that the flight crew noted an abrupt drop in indicated outside air temperature, followed by the loss of the Air Data Reference System and disconnections of the autopilot and autothrust, along with the loss of speed and altitude information. The flight crew used backup instruments and primary data was restored in about 5 minutes. The flight landed at Sao Paulo with no further incident and there were no injuries and damage.

The Safety Board has become aware of another possibly similar incident that occurred on June 23 on a Northwest Airlines A-330 (registration unknown) flying between Hong Kong and Tokyo. The aircraft landed safely in Tokyo; no injuries or damage was reported. Data recorder information, Aircraft Condition Monitoring System messages, crew statements and weather information are being collected by NTSB investigators.

Further information on both incidents will be released when it becomes available.

For what it's worth, a chilling story about a Delta (i.e., Northwest) A330-300 incident has appeared on several aviation message boards over the past day or two. I tend to view undocumented stories on message boards with some skepticism, and as regular readers of Aircrew Buzz know, I am not inclined to report rumors. But I must admit that when today's NTSB advisory showed up in my email inbox my first response was to revisit one of the message boards where I had seen the Delta A330 story to see if my memory of what I had read was correct.

The story described a marked drop in indicated outside air temperature, the loss of airspeed and altitude information, and the sudden disengagement of the autopilot and autothrust. The failure was said to have lasted about three minutes. The details of the story (aircraft type, carrier, route, date) did indeed match those in the above NTSB advisory. The source of the message board story is purported to be a crew member from the flight in question.

Fortunately that story had a favorable outcome, as did the TAM flight mentioned in the NTSB advisory. One cannot help but wonder if indeed something similar happened to Air France Flight 447, but with a different and hugely tragic outcome.

Let's hope that the NTSB, the French BEA, and other agencies will be able to get to the bottom of these apparently similar incidents before we have another occurrence that is irrecoverable.

United Airlines wants up to 150 new aircraft, asks Boeing and Airbus for bids

UAL Corp., the parent of United Airlines, is seeking to acquire up to 150 new aircraft, an order that could be worth up to $10 billion. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) is reporting that UAL has asked both Boeing and Airbus to bid for the order.

Unlike some of its largest domestic rivals, United already flies both Airbus and Boeing planes, giving both manufacturers an incentive to try to grab a bigger share of a major airline's business. As part of its order, United is hoping to simplify its fleet by ending up with fewer different types of aircraft, a change that would cut its maintenance and crew-training costs.

Citing 'people familiar with the matter', the WSJ says the focus of the order will be replacement of "many of United's 111-airplane wide-body fleet, as well as some of its 97 aging Boeing 757 narrow-body planes."

Just a year ago, United announced plans to downsize its fleet, a move that would include retiring six Boeing 747-400 aircraft, and all 94 of the Boeing 737 type. The airline also is in the process of reintegrating the 56 Airbus A320 aircraft that have been operating all-economy Ted flights into the mainline fleet, repainting them in the standard United livery, and reconfiguring the seating to include a First Class cabin.

Hundreds of United pilots are furloughed at present, and the elimination of 100 planes from its fleet over the space of a year has meant that many pilots have had to be retrained to fly different types of aircraft in order to keep their jobs. I can't help but wonder how United's pilots will view this intended expansion of the fleet, especially from a single airframer.

The timing of this proposed order for new aircraft is as surprising as its potential dollar value: the WSJ report indicates that United "could sign a major order as early as the fall." But perhaps the timing is more shrewd than it might seem at first glance. Says the WSJ:

It's a notable move amid falling travel demand and a tight lending environment -- on top of UAL's recent heavy losses and poor credit rating. But even in good times aircraft builders will go to considerable lengths to lock in an order, using in-house financing arms and other maneuvers to help airlines buy...

In other words, UAL is in bargain-hunting mode, and the ace up its sleeve is the lure of a winner-take-all deal for either Boeing or Airbus.

Let the bidding war begin.

Air Austral orders two single-class Airbus A380 aircraft

Air Austral, an airline most people in the world have never heard of, is set to offer something most other airlines would not consider. The airline, which is based in the middle of the Indian Ocean on the island called La Réunion, has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Airbus for the purchase of two A380s in a single-class configuration. That's right -- they are ordering two all-economy class A380 aircraft.

From an Airbus press release about the deal:

In a single-class configuration the aircraft will seat around 840 passengers in the widest economy class seats and the service proven quietest cabin in the sky. Air Austral plans to operate the A380 through one of its subsidiaries on its high-density route from La Réunion to Paris, France. No engine choice has been made at this stage.

This is the first time a carrier has ordered an A380 in a single-class configuration.

"Our vision is to provide a low cost-high quality service on the heavy traffic route between La Réunion and Paris and the A380 allows us to make this vision a reality," said Gerard Etheve, President of Air Austral. "The A380 has the lowest cost per seat and is the most environment-friendly aircraft flying today while at the same time providing a high level of passenger comfort. This will enable Air Austral to better connect La Reunion to France at a lower fare," he added.

Sounds optimistic and very ambitious, especially given the current state of the global economy, when most airlines are reducing capacity. Nevertheless, I certainly wish Air Austral success with this bold move. All of us in the aviation community certainly will be watching.

Emirates A380 pilots complain about 'too quiet' crew rest area

Pilots at Emirates Airline who fly the Dubai-based carrier's Airbus A380 are complaining that the aircraft's crew-rest area is too quiet to afford them proper rest. The crew-rest area is located in the aft section of the aircraft's all-economy main deck, and the pilots claim that noises from the passenger cabin -- ranging from crying babies to flushing vacuum toilets -- can be heard very clearly, interrupting their sleep.

One of the features about the A380 touted by Airbus is that engine noise is barely perceptible inside the aircraft cabin. Ironically, this is exactly what the problem is. Usually, engine noise works like 'white noise' to muffle more intermittent sounds. With no engine thrum to mask other sounds, every noise inside the cabin is heard rather clearly and acutely. Even though they wear earplugs, the pilots' sleep is repeatedly interrupted.

According to Flight International, which broke this story, the problem extends beyond noise, per se. Due to the location of the crew-rest area, passengers also mistake the rest area for a lavatory, and pull the door handle.

The Flight International article says:

Emirates is the only A380 operator so far to have situated the crew-rest areas at the rear of the main deck. It did not opt for Airbus' standard option of locating the pilots' compartment behind the cockpit as it would have compromised the design of the airline's upper deck first-class cabin, while the alternative location of the cargo hold was rejected as it thought crew would find it "claustrophobic".

I am wondering if, in addition, there may be safety implications for locating the crew-rest area in the aft section of the main deck, so far away from the flight deck. One can imagine an emergency arising that would urgently require the presence of a crew member who was on rest break. Imagine the poor pilot who has to make his or her way as quickly as possible from the crew-rest in the aft of the main deck, through the length of the 'super-jumbo' aircraft (possibly having to navigate around passengers, cabin crew, serving carts, and what have you), then  (eventually!) into the flight deck. Now add the not inconceivable dimension of an aircraft that, in said emergency, might not be flying along smoothly in level cruise. Good luck!

[Photo Source]

Air New Zealand identifies those lost in the A320 crash off the coast of France

Air New Zealand has officially identified the five New Zealanders who are presumed to have lost their lives in the crash of an Airbus A320 off the coast of France, on November 27, 2008.

The aircraft, owned by Air New Zealand, had been leased to XL Airways Germany for the past two years, and was about to be returned to Air New Zealand. Immediately prior to yesterday's crash, the accident aircraft had been performing an acceptance flight (as Flight GXL 888T), and was about to be ferried to Frankfurt where it would be officially handed over to Air New Zealand.

According to information provided by the airline, the five New Zealanders on board were:

• Capt. Brian Horrell, 52, Air New Zealand pilot from Auckland
• Murray White, 37, Air New Zealand engineer from Auckland
• Michael Gyles, 49, Air New Zealand engineer from Christchurch
• Noel Marsh, 35, Air New Zealand engineer from Christchurch
• Jeremy Cook, New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority inspector

The names of the two XL Airways crew members who were piloting the aircraft have not yet been made public.

The most recent media statement about the accident issued by Air New Zealand says, in part:

French authorities have now advised Air New Zealand that it should not expect there to be any survivors after its Airbus A320 that was on lease to XL Airways of Germany was lost in the Mediterranean yesterday.

Group General Manager International Airline Ed Sims says rescue authorities have told the airline it appears the aircraft broke up on impact and there was no realistic chance of survivors.

"This is devastating news for the families and all Air New Zealanders as we had all been clinging on to hope. Sadly, rescue authorities have told us that all evidence on site indicates that given the nature of the impact there is no chance of survivors. Debris is spread over a large area and it appears the aircraft is not in large pieces as originally indicated by those who saw the impact," Mr Sims says.

Earlier today, French search and rescue authorities advised Air New Zealand that they had identified locator signals from the two 'black box' flight recorders from accident aircraft. They are not expected to be recovered until tomorrow due to deteriorating weather conditions.

Condolences to the families, colleagues and friends of all seven individuals who were lost in this tragic accident.

Airbus A320 ferry flight ends in the Mediterranean Sea, off France

An Airbus A320 owned by Air New Zealand has been lost in the Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of France. The accident happened on November 27, 2008, at approximately 17:00 local time. The downed aircraft has been located a little over 3 nautical miles offshore, resting in about 30 meters of water, according to several news reports from France. There were seven people on board. At this writing, the remains of three have been recovered, while the fate of the others is not yet known.

The aircraft, which had been leased for the past two years to XL Airways Germany, had been undergoing maintenance by EAS Industries at Perpignan, France in preparation for its return to Air New Zealand. According to a media release issued a short time ago by Air New Zealand, the aircraft was being flown from Perpignan to Frankfurt "where it was due to be handed back to Air New Zealand for a ferry flight back to New Zealand."

One news article about the accident suggests that the crew may have been attempting to ditch, reporting, "The spokesman for XL said the plane tried to make an emergency landing on the sea."

Reports say that the aircraft was being flown by two XL Airways pilots. Also on board were a senior captain and three engineers from Air New Zealand, and an official of the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority. Names of those on board have not been released.

UPDATE Nov. 28, 2008: Today, Air New Zealand officially identified the five New Zealanders who were on board the accident aircraft. The names of the two XL Airways pilots have not yet been made public.

French authorities have identified locator signals from both the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) from the downed A320, but have not yet been able to retrieve them due to poor weather conditions at the accident sit.

UPDATE Dec. 1, 2008: The Air New Zealand Public Affairs Office reports that both the DFDR and the CVR have now been recovered from the sea, however they add that "it is now clear both it and the cockpit voice recorder have been badly damaged. These will be sent to manufacturer Honeywell in North America to determine what data can be extracted."

UPDATE Jan. 12, 2009: FlightGlobal.com is reporting today that investigators have succeeded in retrieving data from the aircraft's flight recorders. After the French Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA) was unable to access data from either device, they were sent to Honeywell, the manufacturer. Honeywell was able to recover data from both recorders, and the BEA are beginning analysis.

ATSB Preliminary Report on the In-Flight Upset of Qantas Flight QF72 in October

A Preliminary Report has just been released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in regard to the in-flight upset of Qantas Flight QF72 on October 7, 2008. Readers will recall that on that date the Airbus A330-300 aircraft was en route from Singapore to Perth, Australia with 10 crew and 303 passengers on board, when it experienced two successive uncommanded pitch-down events. A number of individuals in the passenger cabin were seriously injured. The aircraft diverted to Learmonth, Western Australia, where it made an emergency landing.

About a week after the accident, the ATSB reported that early analysis of the accident aircraft's Flight Data Recorder data, Post Flight Report data and Built-in Test Equipment revealed that an Inertial Reference System fault had occurred within the Number-1 Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU 1). Today's report elaborates further on that finding, and also reports on the overall progress of the investigation, which is ongoing.

A summary of important points is contained in a media release issued by the ATSB in conjunction with the publication of the Preliminary Report. Here is a part of that summary:

Examination of flight data recorder information indicates that, at the time the autopilot disconnected, there was a fault in a flight computer system component known as the air data inertial reference unit number 1 (ADIRU 1) which resulted in a number of spurious spikes in ADIRU parameter values. Further spurious parameter spikes continued to influence a number of system failure indications throughout the flight, resulting in frequent failure messages being provided to the crew. The crew completed required actions in response to the messages, but these actions were not effective in removing the spikes or failure indications. The investigation team is continuing to examine the influence of the spikes in ADIRU parameters on the performance of the flight controls.

Most components on modern aircraft, including ADIRUs, are highly reliable and there has only been a small number of occasions where ADIRUs of different types made by varying manufacturers have had some form of failure. It is extremely rare for any such failures to have an effect on an aircrafts flight controls. The ATSB has previously investigated an in-flight upset related to ADIRU failure from a different manufacturer in a Boeing 777 which occurred in 2005 and was traced to a software fault. While a software fault has not been ruled out in the current investigation, it seems unlikely that the two events are linked.

Still ongoing:

• The three ADIRUs will be subject to comprehensive testing at the manufacturer's facilities in the US.
• Review of the ADIRUs' data monitoring capability and management of anomolous ADIRU data, including flight deck indications.
• Review of records of previous occurrences involving ADIRU failures (which did not result in in-flight upsets) and any occurrences where large numbers of spurious messages were generated.
• Subject to the results of the ADIRU testing, examination of other aircraft components may be conducted such as the three flight control primary computers and their software in order to understand why the fault in the ADIRU was able to be translated to flight control movements.

The report goes on to say that, although this is unlikely, possible external sources of electromagnetic interference are being explored and assessed, "including from the Harold E. Holt very low frequency transmitter near Exmouth, WA and from portable electronic devices on board the aircraft."

The investigation of cabin safety issues related to this accident also is still underway. This includes interviews with the cabin crew and seriously injured passengers, and responses to questionnaires "seeking passenger observations during the upset events and asking questions in relation to the use of seatbelts, injuries and the use of personal electronic devices."

The ATSB also noted that a number of important safety actions have already been implemented arising from the investigation to date.

Here is the link to the entire document: AO-2008-070: Preliminary Report - ATSB, Nov. 14, 2008 (43-page 'pdf' file)

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flt QF 72 on Aircrew Buzz.

Qantas Airbus A380 inaugural commercial flight arrives at Los Angeles

Aviation history was made today as Qantas became the first airline to operate a commercial passenger flight on the Airbus A380 between Australia and the US West Coast. The new A380 'superjumbo' aircraft, operating as Qantas Flight QF 93 landed on Runway 25L at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) early this morning, October 20, 2008, after a scheduled flight from Melbourne, Australia. The flight was met at LAX by celebrities and government officials, including actor John Travolta, Australian singer Olivia Newton-John and Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, among others.

Qantas took delivery of its first A380 (registration number VH-OQA) last month. The aircraft is powered by four Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines, and is configured with 450 seats in four cabins. On the main deck are 14 first class suites, and 332 economy seats. The upper deck has 72 business class seats, plus 32 premium economy seats.

Today's flight was the Qantas A380's first scheduled passenger service. Later this week, on October 24, 2008, the new aircraft will be used for the first time on the Sydney-Los Angeles route.

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Systems fault identified in Qantas Flight QF72 in-flight upset accident

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) held another media conference earlier today to provide new details in the progress of its investigation of the Qantas Flight QF72 in-flight upset. In today's media conference, the ATSB described the role a faulty Air Data Inertial Reference Unit played in the accident involving the Airbus A330-300 aircraft.

To review briefly, the accident occurred on October 7, 2008, while Qantas Flight QF72 was en route from Singapore to Perth, Australia with 303 passengers and 10 crew on board. While in cruise at 37,000 ft., the pilots received electronic centralized aircraft monitoring messages in the cockpit relating to some irregularity with the aircraft's elevator control system, and the aircraft departed level flight. According to the ATSB, "the aircraft climbed about 200 feet from its cruising level of 37,000 feet, the aircraft then pitched nose-down and descended about 650 feet in about 20 seconds, before returning to the cruising level. This was closely followed by a further nose-down pitch where the aircraft descended about 400 feet in about 16 seconds before returning once again to the cruising level."

The in-flight upset injured dozens of people in the aircraft's cabin. The crew ultimately declared a MAYDAY and diverted to Learmonth, Australia where they made an emergency landing.

Systems Fault Identified

Today the ATSB update reported a preliminary sequence of events based on further analysis of the accident aircraft's Flight Data Recorder data, Post Flight Report data and Built-in Test Equipment. Quoting from the ATSB's October 14, 2008 statement:

The aircraft was flying at FL 370 or 37, 000 feet with Autopilot and Auto-thrust system engaged, when an Inertial Reference System fault occurred within the Number-1 Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU 1), which resulted in the Autopilot automatically disconnecting. From this moment, the crew flew the aircraft manually to the end of the flight, except for a short duration of a few seconds, when the Autopilot was reengaged. However, it is important to note that in fly by wire aircraft such as the Airbus, even when being flown with the Autopilot off, in normal operation, the aircrafts flight control computers will still command control surfaces to protect the aircraft from unsafe conditions such as a stall.

The faulty Air Data Inertial Reference Unit continued to feed erroneous and spike values for various aircraft parameters to the aircrafts Flight Control Primary Computers which led to several consequences including:

• false stall and overspeed warnings
• loss of attitude information on the Captain's Primary Flight Display
• several Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring system warnings.

About 2 minutes after the initial fault, ADIRU 1 generated very high, random and incorrect values for the aircrafts angle of attack.

These very high, random and incorrect values of the angle attack led to:

• the flight control computers commanding a nose-down aircraft movement, which resulted in the aircraft pitching down to a maximum of about 8.5 degrees,
• the triggering of a Flight Control Primary Computer pitch fault.

The crew's timely response led to the recovery of the aircraft trajectory within seconds. During the recovery the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.

The Digital Flight Data Recorder data show that ADIRU 1 continued to generate random spikes and a second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with less significant values in terms of aircraft's trajectory.

At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates that the ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely as the origin of the event.

The ATSB officials went on to say that as far as they can understand, this appears to be a unique event and Airbus has advised that it is not aware of any similar event over the many years of operation of the Airbus.

Action by Airbus

Airbus has issued an Operators Information Telex reflecting the preliminary findings of the ATSB investigation of this accident. The ATSB anticipates that Airbus also will issue Operational Engineering Bulletins and provide "information relating to operational recommendations to operators of A330 and A340 aircraft fitted with the type of ADIRU fitted to the accident aircraft. Those recommended practices are aimed at minimising risk in the unlikely event of a similar occurrence. That includes guidance and checklists for crew response in the event of an Inertial Reference System failure."

ATSB Investigation Continues

The ATSB reported that its investigation is ongoing and will include:

• Download of data from the aircraft's three ADIRUs and detailed examination and analysis of that data. Arrangements are currently being made for the units to be sent to the component manufacturer's facilities in the US as soon as possible and for ATSB investigators to attend and help with that testing, along with representatives from the US National Transportation Safety Board, The French Bureau d'Enquêtes et dAnalyses (BEA) and Airbus.
• In addition, investigators have been conducting a detailed review of the aircraft's maintenance history, including checking on compliance with relevant Airworthiness Directives, although initial indications are that the aircraft met the relevant airworthiness requirements.
• Work is also ongoing to progress interviews, which will include with injured passengers to understand what occurred in the aircraft cabin. The ATSB plans to distribute a survey to all passengers.

The ATSB expects to publish a Preliminary Factual report in about 30 days from the date of the accident.

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Qantas takes delivery of its first Airbus A380

In a ceremony at the Airbus facility in Toulouse, France, on September 19, 2008, Australian airline Qantas took delivery of its first Airbus A380 'superjumbo' aircraft. The new aircraft (registration number VH-OQA) will become the Qantas flagship.

The new Qantas double-decker A380, which is powered by Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines, is configured with 450 seats. On the main deck are 14 first class suites, and 332 economy seats. The upper deck has 72 business class seats, plus 32 premium economy seats.

According to Qantas, features of the new A380 include:

• 14 single private suites in First Class featuring a 17 inch LCD wide screen video monitor, a unique touch screen control unit, and a seat (manufactured by B/E Aerospaces's VIP jet group) that swivels into a comfortable armchair and a fully flat, extra long and wide bed
• the next generation of Qantas' award-winning sleeper seat Skybed in Business Class, which now offers an extra long and fully flat bed with ergonomically enhanced cushioning, a larger in-arm entertainment screen, additional storage options and more privacy
• a private lounge area in the upper deck Business Class cabin featuring leather sofas, a self-service bar, large video monitor with laptop connectivity and a feature display cabinet
• Premium Economy seats by Recaro, with fully adjustable, in-arm, digital wide screen television monitors, and a self service bar dedicated to the upper deck Premium Economy cabin
• Recaro seats in Economy Class featuring a sliding base that moves with the seat back to create a more comfortable, ergonomically tested position to aid sleep and eliminate pressure points and a foot net to stop sliding during sleep
• four self-service bars in Economy Class
• state-of-the-art Panasonic inflight entertainment system with more than 100 on demand movies, 350 television selections, 500 audio CDs, 30 PC style games, and a selection of audio books, language tutorials, destination information, business education and radio channels
• in-seat laptop power and connectivity in every class allowing passengers to send and receive emails directly from their personal webmail and hotmail accounts via laptop or seat monitor

The first Qantas A380, named after Australian pioneer aviatrix Nancy-Bird Walton, aged 92, was scheduled to depart Toulouse at 23:55 and operate via Singapore to touch down in Sydney at 09:00 (AEST) on Sunday, September 21, 2008.

Nancy-Bird Walton will attend the official naming ceremony for the aircraft in Sydney on 30 September.

The new Qantas A380 will enter commercial service in October with an inaugural flight to Los Angeles.

In a Qantas news release about the delivery of the aircraft, the airline's Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Geoff Dixon, said the A380 symbolized a new era of travel for Qantas.

"No other airline has flown as far as Qantas for as long as Qantas, so we know very well the value of a well designed inflight product for long haul flights," said Dixon. "The A380, with its extra space, new materials and advanced technology, has given us the ideal platform to reinvent the inflight experience."

Qantas is the third airline to take delivery of an A380 for commercial passenger service. Singapore Airlines flew the first commercial A380 flight last October. In July of this year, Dubai-based Emirates Airline took delivery of its first A380, which made its inaugural flight on August 1.

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Emirates A380 grounded in Dubai

In late July, Emirates Airline took delivery of its first Airbus A-380 'superjumbo' aircraft, and immediately put it into service on the Dubai - New York route. The inaugural flight of the Emirates A380 took place on August 1, 2008. Now, just weeks after its launch, the huge double-decker passenger aircraft has been grounded by the Dubai-based carrier for at least a week.

Late last week, an article in the Arabian Business said that Emirates removed the plane from service because "scheduled engineering on the airline’s only operating A380 is taking longer than expected." Today an article about the grounding of the Emirates A380 on Flight International mentioned "unspecified electrical issues." More from Flight International:

The Dubai-based airline is not expecting to return the aircraft to flight operations until at least 12 September.

Engineers are working on an "electrical issue", says a spokesperson for the carrier, which was "noticed at the end of a training mission when the aircraft was parked in front of the hangars". The aircraft remains parked in Dubai.

Emirates is using Boeing 777-300ER aircraft on the Dubai-JFK route until the issues with the A380 are resolved.

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Singapore Airlines Airbus A380 completes 1,000th commercial flight

Last October, Singapore Airlines made history by operating the first-ever Airbus A380 commercial flight. Now, just shy of 10 months later, Singapore Airlines has completed its 1,000th flight with the A380, the world's largest passenger aircraft.

Singapore Airlines' 1,000th commercial A380 flight was Flight SQ 322, which departed from Singapore Changi Airport at 23:30 local time on August 4, 2008. The non-stop scheduled flight arrived at London Heathrow Airport at 06:00 local time on August 5, 2008.

According to Singapore Airlines, their five A380 aircraft have accumulated 8,500 flying hours to date, and have carried nearly 400,000 customers. The carrier is expected to take delivery of its sixth A380 next month. That aircraft is one of 14 more A380s that Singapore Airlines has on order from Airbus, with options on another six.

Singapore Airlines says that they have stepped up training for crew, so that more are qualified to operate the A380 in the coming years. To date, 140 pilots and 2,000 cabin crew have been trained to fly and serve onboard the aircraft.

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Airbus A380 requires new 'super' wake separation category

Now that the new Airbus A380 'superjumbo' aircraft has begun to fly in U.S. airspace, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) has issued an Operations Bulletin to inform pilots about the new wake separation category that the world's largest airliner has ushered in, requiring separation greater than that required behind the 'heavy' category.

Operations Bulletin 2008-05 issued by ALPA on August 1, 2008, notes that A380 pilots will use the designation 'super' after their call sign while in the airport terminal area. Air traffic controllers will not be allowed to apply visual separation standards to any aircraft following an A380 and will not issue a visual approach to the pilots of any aircraft following an A380.

The FAA separation standards for aircraft following an A380 are:

• En route: Small, large, and heavy behind an A380 - 5 miles
• Terminal: Small, large, and heavy behind an A380 - 10, 8, and 6 miles respectively

The ALPA bulletin points out that movement of the A380 both on the ground and within the terminal area may result in significant delays.

Pilots should report wake turbulence encounters involving any aircraft by filling out a NASA ASRS form and/or via their airline's Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP).

Emirates Airline began scheduled Airbus A380 service to New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) on August 1. Other airlines are expected to begin A380 service to San Francisco International Airport (SFO), Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), and Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) in the near future.

Emirates Airbus A380 Cabin Interior and Special Luxury Features

Yesterday Emirates took delivery of its first Airbus A380 aircraft. The double-decker 'superjumbo' aircraft is the first of 58 that Emirates has ordered from Airbus. The first Emirates Airbus A380 will make its inaugural flight on August 1, 2008, from Dubai to New York.

The cabin features of the huge new A380 are like nothing we have seen before. The first photo on this page shows the economy cabin, with seating for 399 passengers. The cabin has straight walls, designed to give the impression of increased spaciousness. Emirates says that this feature, combined with the advanced mood lighting system and noticeably quieter cabin, works to combat the effects of jetlag.

Of its A380 Economy Class, the carrier says, "More generous seats, wider aisles, Gourmet chef-prepared meals and the Emirates' personal touch mean passengers could be mistaken for thinking they've settled in the wrong cabin class."

That is, unless they get a peek at the upper deck, which the airline bills as "a premium hotel in the sky," promising a level of comfort and space never seen before on a commercial airliner. The whole of the upper deck is dedicated to Premium Class passengers: 14 in First Class, and a 76 in Business Class.

The Business Class cabin, pictured at right, features "intelligent seating," designed to ensure all seats have aisle access. Emirates says, "There's a cleverly designed table that never gets in your way, a seat that slickly becomes a fully-flat bed, and laptop stowage..."

The upper deck of the new Emirates A380 also has an Onboard Lounge. Located in the Business Class cabin for use by First and Business Class passengers, the Lounge "is designed to make passengers feel like they are in their own executive club." Another First Class social area and bar is located at the front of the upper deck.

In the forward section of the upper deck are 14 flat-bed, massage-equipped Private Suites for First Class passengers. The suites include remote controlled doors, a work desk, an electrically controlled mini-bar and the most advanced in-flight entertainment system available.

The First Class feature on the Emirates A380 that is getting the most media attention is the On Board Shower Spa -- two fully equipped bathrooms in its First Class cabins, including shower facilities. Emirates promised some special surprises with its A380 and this certainly is one of them. The airline refers to their A380's First Class Shower Spa as "the jewel in the aircraft's crown."

The Emirates A380 flights will be staffed by 24 Cabin Crew, dressed in their newly updated uniforms. All will have undergone intensive training on the aircraft at the new Emirates Crew Training College in Dubai.

There's a new twist, too. There will be additional staff on board whose job it is to keep things tidy on the huge A380. For the first time, Emirates has hired and trained "Cabin Service Assistants" for keeping the cabin -- including the Shower Spas -- immaculate. The presence of the Cabin Service Assistants will free the regular Cabin Crew to focus on cabin safety, and serving passengers. Now that is a revolutionary feature!

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