Near midair collision between US Airways A319 and Cargolux B747 at Anchorage

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) announced today that it has begun an investigation into a near midair collision between a commercial airliner and a widebody cargo plane at Anchorage a week ago. The incident involved an Airbus A319-100 operated by US Airways, and a Boeing B747-400 freighter operated by Cargolux. The A319 had 138 people on board; the freighter had a crew of two. No one was injured.

According to the NTSB, the incident occurred shortly after midnight on May 21, 2010. US Airways flight USA140 was arriving at Anchorage International Airport (ANC) from Phoenix, and Cargolux Airlines International flight CLX658 was departing ANC for Chicago-O'Hare. The US Airways plane was on approach to runway 14 at ANC when the crew executed a go-around. The Cargolux freighter was departing runway 25R. The NTSB says the two aircraft "came within an estimated 100 feet vertically and a .33 mile lateral separation."

From the NTSB statement announcing the investigation of the incident:

According to the TCAS report from the A319 crew, that aircraft was approaching ANC when, because of the effects of tailwinds on the aircraft's approach path, the crew initiated a missed approach and requested new instructions from air traffic control. The tower controller instructed the A319 to turn right heading 300 and report the departing B747 in sight.

After the A319 crew reported the B747 in sight, the controller instructed the A319 to maintain visual separation from the B747, climb to 3000 feet, and turn right heading 320. The A319 crew refused the right turn because the turn would have put their flight in direct conflict with the B747.

The A319 crew then received a resolution advisory to "monitor vertical speed" and the crew complied with the descent command. During the descent, the A319 crew lost sight of the B747. At about 1700 feet above ground level, the A319 crew received a "clear of conflict" aural command.

The NTSB notes that the incident occurred in night visual meteorological conditions with 10 miles of visibility.

Reviewing the NTSB's 'Most Wanted List' for aviation safety improvements

by B. N. Sullivan

We all know that the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) publishes a 'Most Wanted List' of desired transportation safety improvements, but when was the last time you had a look at that list? I admit, I hadn't reviewed the Most Wanted List in well over a year, so I recently visited the NTSB's Web site to have a look at the current version.

For your edification, here are the items on the current (2009-2010) NTSB Most Wanted List for Aviation:

Improve Oversight of Pilot Proficiency

• Evaluate prior flight check failures for pilot applicants before hiring.
• Provide training and additional oversight that considers full performance histories for flight crewmembers demonstrating performance deficiencies.

Require Image Recorders

• Install crash-protected image recorders in cockpits to give investigators more information to solve complex accidents.

Improve the Safety of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Flights

• Conduct all flights with medical personnel on board in accordance with stricter commuter aircraft regulations.
• Develop and implement flight risk evaluation programs for EMS operators.
• Require formalized dispatch and flight-following procedures including up-to-date weather information.
• Install terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) on aircraft used for EMS operations.

Improve Runway Safety

• Give immediate warnings of probable collisions/incursions directly to flight crews in the cockpit.
• Require specific air traffic control (ATC) clearance for each runway crossing.
• Require operators to install cockpit moving map displays or an automatic system that alerts pilots when a takeoff is attempted on a taxiway or a runway other than the one intended.
• Require a landing distance assessment with an adequate safety margin for every landing.

Reduce Dangers to Aircraft Flying in Icing Conditions

• Use current research on freezing rain and large water droplets to revise the way aircraft are designed and approved for flight in icing conditions.
• Apply revised icing requirements to currently certificated aircraft.
• Require that airplanes with pneumatic deice boots activate the boots as soon as the airplane enters icing conditions.

Improve Crew Resource Management

• Require commuter and on-demand air taxi flight crews to receive crew resource management training.

Reduce Accidents and Incidents Caused by Human Fatigue in the Aviation Industry

• Set working hour limits for flight crews, aviation mechanics, and air traffic controllers based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms, and sleep and rest requirements.
• Develop a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program for controllers and those who schedule them for duty.
• Develop guidance for operators to establish fatigue management systems, including a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of these systems.

The NTSB has the notation "Acceptable response,progressing slowly," on the runway safety and crew resource management (CRM) items. On all the other items is the notation "Unacceptable response," even though some of these requests have populated the Most Wanted List for quite a number of years. For example, the Runway Safety item has been on the list continuously since the list's inception in 1990 (although it was titled 'Runway Incursions' until November of 2007). CRM for Part 135 operators has been on the list since November of 2006.

Some of the fatigue-related items have been on the Most Wanted List since May, 1995, although air traffic controller fatigue was not specifically mentioned until November, 2007.

The newest item on the Most Wanted List for aviation, Improve Oversight of Pilot Proficiency, was just added in February of this year.

Since the NTSB has no regulatory power, it can only request these safety measures. It is up to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to act upon the advice of the NTSB and create new regulations that would result in improvements to aviation safety.

Visit this page on the NTSB's Web site for more information about the Most Wanted List (including Highway, Marine and Rail issues, as well as Aviation).

Take your kid to work day -- on a live radio at an ATC tower??

by B. N. Sullivan

I'm not big on writing about scandals, but this item really bothers me. Boston's Fox 25 ran an article today about a child communicating instructions to aircraft over an air traffic control frequency at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport.

Think I'm joking? Check out this audio clip:

Yes, it's authentic. Fox 25 reports:

The FAA is certainly taking the matter seriously.

They have confirmed for FOX 25 that the recording we have with a child directing airplanes is an authentic recording from the JFK tower and an investigation is now underway.

The Fox 25 piece points out that the child appears to be supervised (!!) and that "the pilots respond enthusiastically" to him. Indeed, the kid does sound cute and precocious, but it's just not funny.

At one point in the audio, an adult voice is heard to say, "That's what you get guys when the kids are out of school. (laugh)"

Um, no. Just because the pilots on the other side of the conversation were good-natured about it doesn't make it right.

Fox 25 published this statement from the FAA:

Pending the outcome of our investigation, the employees involved in this incident are not controlling air traffic. This behavior is not acceptable and does not demonstrate the kind of professionalism expected from all FAA employees.

And this one from 'the union that represents air traffic controllers' [presumably NATCA]:

We do not condone this type of behavior in any way, and it is not indicative of the highest professional standards that controllers set for themselves and exceed each and every day in the advancement of aviation safety.

Taking your kid to work is one thing. Letting your kid pose as an air traffic controller, even briefly, is quite another. I have a feeling that we may be hearing a lot more more about this incident.

UPDATE Mar. 3, 2010: The FAA addressed this incident this morning with the following statement, issued as a press release:

The Federal Aviation Administration announced today that two employees at John F. Kennedy Airport Tower are on administrative leave following an incident last month when a child was permitted to talk with pilots on an air traffic control frequency.

“This lapse in judgment not only violated FAA’s own policies, but common sense standards for professional conduct. These kinds of distractions are totally unacceptable,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “We have an incredible team of professionals who safely control our nation’s skies every single day. This kind of behavior does not reflect the true caliber of our workforce.”

The two JFK Tower employees, a supervisor and an air traffic controller, are on administrative leave pending the outcome of an official FAA investigation into the incident which is already underway.

In addition, all unofficial visits to FAA air traffic control operational areas, such as towers and radar rooms, will be suspended during the investigation. The FAA Administrator has directed a team to conduct a full-scale review of air traffic control policies and procedures related to facility visitors.

Northwest pilots who overflew Minneapolis tell NTSB they were engrossed, using laptops

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has just released a statement regarding its continuing investigation of the Northwest Airlines flight that overflew its destination last week after being out of radio contact with air traffic control for a period of time. The incident occurred on October 21, 2009. Northwest Airlines Flight 188, an Airbus A320, eventually resumed radio contact, turned around and landed safely -- albeit late -- at Minneapolis, its intended destination. The incident has garnered enormous media attention, so today's factual update from the NTSB is welcome.

Here is the actual text of today's NTSB advisory about Northwest Flight 188:

In its continuing investigation of an Airbus A320 that overflew the Minneapolis-St Paul International/Wold-Chamberlain Airport (MSP), the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:

On Wednesday, October 21, 2009, at 5:56 pm mountain daylight time, an Airbus A320, operating as Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 188, became a NORDO (no radio communications) flight at 37,000 feet. The flight was operating as a Part 121 flight from San Diego International Airport, San Diego, California (SAN) to MSP with 144 passengers, 2 pilots and 3 flight attendants.

Both pilots were interviewed separately by NTSB investigators yesterday in Minnesota. The following is an overview of the interviews:

• The first officer and the captain were interviewed for over 5 hours combined.
• The Captain, 53 years old, was hired in 1985. His total flight time is about 20,000 hours, about 10,000 hours of A-320 time of which about 7,000 was as pilot in command.
• The First Officer, 54 years old, was hired in 1997. His total flight time is about 11,000 hours, and has about 5,000 hours on the A-320.
• Both pilots said they had never had an accident, incident or violation.
• Neither pilot reported any ongoing medical conditions.
• Both pilots stated that they were not fatigued. They were both commuters, but they had a 19-hour layover in San Diego just prior to the incident flight. Both said they did not fall asleep or doze during the flight.
• Both said there was no heated argument.
• Both stated there was a distraction in the cockpit. The pilots said there was a concentrated period of discussion where they did not monitor the airplane or calls from ATC even though both stated they heard conversation on the radio. Also, neither pilot noticed
  messages that were sent by company dispatchers. They were discussing the new monthly crew flight scheduling system that was now in place as a result of the merger. The discussion began at cruise altitude.
• Both said they lost track of time.
• Each pilot accessed and used his personal laptop computer while they discussed the airline crew flight scheduling procedure. The first officer, who was more familiar with the procedure was providing instruction to the captain. The use of personal computers on the flight deck is prohibited by company policy.
• Neither pilot was aware of the airplane's position until a flight attendant called about 5 minutes before they were scheduled to land and asked what was their estimated time of arrival (ETA). The captain said, at that point, he looked at his primary flight display for an ETA and realized that they had passed MSP. They made contact with ATC and were given vectors back to MSP.
• At cruise altitude - the pilots stated they were using cockpit speakers to listen to radio communications, not their headsets.
• When asked by ATC what the problem was, they replied "just cockpit distraction" and "dealing with company issues".
• Both pilots said there are no procedures for the flight attendants to check on the pilots during flight.

The Safety Board is interviewing the flight attendants and other company personnel today. Air traffic control communications have been obtained and are being analyzed.

Preliminary data from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed the following:

• The CVR recording was 1/2 hour in length.
• The cockpit area microphone channel was not working during this recording. However, the crew's headset microphones recorded their conversations.
• The CVR recording began during final approach, and continued while the aircraft was at the gate.
• During the hours immediately following the incident flight, routine aircraft maintenance provided power to the CVR for a few minutes on several occasions, likely recording over several minutes of the flight.

The FDR captured the entire flight which contained several hundred aircraft parameters including the portion of flight where there was no radio communication from the flight crew. Investigators are examining the recorded parameters to see if any information regarding crew activity during the portion of flight where radio contact was lost can be obtained.

The Safety Board's investigation continues.

So, no sleeping, napping or nodding off; no claim of fatigue; no 'heated discussion' or argument -- just two well-rested, very experienced pilots losing situational awareness for an extended period of time because of crew scheduling issues? (Makes you wonder: Just how complex is that bidding system, anyway?)

This story just gets 'curioser and curioser' and leaves so many questions still unanswered. How did they miss the handoff from Denver Center to Minneapolis Center? How could they not have noticed any ACARS messages or SELCAL communications? And so on...

In any case, that's all of the official information for now, folks! Stay tuned for future developments.

UPDATE: Delta Air Lines (which now owns Northwest Airlines) made a public statement about the incident, saying that the two pilots "remain suspended until the conclusion of the investigations into this incident." Then came this elaboration:

Using laptops or engaging in activity unrelated to the pilots' command of the aircraft during flight is strictly against the airline's flight deck policies and violations of that policy will result in termination.

Probable translation: "Those two pilots are SO fired..."

Northwest pilots lose situational awareness, overfly destination

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating an incident in which a Northwest Airlines A320 aircraft overflew its destination by approximately 150 miles. The two pilots attributed the incident to a loss of situational awareness due to engaging in a 'heated discussion', according to a press release issued by The NTSB.

From the NTSB:

On Wednesday, October 21, 2009, at 5:56 pm mountain daylight time, an Airbus A320, N03274, operating as Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 188, became a NORDO (no radio communications) flight at 37,000 feet.

The flight was operating as a Part 121 flight from San Diego International Airport, San Diego, California (SAN) to MSP with 147 passengers and unknown number of crew.

At 7:58 pm central daylight time (CDT), the aircraft flew over the destination airport and continued northeast for approximately 150 miles. The MSP center controller reestablished communications with the crew at 8:14 pm and reportedly stated that the crew had become distracted and had overflown MSP, and requested to return to MSP.

According to the Federal Administration (FAA) the crew was interviewed by the FBI and airport police. The crew stated they were in a heated discussion over airline policy and they lost situational awareness. The Safety Board is scheduling an interview with the crew.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) have been secured and are being sent to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, DC.

An article about the incident on the Wall Street Journal Web site suggested that the incident was "a possible case of pilots nodding off at the controls." Presumably an analysis of the CVR contents will clear up whether the pilots were indeed arguing, or whether the cockpit was silent during the period of no radio contact.

UPDATE: The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has issued a statement about actions they took regarding the "unresponsive aircraft".

Fighters from two North American Aerospace Defense Command sites were put on alert yesterday for a Northwest Airlines commercial airliner that was not responding to radio calls from the Federal Aviation Administration. Before the fighters could get airborne, FAA re-established communications with the pilots of the Northwest Airlines commercial airliner and subsequently, the NORAD fighters were ordered to stand down. NORAD does not discuss locations of alerts sites.

UPDATE Oct. 23, 2009: This could be bad news for the investigation of this incident: A new NTSB press release mentions, "The 30 minute solid-state Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) captured a portion of the flight that is being analyzed." If the portion of the flight that the CVR captured is the final 30 minutes, it may not be able to resolve what was happening on the flight deck (and what was not) during the period of radio silence.

---

Related:

• Northwest pilots who overflew Minneapolis tell NTSB they were engrossed, using laptops - AircrewBuzz.com, Oct. 26, 2009
• FAA revokes licenses of Northwest Airlines 'laptop pilots' - AircrewBuzz.com, Oct. 27, 2009
• Northwest Flight 188 incident: ATC audio and transcripts released by FAA - AircrewBuzz.com, Nov. 27, 2009
• Northwest Flight 188 incident: Pilots' appeal documents - AircrewBuzz.com, Dec. 10, 2009

FAA plans to restructure New York City airspace and operating rules

by B.N. Sullivan

Back in mid-August, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) convened a New York Airspace Working Group to review current operating procedures over the Hudson and East Rivers and recommend safety improvements. Today FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt announced that the task force had developed a comprehensive series of recommendations that the FAA plans to implement immediately.

According to the FAA, the new safety enhancements would restructure the airspace, mandate pilot operating rules, create a new entry point into the Hudson River airspace from Teterboro, standardize New York area charts and develop new training for pilots, air traffic controllers and businesses that operate helicopters and aircraft in the area.

One change under consideration is to divide the airspace into altitude corridors that separate aircraft flying over the river from those operating to and from local heliports or seaplane bases. This new exclusionary zone would be comprised of three components:

• It would establish a uniform “floor” for the Class B airspace over the Hudson River at 1,300 feet, which would also serve as the “ceiling” for the exclusionary zone.
• Between 1,300-2,000 feet, it would require aircraft to operate in the Class B airspace under visual flight rules but under positive air traffic control, and to communicate on the appropriate air traffic frequency.
• Between 1,000-1,300 feet, it would require aircraft using VFR to use a common radio frequency for the Hudson River. Aircraft operating below 1,000 feet would use the same radio frequency.

Pilots will be required to use specific radio frequencies for the Hudson River and the East River. Under the proposed new rules, operating speeds will be set at 140 knots or less, pilots will be required to turn on anti-collision devices, position or navigation equipment and landing lights. Pilots also will be required to announce when they enter the area and to report their aircraft description, location, direction and altitude.

The practice of flying along the west shore of the river when southbound and along the east shore when northbound will become mandatory. In addition, the FAA will require that pilots have charts available and be familiar with the airspace rules.

From the FAA press release announcing the proposed changes:

The FAA also intends to propose standardized procedures for fixed-wing aircraft leaving Teterboro to enter the Class B airspace over the Hudson River or the exclusionary zone. If an aircraft plans to enter the Class B airspace, Teterboro controllers would request approval from Newark before the aircraft takes off and be authorized to climb the aircraft to 1,500 feet. Aircraft that want to enter the VFR exclusionary zone would be directed by a special route over the George Washington Bridge.

The FAA expects to complete and publish any changes in time to have them in effect by November 19, so that they can be incorporated on new, standardized aeronautical charts that will replace existing charts. The charts will highlight the Class B VFR corridor, encouraging more pilots to exercise the option to fly over the Hudson River under air traffic control, instead of entering the congested exclusionary zone.

Finally, the FAA intends to develop training programs specifically tailored for pilots, air traffic controllers and fixed-base operators to increase awareness of the options available in the Hudson River airspace, and better develop plans that enhance safety for the intended flight.

“These steps will significantly enhance safety in this busy area and create crystal-clear rules for all of the pilots who operate there,” said Babbitt.

Business Jet Safety Research: A new report from the UK

The UK's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has published an important Business Jet Safety Research report that should be of great interest to operators of business aircraft as well as to the crews who fly them.    This new report  is based on an analysis of worldwide accident data, supplemented by externally contracted research that entailed industry visits and a questionnaire about safety issues sent to business jet operators and pilots.

The Business Jet Safety Research report first presents findings from the analysis of accident data.  The second part of the report discusses the findings in terms of various safety issues, and presents a series of recommendations.

Data Analysis

The CAA's analysis of accident data for the eight-year period covering 2000 through 2007 revealed that business jets appeared to be involved in a disproportionate number of fatal accidents, compared to commercially operated large western-built jets and turboprops.  Notably, the analysis also showed that more than one third of fatal business jet accidents involved ferry or positioning flights.  

Also highlighted was an apparent difference in fatal accident rates between corporate operators and air taxi operators.  The fatal accident rate for air taxi operators was substantially higher than for corporate operations.   The report suggests that a significant factor behind the far better safety record of the corporate operators in comparison to air taxi operators hinges on their adoption of industry 'best practice' standards, such as the International Business Aviation Council's 'International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations' (IS-BAO).

The CAA report recommends further study of air taxi operations in light of their much higher fatal accident rate.  The report implies that the impact of regulatory differences between the rules governing US (Part 135) and European (EU-OPS) air taxi operations also may be a fruitful area for further analysis.

Safety Issues and Recommendations

The Business Jet Safety Research report addresses four categories of safety issues:  flight crew training; regulator interaction; operational issues; and air traffic control.

Recommendations regarding flight crew training center on the use of simulators for recurrent training of pilots, and recording performance data to identify areas for improvement during training activities.  The report says:

Findings suggest that pilots might have have incomplete understanding or variable ability in areas such as use of auto-flight modes (particularly in relation to vertical guidance), energy management and poor weather operations. Limited use of simulation for recurrent training reduces opportunities for practice, lack of pre-course preparatory material reduces training effectiveness, and lack of training in additional duties peculiar to business jet operations may cause such tasks to distract pilots from primary flying tasks. There was concern regarding the limited ability of pilots to conduct safe flight without a serviceable FMS.

The report's section on regulator interaction focuses on difficulties operators experience in interfacing with regulatory agencies. Several recommendations for improving two-way communication between regulatory agencies and the business jet community are offered.

Operational issues identified in the report include flight crew fatigue/tiredness; commercial pressure, especially for air taxi operations; de-icing operations; SOP standardization, especially for small operators; runway length/performance issues; runway contamination; and poor reporting culture.  Recommendations include proposals for making aircrew fatigue evaluation software models available to business jet operators; and promoting the use of web-based training materials for poor weather operations, etc.

Safety issues related to air traffic control comprise the final section of the Business Jet Safety Research report. Analysis of ATC event data showed that business jets were involved in a disproportionate number of level busts, lateral non-compliance events, and runway incursions.  The report suggests that this may be due in part to suboptimal understanding of business jet safety issues on the part of ATC.

Questionnaire responses from the study indicated "a lack of ATC appreciation of business jet performance," particularly in regard to climb/descent rates and their relationship to speed restrictions. ATC difficulties for pilots were caused as well by late changes -- particularly departure clearances -- and the high level of radio transmissions during critical stages of flight.

The report recommends measures aimed at increasing ATC awareness of business jet safety and performance issues.

The full report -- titled Business Jet Safety Research: A Statistical Review and Questionnaire Study of Safety Issues Connected with Business Jets in the UK --  is available for download from the CAA website.  Here is the link:  CAA Paper 2009/03 - 56-page 'pdf' file

Chicago-O'Hare air traffic controller blamed for near mid-air collision

This past July, there was a near mid-air collision at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport between a departing American Eagle ERJ-145, and a Learjet LR60 that was arriving on an intersecting runway. No one was injured, and neither aircraft was damaged in the July 22, 2008 incident, but it was a very close call: according to ground radar (ASDE-X) analysis and radar replay, the LJ60 passed 325 feet above and slightly behind the departing E145. 

A 'probable cause' report issued recently by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) cites "[t]he LC-10 [Local Control] controller's failure to ensure the appropriate separation between two airplanes operating on runways where flight paths intersect" as the cause the incident.

Here is the timeline of events, from the NTSB report:

At 1243:09, the ORD tower local control 10 (LC-10) controller instructed the E145 pilots to taxi into position and hold on runway 32L at taxiway M. The LC-10 controller issued a wake turbulence advisory to the pilots and advised them to expect about a 2 1/2 minute delay before "we can getcha rollin". The E145 pilots acknowledged the clearance. The runway 32L/taxiway M intersection is approximately 8,800 feet from the runway 9R final approach path.

At 1244:57, the LJ60 pilot contacted the north local controller (NLC) and reported over Lance, the runway 9R outer marker, located about 4.1 nautical miles from the approach end of the runway. The NLC cleared the LJ60 pilots to land on runway 9R and advised them to "plan a left turn on runway 32R" during their landing roll. The LJ60 pilots acknowledged the clearance and repeated the exit information.

At 1245:27, the LC-10 controller cleared the E145 for takeoff stating, "...runway 32L at [taxiway] M, cleared for takeoff, turn right heading 330 [degrees]." The controller did not provide any information regarding the LJ60 that was about 2.5 miles from the runway 9R runway threshold. The E145 pilot acknowledged the takeoff clearance. At 1245:45, EGF298 commenced its takeoff roll.

According to the local monitor's statement, he recognized the potential conflict between the E145 and LJ60 and told the LC10 controller to advise the departing aircraft to stay low.

About 1246:13, when the LJ60 was about 3/4 of a mile from runway 9R, the NLC instructed the LJ60 pilots to "...go around maintain 4,000 [feet msl]." According to the LJ60 pilot-flying's (PF) statement, the pilot not flying observed the E145 on runway 32L and told the LJ60 pilot flying (PF) "Climb, climb, there is an MD80 on takeoff roll on [runway] 32R."

At 1246:19, the LC-10 controller advised the E145 pilots to "...stay low...stay low traffics above you."

At 1246:26, the ASDE-X data revealed that the closest recorded proximity occurred as the LJ60 passed about 150 feet laterally and about 325 feet above the E145. About 13 seconds later, the NLC instructed LJ60 pilots to "Turn right heading 140 [degrees], contact Chicago departure control on 127.4." The pilots acknowledged the clearance.

At 1246:27, the LC-10 controller instructed E145 pilots to "Climb and maintain 5 [thousand feet], sorry about that." A few seconds later, the pilots acknowledge the clearance.

At 1246:43, the E145 pilots said, "...it was interesting." About 19 seconds later, the LC-10 controller instructed the E145 pilots, "Contact Chicago departure 125.4." [NTSB ID: OPS08IA011A]

The report also includes statements from the pilots on both aircraft. The crew on the Lear spotted the ERJ nearly concurrently with the controller's go-around instruction. The PNF (pilot not flying) told the NTSB "...We never received a TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) advisory - either alert or resolution - during the go-around."

Meanwhile, the ERJ captain, who was the PF, said, "...As I called gear up after rotating, I see a Learjet at 11 o'clock converging directly with our flight path. I immediately leveled the aircraft at 200 feet above the runway to avoid a collision and maintained runway heading. The tower issued an alert to level off two seconds later, as the Lear [jet] passed directly over our cockpit. I am estimating 600 feet separation. The controller apologized."

The American Eagle first officer, who was the PNF, said, "...From my vantage point, all I saw was an aircraft directly above us moving left to right at no more than 200 feet of separation vertically. The Captain immediately initiated a level off at no more than 200 feet AGL until we were instructed to continue the climb. The tower apologized and continued working aircraft, handed us off to departure where the flight continued without further incident."

The NTSB report notes that "The LC10 position, located on the south side of the tower cab that has an external view of the runway 32L/9R intersections. The tower was equipped with digital radar and ASDE-X displays. ORD managers reported that the ASDE- X did not have crossing runway logic installed, and the ASDE-X did not alarm during the incident.

US Airways Flight 1549: The air traffic controller's story

Yesterday the the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, held a hearing about US Airways Flight 1549, the A320 that ditched in the Hudson River on January 15, 2009. Among those who testified was Patrick Harten, the New York TRACON air traffic controller who was handling departures from LaGuardia at the time of Flight 1549's emergency.

The crew members who were on board Flight 1549 have been interviewed by the media a number of times, and their stories about the accident have been widely circulated. Until yesterday, I don't think I had heard the air traffic controller's own riveting account of the emergency.

Mr. Harten's story, which is now part of the public record as Congressional testimony, is remarkable not only for the factual information it presents about the course of events, but also for the very personal and candid glimpse it provides into the situation of an air traffic controller who suddenly finds himself dealing with an imminent catastrophe.

Here is the complete, unedited text of Patrick Harten's written testimony, dated February 24, 2009:

Good morning Chairman Costello and Ranking Member Petri. My name is Patrick Harten.

I have been an air traffic controller at the NY TRACON and a proud member of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association for the past 10 years.

While January 15, 2009 is forever etched in my memory, it began unremarkably. I arrived at work at 12:30pm to begin my eight-hour shift.

At 3:12 PM I was assigned to work the LaGuardia (LGA) departure RADAR position. This position handles all departures from LGA airport.

At 3:25 PM, the LGA tower controller advised me that Cactus 1549 was the next departure rolling for takeoff.

It was a routine westbound departure off of Runway 4 traveling due north on a 360 degree heading and climbing to 5,000 feet.

I instructed Cactus to climb to 15,000 and turned my attention to give instructions to another aircraft under my control.

I then turned back to Cactus 1549 and instructed him to turn left to heading 270, heading the aircraft towards its destination. That is when the Captain advised me that they suffered a bird strike, lost thrust in both engines, and needed to return to LGA for an emergency landing.

When a pilot tells a controller he needs to make an emergency landing, the controller must act quickly and decisively.

I made a split second decision to offer him Runway 13, which was the closest runway to his current position and turned him left at a 220 heading so he could return to the airport.

I then immediately contacted LGA tower to ask them to stop departures and clear the runways for an emergency return.

While I have worked 10 or 12 emergencies over the course of my career, I have never worked an aircraft with zero thrust capabilities. I understood how grave this situation was.

After I gave him his instructions, the Captain very calmly stated: “We’re unable.”

I quickly vectored an aircraft that was still in my airspace and then gave 1549 a second option: land on LGA Runway 31.

Again the Captain said, “Unable.”

I then asked the Captain what he needed to do to land safely. At this point, my job was to coordinate and arrange for the pilot to be able to do whatever was necessary.

The pilot told me that he could not land on any runway at LGA, but asked if he could land in New Jersey and suggested Teterboro.

I had experienced working traffic into TEB from my time working in the EWR sector and after coordinating with the controllers in TEB, we were able to determine that Runway 1 was the best option. It was the arrival runway, and clearing it for an emergency landing would be easier and faster. It also meant that 1549 would be landing into the wind, which could have assisted the pilot in making a safe landing. I called TEB and explained the situation. The controller at TEB reacted quickly and prepared Runway 1 for the emergency landing.

I then instructed the Captain to turn right on a 280 heading to land on Runway 1.

The Captain replied: “We can’t do it.”

I replied immediately, “Which runway would you like at Teterboro?”

The captain replied: “We’re gonna be in the Hudson.”

I asked him to repeat himself, even though I heard him just fine. I simply could not wrap my mind around those words. People don’t survive landings on the Hudson River; I thought it was his own death sentence. I believed at that moment, I was going to be the last person to talk to anyone on that plane alive.

I then lost radio contact with 1549, and the target disappeared from my radar screen as he dropped below the tops of the New York City skyscrapers. I was in shock. I was sure the plane had gone down.

Less than a minute later, 1549 flickered back onto my radar scope. The aircraft was at a very low altitude, but its return to radar coverage meant that there was a possibility 1549 had regained the use of one of its engines.

Grasping at that tiny glimmer of hope, I told 1549 that it could land at EWR seven miles away on Runway 29, but I received no response. I then lost radar contact again, this time for good.

I was relieved from my position a few minutes later, as soon as it was possible. I was in no position to continue to work air traffic. It was the lowest low I had ever felt. I wanted to talk to my wife. But I knew if I tried to speak or even heard her voice, I would fall apart completely.

I settled for a hasty text message: “Had a Crash. Not ok. Can’t talk now.” When I got home, she told me she thought I had been in a car accident. Truth was I felt like I’d been hit by a bus.

It took six hours before I could leave the facility. I had to review the tapes, fill out paperwork and make an official statement.

It may sound strange, but for me the hardest and most traumatic part of the entire event was when it was over.

During the emergency itself, I was hyper-focused. I had no choice but to think and act quickly, and remain calm. But when it was over, it hit me hard. It felt like hours before I learned about the heroic water landing that Captain Sullenberger and his crew had managed. Even after I learned the truth, I could not shake the image of tragedy in my mind. Every time I saw the survivors on the television, I imagined grieving widows.

It has taken over a month for me to be able to see that I did a good job; I was flexible and responsive, I listened to what the pilot said and made sure to give him the tools he needed. I stayed calm and in control.

I return to work this week, and while it may take time for me to regain my old confidence; I know I will get there. I would like to end by personally recognizing the Captain and crew of Flight 1549 for their professionalism, skill and heroic efforts that day. I also would like to recognize the professionalism of the other controllers who helped clear the skies and the runways for 1549, as well as the engineers, who helped ensure that the aircraft itself could survive the landing in the Hudson and that those inside would be safe.

Finally, I want to thank my wife Regina. She has been my rock these past few weeks—as she always has and always will be. I couldn’t have survived this without her.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am prepared to answer any questions you have.

Thank you, Patrick Harten, for telling your side of the story so compellingly well.

Related:

• US Airways Flight 1549: Congressional testimony by crew members and ATC - AircrewBuzz.com, Feb. 24, 2009
• What Capt. 'Sully' Sullenberger told Congress today - AircrewBuzz.com, Feb. 24, 2009
• What US Airways pilot Jeff Skiles told Congress today - AircrewBuzz.com, Feb. 24, 2009

Click here to view all posts about US Airways Flt 1549 on Aircrew Buzz.

US Airways Flight 1549: Congressional testimony by crew members and ATC

Crew members from US Airways Flight 1549, which ditched in the Hudson River in New York on January 15, 2008, testified at a hearing this morning before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives. All five crew members from US Airways Flight 1549 were present at the hearings: Captain Chesley B. Sullenberger III; First Officer Jeffrey B. Skiles; and Flight Attendants Sheila Dail, Doreen Welsh, and Donna Dent. New York TRACON air traffic controller Patrick Harten, who was handling Flight 1549 at the time of the emergency also testified.

Both of the pilots from US Airways Flight 1549 submitted prepared statements to the Committee, as did Mr. Harten. Copies of their written testimony, as well as that of other witnesses at the hearings, are available for download from the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee website.

Here are the direct links to individual statements of the pilots, and the TRACON controller:

• Chesley B. Sullenberger, III, Captain - 3 page 'pdf' file
• Jeffrey B. Skiles, First Officer - 3-page 'pdf' file
• Patrick Harten, Air Traffic Controller - 4-page 'pdf' file

Each statement presents an important point of view. Successive posts here on Aircrew Buzz will feature excerpts from their testimony.

Related:

• What Capt. 'Sully' Sullenberger told Congress today - AircrewBuzz.com, Feb. 24, 2009
• What US Airways pilot Jeff Skiles told Congress today - AircrewBuzz.com, Feb. 24, 2009
• US Airways Flight 1549: The air traffic controller's story - AircrewBuzz.com, Feb. 25, 2009

Click here to view all posts about US Airways Flt 1549 on Aircrew Buzz.

Aircraft separation incident blamed on San Juan CERAP controllers

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued a very brief probable cause report on an aircraft separation incident that occurred over the Atlantic Ocean, north of San Juan, Puerto Rico, in August of 2008. The NTSB's investigation of the incident concluded that "the San Juan CERAP controllers failure to ensure the two aircraft were properly separated using non-radar separation standards."

The NTSB report recounts the incident, as follows:

On August 28, 2008, at approximately 1837 Atlantic standard time, Russian Registered Transaero flight 554, a Boeing 744, and Delta Airlines flight 845, a Boeing 738, came within zero feet vertical and 1 minute lateral separation (15 minutes is required in non-radar environment) at FL330 179N San Juan, PR. Transaero 554 descended 200-300 feet due to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution alert. [NTSB ID: OPS08IA014B]

As reported soon after the incident here on Aircrew Buzz, the Transaero Boeing 747-400, operating as Flight TSO 554, was en route from Moscow Domodedovo International Airport to Punta Cana International Airport in the Dominican Republic. The Delta Air Lines Boeing 737-800, operating as Flight DAL 485, was en route from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New york to Piarco International Airport in Trinidad.

The San Juan CERAP (Combined En Route Radar Approach Control) is the only such facility in the Caribbean.

FAA releases ATC audio related to the US Airways Flight 1549 accident

This morning the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released eight ATC audio recordings related to the ditching of US Airways Flight 1549 in the Hudson River in New York on January 15, 2009. All of the recordings and related transcripts are available for download from the FAA website:

USAirways 1549 (AWE1549), January 15, 2009, FAA Air Traffic Control Communications

All of the audio recordings are MP3 files, but be warned that some file sizes are rather large, and since they are unedited, some have a long run time (more than 40 min). The transcripts are PDF files.

Communications between the flight crew of 'Cactus 1549' and ATC are on the New York TRACON audio. Other audio files provide insight into what was going on and being said on the ground at LaGuardia and Teterboro during the emergency.

The Class Bravo Airspace Position audio records conversations between ATC and some helicopter pilots who saw the A320 splash down in the Hudson. They reported its position abeam of the USS Intrepid, and that the aircraft was afloat and rafts were being deployed.

On the Cab Coordinator Position audio, you can hear someone from the Port Authority say, "we got survivors, we got survivors, alright they're picking 'em up," and then, "there are numerous survivors... the plane's still afloat."

As we know now, all 155 souls on board US Airways Flight 1549 did indeed survive.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about US Airways Flt 1549 on Aircrew Buzz.

Update on the Allentown airport runway near-collision in September

Th U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued an update on the near-collision between a regional jet and a small general aviation aircraft at Lehigh Valley International Airport, Allentown, PA, this past September. The update includes a time line of events, and a photo (at right) of the tire marks made by the jet as it swerved to avoid a collision with the smaller aircraft.

Readers will recall that on the evening of September 19, 2008, a Canadair CRJ-700 aircraft (registration N506MJ), operating as Mesa Air Shuttle Flight 7138, was preparing to depart Lehigh Valley International Airport (ABE) for a scheduled passenger service to Chicago. The CRJ aborted take off from runway 6 at ABE due to what the NTSB has classified as a runway incursion. According to factual information provided by the NTSB, the CRJ rejected takeoff at a speed of about 120 knots (138 mph), skidding around a Cessna R172K (registration N736GV) that had just landed and was still taxiing on the runway. The crew of the CRJ estimated the distance between the two aircraft as 10 feet when they passed.

The CRJ had four crew members and 56 passengers on board; the Cessna was carrying a pilot and two passengers. No injuries were reported, and neither aircraft was damaged.

Today the NTSB released an advisory that included the following timeline of the near-collision incident:

7:29:28 - Cessna contacts Allentown tower while about 8 miles east of the airport.

7:33:30 - Cessna, in landing pattern for runway, is cleared to land on runway 6.

7:34:50 - Mesa Air regional jet contacts tower and reports ready for takeoff and holding short of runway 6. Controller instructs pilot to hold short of runway 6 for landing traffic.

7:36:15 - Cessna crosses threshold of runway 6 and lands.

7:36:27 - Mesa Air instructed by tower controller to taxi into position on runway 6 and hold.

7:36:36 - Tower controller asks pilot of Cessna where he intends to park. Following pilot response, controller provides taxi directions, instructing pilot to exit runway
at taxiway A4.

7:37:11 - Mesa Air cleared for takeoff.

7:37:18 to 7:37:32 - Controller turns attention to an inbound aircraft and issues landing instructions.

7:37:34 - Cessna pilot informs tower controller that he had missed the A4 taxiway and asks for permission to exit at taxiway B.

7:37:42 - Controller replies, "...no delay, turn immediately," which Cessna pilot acknowledges.

7:38:16 - Mesa Air radios tower controller: "We got it, tower - we're going to need to go back to the gate."

Following the incident, both aircraft taxied to parking. The Mesa Air crew elected to cancel the flight and have the aircraft inspected. The Cessna taxied to general aviation parking and concluded the flight.

Today's report included the photo above, showing tire marks created on the left side of the centerline by the Mesa Air regional jet as it veered around the Cessna.

NTSB investigators have interviewed the pilots involved in the incident, and the air traffic controllers on duty at the time of the incident as well as the FAA tower managers. To date, the NTSB has released factual information about the incident, but has not issued a final report that includes probable cause.

It should be noted that the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) issued a statement claiming that the control tower at ABE was staffed by unsupervised trainees at the time of this incident. NATCA suggests that at least part of the blame for this serious runway incursion incident lies with the control tower staffing policies of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

[Photo Source]

Four commercial passenger flights re-routed solely as test for ATC trainee

The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), the union for air traffic controllers in the United States, blew the whistle yesterday on an FAA Supervisor at the Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center who ordered several controllers to issue new routes to four flights "for the purpose of generating more traffic for a trainee undergoing a skills check." The incident occurred this past Saturday, Oct. 11, 2008. According to NATCA, the four re-routed commercial passenger flights included a Delta Air Lines Boeing 757, a Virgin Atlantic Boeing 747 and two Southwest Airlines Boeing 737s.

Say again??

NATCA says that the new routings issued to four flights around Wilmington, N.C. required the aircraft "to fly in excess of 100 miles further and took them from a routing that was clear of weather and forced them to fly through thunderstorms." According to NATCA, when the Virgin pilot asked for the reason for the re-route, the supervisor ordered the controller to advise the pilot that it was due to weather.

The FAA Supervisor was carrying out a skills check -- that is, observing a trainee to see if he or she is ready to be certified to work that sector without direct supervision by a certified air traffic controller. But NATCA's Jacksonville Center Facility Representative, Dave Cook, said, "While these skills checks are a normal part of the life of a trainee, forcing the airlines to fly further goes against the very grain of the service that air traffic control provides. Forcing air carriers full of passengers to fly through hazardous weather is needlessly endangering people’s lives – and the FAA Supervisor doing so to meet his training requirements is reckless."

The FAA is now looking into the matter, and released the following statement:

The Federal Aviation Administration is looking into whether training of a controller at the Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center in Hilliard, FL, was conducted in accordance with the agency's strict training guidelines on Saturday afternoon, October. 11. The training involved a developmental controller who was handling flights in a high-altitude sector off the coast of Savannah, GA.

The FAA will determine whether experienced controllers were directed to re-route air carrier flights to generate additional traffic for the trainee, who was undergoing a skills check. The FAA has strict training guidelines which do not permit re-routing flights nor inconveniencing pilots or the flying public.

Our preliminary review indicates that four flights each were re-routed approximately 33 to 50 miles. The flights were not routed into thunderstorms.

The preliminary review also indicates the flights were at an altitude of about 30,000 feet. The re-routes did not result in a loss of separation. Passenger safety was not compromised by the re-routing."

An article published today on a Florida news website, firstcoastnews.com, notes that the FAA Supervisor blamed for the incident has been placed leave while investigators "piece together why four flights were re-routed to reportedly test the skills of a controller-trainee."

Allentown runway incursion: Air traffic controllers cite tower understaffing

A press statement issued by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) claims that the control tower at Allentown, PA's Lehigh Valley International Airport (ABE) was staffed by unsupervised trainees at the time of a serious runway incursion incident this past Friday, September 19, 2008. The incident resulted in a near collision between a Mesa Airlines regional jet and a Cessna 172. The Cessna had failed to vacate the runway before controllers cleared the Mesa CRJ-700 aircraft for takeoff. When they saw the Cessna still on the runway, the crew of the regional jet rejected takeoff at high speed, and had to swerve to avoid colliding with the smaller aircraft. Fortunately, no one was injured, but it was a very close call: the RJ crew estimated that they cleared the Cessna by about 10 feet.

Whenever there is a runway incursion, we all wonder how it could have happened. In this instance, NATCA assigns at least part of the blame to the control tower staffing policies of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Here is exactly what the NATCA press release about the Allentown runway incursion said:

A Mesa Airlines regional jet was forced to abort its takeoff and swerve on the runway to miss a Cessna on Friday evening at Lehigh Valley International Airport. There were two Federal Aviation Administration employees in the tower, both controller trainees.

The incident comes as the House Aviation Subcommittee prepares to hold a follow-up hearing this Thursday on runway safety. NATCA President Patrick Forrey will be testifying.

At approximately 7:35 p.m. EDT Friday, the Cessna landed on Runway 6. The Mesa Airlines regional jet (RJ), ASH7138 headed to Chicago O’Hare, was instructed to taxi into position and hold its position on the runway. The Cessna was told to exit the runway at Taxiway A4 and taxi to the ramp on the local control radio frequency.

The trainee working local control in the tower thought they saw the Cessna clear the runway and cleared the RJ for takeoff. But the Cessna missed its taxiway and was still on the runway as the RJ was picking up speed. The RJ saw the Cessna and aborted its takeoff but was close enough to the small plane that it had to swerve to the left to avoid a collision. The jet returned to the ramp and the flight to O’Hare was canceled.

Of the 31 on board in the tower and radar control room at this FAA facility, 11 are trainees. That is 35 percent, which NATCA believes is far too many trainees than a facility can safely train.

"This was a very serious incident that points out all of the problems with the ramifications of the FAA's understaffing issues nationwide and our concerns about allowing newly and partially certified controllers to work on their own," Forrey said. "The FAA is so desperate to staff its towers they are forced to work trainees by themselves without adequate numbers of experienced controllers there to work with them. This has exposed the inexperience of our new workforce. These new hires are paying a heavy price for the continued failures of this reckless FAA management team. It’s unfair to these trainees and should be unacceptable to the flying public."

Before you begin your next takeoff roll, perhaps you should ask the ATC giving you clearance if he or she is an unsupervised trainee.

Aircraft separation incident: Delta Boeing 737 and Transaero Boeing 747

An aircraft separation incident over the Atlantic Ocean involving two passenger aircraft is being investigated by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The two aircraft involved in the incident were a Boeing 737-800 operated by Delta Air Lines, and a Boeing 747-400 operated by Russian carrier Transaero. No one was injured.

According to information provided by the NTSB, on August 28, 2008, at approximately 18:37 Atlantic Standard Time, the two aircraft "came within zero feet vertical and 1 minute lateral separation at an altitude of 33,000 feet about 179 miles north of San Juan, Puerto Rico." The incident occurred over the Atlantic Ocean in a non-radar environment where 15 minutes of lateral separation is required.

The NTSB says that the Transaero 747 "descended 200-300 feet after receiving an alert from its Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)." The NTSB statement did not mention what action was taken by the Delta aircraft.

The Transaero Boeing 747-400, operating as Flight TSO 554, was en route from Moscow Domodedovo International Airport to Punta Cana International Airport in the Dominican Republic. The Delta Air Lines Boeing 737-800, operating as Flight DAL 485, was en route from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New york to Piarco International Airport in Trinidad.

UPDATE Feb. 23, 2009: The NTSB reports probable cause for this incident as follows: "The San Juan CERAP controllers failure to ensure the two aircraft were properly separated using non-radar separation standards."

Near mid-air collision at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) announced yesterday that an investigation has been initiated regarding a near mid-air collision at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport (ORD) earlier this week. The incident occurred on Monday, July 21, 2008, at 12:47 CDT, when a regional jet operated by American Eagle, and a privately owned Learjet LR60 came in close proximity to one another while aloft. There were no reports of injuries, and no damage to either aircraft.

According to information in today's NTSB Advisory about the incident, an Embraer ERJ-145 aircraft, operating as American Eagle Flight EGF298, was departing ORD runway 32L, and the Learjet was landing on runway 9R. The local assistant/monitor for the local air traffic controller observed the converging paths of the two airplanes and advised the local controller to instruct the Learjet to go around. The American Eagle ERJ-145 was instructed to stay low on departure. The NTSB says that analysis of radar replays revealed that the Learjet passed 325 feet above and slightly behind the departing ERJ-145.

The NTSB states that as a result of this incident, new procedures have been implemented for arrivals to runway 9R requiring specific coordination between approach control and the tower regarding whether 9R is in use.

American Eagle Flight EGF298 was departing on a scheduled passenger flight to Greater Peoria Regional Airport (PIA). The Learjet (registration N252RP) was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 as a corporate flight. FAA records indicate that the Learjet is owned by Electrolux Home Products, Inc. of Augusta, GA.

According to the NTSB, a preliminary report on the incident is expected to be published later this week on the Board's website.

This near collision comes close on the heels of another midair incident earlier this month at New York's JFK Airport. In that incident, the path of a LAN Chile Boeing 767-300 that was departing JFK's runway 13R intersected with that of a Cayman Airways Boeing 737-300, which had performed a go-around while on approach to JFK runway 22L. Air traffic controllers at New York TRACON estimated their closest proximity at 100 feet.

UPDATE: Mar. 3, 2009: The NTSB recently issued a report about this incident, concluding that the 'probable cause' was: "The LC-10 [Local Control] controller's failure to ensure the appropriate separation between two airplanes operating on runways where flight paths intersect."

For more details, see: Chicago-O'Hare air traffic controller blamed for near mid-air collision

NTSB investigating two runway incursions at Teterboro Airport

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has launched an investigation into two recent runway incursion incidents at New Jersey's Teterboro Airport (TEB). The first of the two incidents occurred on June 25, 2008, when a JetRide Learjet 45 flew over two airport workers at a height of 150 ft. and landed on a closed runway. The second incident occurred on July 9, 2008, when a Cessna 172 taxied across the hold line for a runway on which a Falcon 200 had just been cleared for take-off. No one was injured in either incident.

Here are details of the Learjet incident, from the NTSB Preliminary Incident Report (re-paragraphed for easier reading):

On June 25, 2008, at 5:34 am eastern daylight time, a runway incursion occurred at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey involving Windrider (WDR) flight 988, a Learjet 45, occurred during the midnight shift when there was one controller scheduled to be in the tower.

The Federal Aviation Administration reported that runway 1/19 had been closed by Airport Operations and confirmed by the controller. The controller placed two runway incursion devices (RID) at the local control position but did not inform approach control of the closure.

A lighted X had been placed on the runway at the departure end of runway 19.

The approach controller called the tower controller 27 minutes later to request a visual approach to runway 19 for WDR988. The tower controller approved the request. On the initial transmission, the tower controller cleared WDR988 to land on runway 19.

The airplane flew over two employees who were working north of the displaced threshold of runway 19, between taxiways L/A and B and landed on the runway. The displaced threshold is 770 feet from the approach end of runway 19. Closest estimated proximity was 150 feet vertical.

The controller was working the local control position for 7 hours and 21 minutes when the incident occurred. At the time of the incident it was daylight, the wind was calm, sky clear, with 10 statute miles visibility.

The initial review of data indicated that the controller sounded engaged and alert in his communications with aircraft and vehicles operating on the airfield. The controller was scheduled to work the midnight shifts each night from June 23 through June 26. The week before this event, the controller worked evening shifts (3:00 pm to 11:00 pm). The controller's statement reads in its entirety, "While performing required non-control duties WDR 988 landed on runway 19".

The automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information H did not mention the closed runway. [NTSB ID: OPS08IA009]

Here is what the NTSB had to say in a news release about the Cessna/Falcon incident:

On July 9, 2008, at 10:10 a.m. (EDT), a Cessna 172 (N316AS) and, a Dassault Falcon 200 (N277QS) were also involved in a runway incursion at Teterboro Airport.

The Cessna landed on runway 19 and requested a back taxi to the approach end of runway 19 for departure. The ground controller instructed the pilot to taxi to runway 19 via taxiway L and to hold short of runway 19. However, the pilot was not instructed to hold short of runway 24, which intersected runway 19.

The airplane had crossed the hold line for runway 24 but not over the runway edge when the tower controller cleared the Falcon for takeoff on runway 24. The tower cancelled the Falcon's clearance once it was determined that the Cessna was across the runway hold line. The FAA reported the two airplanes were 1,200 feet apart.

The incident occurred during the day shift with a front line manager and two air traffic control specialists on position.

Here are the NTSB Preliminary Incident reports about the second incident: NTSB ID: OPS08IA010A; NTSB ID: OPS08IA010B

NTSB Air Traffic Control Investigator Daniel Bartlett has been designated Investigator-in-charge for both incidents.

Near midair collision at JFK airport

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has initiated an investigation regarding a near midair collision at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK). According to an advisory issued this morning by the NTSB, the incident occurred on the evening of July 5, 2008, when two passenger aircraft nearly collided. The two aircraft involved in the incident were a Cayman Airways Boeing 737-300, operating as Flight CAY792, and a Linea Aerea Nacional de Chile (LAN Chile) Boeing 767-300, operating as Flight LAN533.

According to preliminary information released by the NTSB:

The Cayman Airways flight, on approach to runway 22L, was executing a missed approach and conflicted with the Linea Aeroea Navional de Chile flight that was departing runway 13R. Tower controllers intervened to attempt to resolve the conflict, assigning both aircraft diverging headings. The closest proximity of the two aircraft has not yet been determined. At the time of the incident, the weather was VFR with 6 miles visibility and haze.

The Cayman Airways flight was arriving at JFK from Grand Cayman. The LAN Chile flight was departing JFK for Santiago Chile. There were no reported injuries or damage to the aircraft.

UPDATE: The National Association of Air Traffic Controllers (NATCA) issued a news release about the JFK near collision, calling the incident "very scary." More from the NATCA news release:

When a JFK Tower air traffic controller saw that Cayman 792 was executing the missed approach, he gave instructions for the jet to make a left turn to avoid the departing LAN Chile 533, which was told to turn right, over the water. But it was too late. The paths of both jets crossed. Air traffic controllers at New York Terminal Radar Approach Control in Westbury, N.Y., which handles airborne flights into and out of JFK, say the radar targets of both jets merged on top of each other and estimated their closest proximity at 100 feet.

Controllers at both JFK Tower and New York TRACON all used the word “ugly” to describe the incident. One TRACON controllers said it was the ugliest go-around they have seen in 24 years on the job. Other TRACON controllers said the radar targets of both jets merged into one on their scopes.

Here is the link to the ATC audio of the near collision incident, posted on the NATCA website.

Delta Boeing 767 and Russian plane nearly collide mid-air

Earlier this morning, April 13, 2008, a Delta Air Lines Boeing 767-400 aircraft and a Boeing 737-500 operated by a Russian carrier nearly collided mid-air near Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, according to Russia's ITAR-TASS news agency. Apparently the incident was resolved safely, and no one was injured.

An English language article on the ITAR-TASS news website, quoting "a source at the city automatic air traffic control center," says:

“The crew of a Boeing 737-500 en route from Moscow to Rostov-on-Don did not fulfill an air traffic controller’s order and created the tense moment at 9:44 a.m. Moscow time,” he said.

The air traffic controller told the plane carrying 57 people to climb to the altitude of 2,100 meters and warned about the approaching Boeing 767-400 of the American Delta airline en route from Atlanta to Sheremetyevo,” the source said.

The American jetliner carrying 12 crewmembers and 219 passengers was descending to 2,400 meters for landing. Its crew also received instructions from the air traffic controllers.

The controller watching the Boeing 737-500 noticed that the plane continued the climb and was rapidly approaching the Delta’s jetliner. He ordered the Delta’s pilot to descent and the instruction was fulfilled promptly.

Thus, the controller prevented an air crash and the planes passed each other on the crossing courses at the distance of eleven kilometers instead of the safe 30-kilometer distance.

Another article about the near-collision, which appeared on CNN Money, gave similar information. The article on CNN Money added that the Boeing 737-500 was operated by Don-Avia and had 51 passengers and six crew on board, while the Delta plane was carrying 219 passengers and 12 crew.