SkyWest Airlines fined $359,000 for alleged violations of FAA regulations

by B. N. Sullivan

Today, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced proposed civil penalties (i.e, fines) against SkyWest Airlines, Inc. The FAA proposed fines totaling $359,000 for three separate alleged violations of Federal Aviation Regulations.

The FAA press release explains:

The FAA proposed a penalty of $220,000 for alleged failure to document heavy checked bags, motorized mobility aids and a heavy shipment carried in the cargo compartment of the company’s passenger aircraft.  As a result, the company operated the aircraft on five flights between April 21 and May 25, 2010 with incorrect weight and balance data.  The FAA alleges the violations occurred because the carrier’s employees failed to follow required procedures for documenting cargo carried on revenue passenger flights.

The other two proposed civil penalties are for allegedly operating two Bombardier Regional Jet aircraft when they were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

In the first case, a proposed civil penalty of $70,500, the FAA alleges SkyWest employees failed to follow the company’s Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program (CAMP) and the Bombardier maintenance and inspection manual during five attempts by mechanics to correct an avionics system cooling problem on one aircraft.  SkyWest operated the aircraft on at least five revenue passenger flights between July 15 and 21, 2009 when it was not in compliance.

In the second case, the FAA is proposing a civil penalty of $68,500, alleging SkyWest operated another Bombardier jet on eight revenue passenger flights between May 30 and June 1, 2010 when it was not in compliance with regulations.  The FAA alleges SkyWest mechanics failed to follow procedures required in the airline’s CAMP when replacing the right air conditioning pack’s pressure-regulating and shutoff valve.

SkyWest, which is headquartered in St. George, Utah, has 30 days to respond to the FAA.

FAA fines Continental Airlines and American Eagle for maintenance issues

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed civil penalties -- i.e., fines -- against both Continental Airlines and American Eagle Airlines for operating passenger aircraft that were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

A $275,000 fine is proposed against Continental for operating two non-compliant Boeing 737-900ER aircraft on 73 flights.

The FAA alleges Continental mechanics failed to follow the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual when they installed incorrect main landing gear wheel-tire assemblies on two aircraft and released them for service on Nov. 7 and 19, 2009.

The manual contains specific instructions to mechanics not to use wheel-tire assemblies intended for the B-737-700, -800 and -900 on the heavier B-737-900ER.  The manual says using the incorrect assemblies on the heavier version of the B-737 might lead to damage to the aircraft or injury to people working on and around the aircraft.

A fine of $330,000 is proposed against American Eagle for operating a non-compliant Embraer 135 aircraft on 12 revenue passenger flights.

The FAA alleges American Eagle mechanics failed to note broken passenger seats and armrests on two aircraft during a Dec. 18, 2008 inspection and did not follow the approved maintenance manual instructions during those inspections.  FAA inspectors discovered seats on two aircraft that would not raise and stow into the upright and locked position for takeoffs and landings.  FAA inspectors also found damaged center arm rests that would not stow in the upright and locked position.

The FAA further alleges that American Eagle used one of the aircraft on 12 revenue passenger flights between the inspection and eventual repair of the seats and armrests.  The other aircraft did not fly again until the airline completed the required work.

The airlines have 30 days to respond to the FAA.

Qantas Flight 32: Crew response to the emergency

by B. N. Sullivan

This is the third in a series of posts about Qantas Flight 32, an Airbus A380 (registration VH-OQA) that experienced an uncontained failure of one of its four Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines during flight on November 4, 2010.  The information here is based on a preliminary report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), issued On December 3, 2010.

As mentioned in the previous post, there were five flight crew on board Qantas Flight 32: the Captain (PIC); a First Officer (FO), acting as co-pilot; a Second Officer (SO); a second Captain, who was training as a Check Captain (CC); and a Supervising Check Captain (SCC), who was training the CC.  This post details how they responded to the emergency following the uncontained engine failure that damaged the aircraft and a number of its systems.

Early in the emergency, given that the aircraft was controllable, the crew decided to hold their present altitude while they processed the plethora of ECAM messages that immediately followed the engine failure.  [See previous post.]  They contacted Singapore ATC and asked for an appropriate holding position, ultimately requesting "to remain within 30 NM (56 km) of Changi Airport in case they should need to land quickly."  ATC vectored the aircraft into a holding pattern east of the airport  at 7,400 ft.

As the crew went through procedures associated with the ECAM messages, the SO went into the cabin to try to visually assess the damage to No 2 engine.

As the SO moved through the cabin a passenger, who was also a pilot for the operator, brought the SO’s attention to a view of the aircraft from the vertical fin mounted camera that was displayed on the aircraft’s in-flight entertainment system.  That display appeared to show some form of fluid leak from the left wing.

The SO then went to the left side of the aircraft's lower deck and observed the wing damage and fuel leak.  He saw a fuel trail about 0.5 m wide that appeared to be coming from underneath the wing.

Later, the SCC and SO returned to the cabin "on numerous occasions to visually assess the damage on the left side of the aircraft, and to inspect the right side of the aircraft, and to provide feedback to the cabin crew and passengers."

Meanwhile, up on the flight deck:

The flight crew reported that, during their assessment of subsequent multiple fuel system ECAM messages, they elected not to initiate further fuel transfer in response to a number of those messages, as they were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system.  In addition, the crew could not jettison fuel due to the ECAM fuel jettison fault and they were aware that there was fuel leaking from the left wing.  The crew also recalled an indication that the aircraft’s satellite communications system had failed.  They also received an aircraft communications and automatic reporting system (ACARS)message from the aircraft operator that indicated that multiple failure messages had been received by the operator from the aircraft.

It took about 50 minutes for the crew to complete procedures associated with the many ECAM messages.

They then assessed the aircraft systems to determine those that had been damaged, or that were operating in a degraded mode.  They considered that the status of each system had the potential to affect the calculation of the required parameters for the approach and landing.  The crew also believed that the failure may have damaged the No 1 engine, and they discussed a number of concerns in relation to the lateral and longitudinal fuel imbalances that had been indicated by the ECAM.

The FO and the SCC performed several calculations to determine the landing distance required for their overweight landing.  They determined that landing on Changi's runway 20C  "was feasible, with 100 m of runway remaining," and advised ATC to that effect.

Approach and Landing

Prior to leaving the holding pattern, the crew carried out a number of manual handling checks at holding speed to assess the controllability of the aircraft.

As the crew started to reconfigure the aircraft for the approach by lowering flaps, they conducted further controllability checks at the approach speed and decided that the aircraft remained controllable.  As a result of the landing gear-related ECAM messages, the landing gear was lowered using the emergency extension procedure and a further controllability check was conducted.

The landing performance application indicated a required approach speed of 166 kts.  The flight crew reported being aware that: reverse thrust was only available from the No 3 engine, no leading edge slats were available, there was limited aileron and spoiler control, anti-skid braking was restricted to the body landing gear only, there was limited nosewheel steering and that the nose was likely to pitch up on touchdown.  An ECAM message indicated that they could not apply maximum braking until the nosewheel was on the runway.  The wing flaps were extended to the No 3 position.

Singapore ATC vectored the aircraft to a position 20 NM (37 km) from the threshold of runway 20C and provided for a progressive descent to 4,000 ft.  The PIC was aware that accurate speed control on final would be important to avoid either an aerodynamic stall condition, or a runway overrun. Consequently, the PIC set the thrust levers for Nos 1 and 4 engines to provide symmetric thrust, and controlled the aircraft’s speed with the thrust from No 3 engine.

The autopilot disconnected a couple of times during the early part of the approach as the speed reduced to 1 kt below the approach speed.  The PIC initially acted to reconnect the autopilot but, when it disconnected again at about 1,000 ft, he elected to leave it disconnected and to fly the aircraft manually for the remainder of the approach.  Due to the limited landing margin available, the CC reminded the PIC that the landing would have to be conducted with no flare and that there would be a slightly higher nose attitude on touchdown.

Cabin crew were briefed to prepare the cabin for a possible runway overrun and emergency evacuation.

The aircraft touched down, the PIC applied maximum braking and selected reverse thrust on the No 3 engine.  The aircraft came to a stop with about 150 meters of runway remaining.

After Landing

The crew shut down the remaining engines, however the No 1 engine continued to run.  The crew recycled the engine master switch to OFF, but the engine still did not shut down.  The crew then tried using the emergency shutoff and fire extinguisher bottles to shut down No 1 engine, but to no avail.  Activating a series of circuit breakers in the aircraft's equipment bay, and efforts to starve the No 1 engine of fuel also were unsuccessful.  Ultimately, "the decision was taken to drown the engine with fire-fighting foam from the emergency services fire vehicles," but this did not happen until about 2 hours and 7 minutes after the aircraft landed!

Meanwhile, passengers disembarked on the right side of the aircraft via stairs.

The crew elected to use a single door so that the passengers could be accounted for as they left the aircraft and because they wanted the remainder of the right side of the aircraft to be kept clear in case of the need to deploy the escape slides. They also decided to have the other doors remain armed, with crew members in their positions at those doors ready to activate the escape slides if necessary, until all of the passengers were off the aircraft.

It took about an hour for all passengers and crew to leave the aircraft. There were no injuries reported among the five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers on board Qantas Flight 32.

[Photo Source]

Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flight 32 on Aircrew Buzz.

Qantas Flight 32: Uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft

by B. N. Sullivan

This is the second in a series of posts about the events on board Qantas Flight 32, an Airbus A380 (registration VH-OQA) that experienced an uncontained failure of one of its four Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines during flight on November 4, 2010.  The information here is based on a preliminary report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), issued On December 3, 2010.

There were five flight crew on board Qantas Flight 32: the Captain (PIC); a First Officer (FO), acting as co-pilot; a Second Officer (SO); a second Captain, who was training as a Check Captain (CC); and a Supervising Check Captain (SCC), who was training the CC.

In a media briefing on the day the preliminary report was released, ATSB Chief Commissioner Martin Dolan praised the crew of Qantas Flight 32, stating that the A380 "would not have arrived safely in Singapore" were it not for the actions of the flight crew.   Reading through the ATSB report, it is clear that the entire crew really had their hands full.

Engine Failure

The ATSB report says that the first sign of trouble came during the climb out of Singapore when the crew heard two "almost coincident" loud bangs.  The PIC immediately selected altitude and heading hold on the autopilot control panel, and the aircraft leveled off, however the autothrust system did not reduce power to the engines as expected.  When it became clear that the autothrust system was no longer active, the PIC manually retarded the thrust levels to control the aircraft's speed.

The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) system displayed an "overheat" warning message for the No 2 engine.  Then all hell broke loose on the flight deck.

Within seconds, the overheat warning changed to a fire for the No 2 engine.  The crew decided to shut down No 2 engine, and "after they had selected the ENG 2 master switch OFF, the ECAM displayed a message indicating that the No 2 engine had failed."

The crew discharged one of the engine's two fire extinguisher bottles, but did not receive a confirmation that it had discharged.  They repeated the procedure and again did not receive the expected confirmation.  They attempted to discharged the second bottle; again they did not receive confirmation that the second bottle had discharged.

The crew reported that they then elected to continue the engine failure procedure, which included initiating an automated process of fuel transfer from the aircraft’s outer wing tanks to the inner tanks.

The crew also noticed that the engine display for the No 2 engine had changed to a failed mode, and that the engine display for Nos 1 and 4 engines had reverted to a degraded mode.  The display for the No 3 engine indicated that the engine was operating in an alternate mode as a result of the crew actioning an ECAM procedure.

Shortly afterward, a flood of ECAM messages began to display.  Quoting from the ATSB report:

The flight crew recalled the following system warnings on the ECAM after the failure of No. 2 engine.

• engines No 1 and 4 operating in a degraded mode
• GREEN hydraulic system -- low system pressure and low fluid level
• YELLOW hydraulic system -- engine No. 4 pump errors
• failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No. 1 and 2 bus systems
• flight controls operating in alternate law
• wing slats inoperative
• flight controls -- ailerons partial control only
• flight controls -- reduced spoiler control
• landing gear control and indicator warnings
• multiple brake system messages
• engine anti-ice and air data sensor messages
• multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault
• center of gravity messages
• autothrust and autoland inoperative
• No. 1 engine generator drive disconnected
• left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
• avionics system overheat

Damage to the Aircraft

Unbeknown to the crew at that time, the No 2 engine's intermediate pressure (IP) turbine had failed.  The turbine disc, blade and nozzle guide vanes separated, ruptured the surrounding casing, and damaged the engine's thrust reverser.  A number of components were ejected, which struck the aircraft.

The leading edge of the left wing was penetrated, resulting in "damage to the leading edge structure, the front wing spar and the upper surface of the wing."

The left wing-to-fuselage fairing also was penetrated, "resulting in damage to numerous system components, the fuselage structure and elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring."

Damaged were "elements of the aircraft's electrical wiring that affected the operation of the hydraulic system, landing gear and flight controls; a number of fuel system components; and the leading edge slat system."

The left wing's lower surface was impacted, "resulting in a fuel leak from the Number 2 engine fuel feed tank and the left wing inner fuel tank."

[Photo Source]

Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flight 32 on Aircrew Buzz.

Qantas Airbus A380 uncontained engine failure: ATSB preliminary report

by B. N. Sullivan

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released its preliminary report regarding its investigation of the November 4, 2010 uncontained failure of a Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine on a Qantas Airbus A380 aircraft over Batam Island, Indonesia.  The aircraft (registration VH-OQA), operating as Qantas Flight QF32, was en route from Changi Airport, Singapore to Sydney with five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers on board.  No one on board was injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage.  Two people on the ground sustained minor injuries due to falling debris.

The abstract of the ATSB report provides this brief summary of what happened:

Following a normal takeoff, the crew retracted the landing gear and flaps.  The crew reported that, while maintaining 250 kts in the climb and passing 7,000 ft above mean sea level, they heard two almost coincident ‘loud bangs’, followed shortly after by indications of a failure of the No 2 engine.

The crew advised Singapore Air Traffic Control of the situation and were provided with radar vectors to a holding pattern.  The crew undertook a series of actions before returning the aircraft to land at Singapore.  There were no reported injuries to the crew or passengers on the aircraft.  There were reports of minor injuries to two persons on Batam Island, Indonesia.

A subsequent examination of the aircraft indicated that the No 2 engine had sustained an uncontained failure of the Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc.  Sections of the liberated disc penetrated the left wing and the left wing-to-fuselage fairing, resulting in structural and systems damage to the aircraft.

As a result of this occurrence, a number of safety actions were immediately undertaken by Qantas, Airbus, Rolls-Royce plc and the European Aviation Safety Agency.  On 1 December 2010, the ATSB issued a safety recommendation to Rolls-Royce plc in respect of the Trent 900 series engine high pressure/intermediate pressure bearing structure oil feed stub pipes.  In addition, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority issued a Regulation 38 maintenance direction that addressed the immediate safety of flight concerns in respect of Qantas A380 operations with the Trent 900 series engine.  On 2 December 2010, Qantas advised that the requirements of Rolls-Royce plc Service Bulletin RB211 72 G595 would take place within the next 24 hours on engines in place on A380 aircraft currently in service, and before further flight on engines on aircraft not yet returned to service.

The ATSB report, which was issued today, is lengthy and detailed.  I will present some of the details of particular interest to crew members in the next two posts on Aircrew Buzz.  Stay tuned for that.

Meanwhile, here is the link to the landing page on the ATSB website where you can find links to the full text reports; photos; and safety recommendations pertaining to this accident: ATSB Investigation Number:AO-2010-089

[Photo Source]

ATSB Final Report: July 2008 Qantas Boeing 747 depressurization accident

by B. N. Sullivan

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a final report on the sudden decompression in flight of a Qantas Boeing 747-400 on July 25, 2008.  The accident happened during the cruise phase of Qantas Flight QF30, which was en route from Hong Kong to Melbourne.  The flight diverted to Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila where it landed safely.  There were no serious serious injuries to those on board, however the aircraft's fuselage ruptured over an area measuring approximately 2 x 1.5 m (6.6 x 4.9 ft).

The ATSB investigation determined that the fuselage rupture "had been induced by the forceful bursting of one of a bank of seven oxygen cylinders located along the right side of the cargo hold," i.e.one of the oxygen cylinders that provide the emergency supplementary oxygen supply for passengers.

An analysis of the damage produced by the ruptured cylinder showed that the force of the failure had projected the cylinder vertically upward into the aircraft's cabin, where it had impacted the R2 door frame, handle and the overhead panelling and structure, before presumably falling to the cabin floor and being swept out of the aircraft during the depressurisation. No part of the cylinder body was located within the aircraft, despite a thorough search.

The ATSB investigation "was unable to identify any particular factor or factors that could, with any degree of probability, be associated with the cylinder failure event."

Despite the inconclusive outcome of the investigation as to contributing factors, the associated engineering study did confirm that the cylinder type was fit-for-purpose.  There was no individual or broad characteristic of the cylinders that was felt to be a threat to the safety or airworthiness of the design.  Similarly, there was no aspect of the batch of cylinders produced with the failed item, which deviated from the type specification, or provided any indication of the increased potential for the existence of an injurious flaw or defect within that particular production lot.

In other words, in the opinion of the ATSB investigators, the rupture of the oxygen cylinder on Qantas Flight 30 was "a unique event and highly unlikely to happen again."

Here is the link to the full report: ATSB: Oxygen cylinder failure and depressurisation - 475 km north-west of Manila, Philippines, 25 July 2008, Boeing 747-438, VH-OJK

The report includes a number of photos showing the extent of the damage to the aircraft.


RELATED: Click here to view all posts about Qantas Flt 30 on Aircrew Buzz.

Crew fatigue cited in Delta Air Lines Boeing 767 taxiway landing at Atlanta

by B. N. Sullivan

A final report has been issued by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding its investigation of a 2009 incident in which a Delta Air Lines Boeing 767-332ER aircraft landed on a taxiway at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL).  According to the report, crew fatigue was a major cause of the incident.

At the time of the incident, on October 19, 2009, the aircraft (registration N185DN) was arriving at Atlanta.  The aircraft was operating as Delta Flight 60, a scheduled passenger service from Rio de Janeiro (GIG) to ATL.  The NTSB report summary gives this account of what happened:

During the flight one of the three required flight deck crew members became ill and was considered to be incapacitated.  The remaining two crew members conducted the entire night flight without the benefit of a customary break period.  Throughout the flight the crew made comments indicating that they were fatigued and identified fatigue as their highest threat for the approach, but did not discuss strategies to mitigate the consequences of fatigue.  At the time of the incident, the crew had been on duty for about 12 hours and the captain had been awake for over 22 hours, while the first officer had been awake for at least 14 hours.

During the descent and approach, the flight crew was assigned a number of runway changes; the last of which occurred near the final approach fix for runway 27L While the flight was on final approach, the crew was offered and accepted a clearance to sidestep to runway 27R for landing.  Although the flight crew had previously conducted an approach briefing for two different runways, they had not briefed the approach for runway 27R and were not aware that the approach light system and the instrument landing system (ILS) were not available to aid in identifying that runway.  When the crew accepted the sidestep to runway 27R, the captain, who was the flying pilot, saw the precision approach path indicator and lined the airplane up on what he said were the brightest set of lights he could see.  During the final approach, the first officer was preoccupied with attempting to tune and identify the ILS frequency for runway 27R.  Just prior to the airplane touching down, the captain realized they were landing on a taxiway.  The airplane landed on taxiway M, 200 feet north of, and parallel to, runway 27R.

Postincident flight evaluations of the airport lighting indicated that there were a number of visual cues that could have misguided the captain to align with taxiway M instead of runway 27R while on final approach.  These cues included numerous taxiways signs along the sides of taxiway M which, from the air, appeared to be white and could be perceived as runway edge lights.  In addition, the blue light emitting diode (LED) lights used on the eastern end of taxiway M were perceived to be brighter than the adjacent incandescent lights on the airfield and the alternating yellow and green lights in the ILS critical area provided the appearance of a runway centerline.  The postincident flight evaluations indicated that when the approach lights or the ILS for runway 27R were available and used, it was clearly evident when the airplane was not aligned with the runway.

The NTSB determined the probable cause of this incident to be, "The flight crew’s failure to identify the correct landing surface due to fatigue."

Contributing causes were:

• the flight crew’s decision to accept a late runway change,
• the unavailability of the approach light system and the instrument landing system for the runway of intended landing,
• the combination of numerous taxiway signs and intermixing of light technologies on the taxiway.

No one was injured in the incident.

Here are the links to the NTSB's final report:

• NTSB ID OPS10IA001 - Summary
• NTSB ID OPS10IA001 - Full Narrative

RELATED:  NTSB investigating Delta Air Lines Boeing 767 taxiway landing at Atlanta - AircrewBuzz.com, Oct 21, 2009

Flight crew's unprofessional behavior caused PSA Airlines CRJ-200 runway overrun at Charleston, WV

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued its final report on the PSA Airlines CRJ-200 runway overrun at Charleston, WV, in January of this year.  The aircraft (registration N246PS) overran a runway at Yeager Airport (CRW), Charleston, WV, following a rejected takeoff.  The NTSB report attributes the incident to the flight crew's "unprofessional behavior."

The incident flight, operating as US Airways Express Flight 2495, was departing Charleston for Charlotte Douglas International Airport, NC.  After noticing that the flaps were incorrectly configured for takeoff, the crew rejected takeoff at high speed -- well above V1.  The aircraft overran the end of the runway and came to a stop in the engineered materials arresting system (EMAS) in the runway end safety area.

There were no injuries among the three crew members and 31 passengers on board.  The aircraft's flaps, landing gear, and landing gear doors "received minor damage," according to the NTSB.

The NTSB's statement of probable cause is as follows:

(1) The flight crewmembers’ unprofessional behavior, including their nonadherence to sterile cockpit procedures by engaging in nonpertinent conversation, which distracted them from their primary flight-related duties and led to their failure to correctly set and verify the flaps;

(2) the captain’s decision to reconfigure the flaps during the takeoff roll instead of rejecting the takeoff when he first identified the misconfiguration, which resulted in the rejected takeoff beginning when the airplane was about 13 knots above the takeoff decision speed and the subsequent runway overrun; and

(3) the flight crewmembers’ lack of checklist discipline, which contributed to their failure to detect the incorrect flap setting before initiating the takeoff roll.

Contributing to the survivability of this incident was the presence of an engineered materials arresting system beyond the runway end.

Here are the links to the NTSB's final report:

• NTSB ID DCA10IA022: Summary
• NTSB ID DCA10IA022: Full Narrative

RELATED: PSA Airlines CRJ-200 runway overrun at Charleston, WV - AircrewBuzz.com, Jan 19, 2010

[Photo Source]

Evergreen International fined $4.855 million by FAA over pilot training

by B. N. Sullivan

Evergreen International Airlines faces a $4.855 fine, proposed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  "for allegedly using pilots on 232 revenue flights who had not bee trained in accordance with an FAA-approved training program."

In 2009, Evergreen aircraft were equipped with a new Flight Management System (FMS).  The FAA says the new FMS was different enough from the prior system that it required pilots to be specifically trained on it.  According to the FAA, Evergreen "did not complete its FAA-approved training for pilots before assigning them to fly revenue trips using the new FMS."

In a press release announcing the proposed civil penalty, the FAA explains:

The FAA alleges Evergreen line pilots received ground training and a check ride on the new FMS, but that the company did not provide required familiarization flights supervised by the company’s check pilots despite being told to do so by the FAA.  The familiarization flights are part of the FAA-approved training program for Evergreen aircraft equipped with the FMS.  Evergreen also failed to distribute copies of the required system manual to crews who would be using the FMS.

Subsequent to these improperly conducted flights, Evergreen has ensured that its pilots are trained in accordance with its FAA-approved training program and continues to operate under an FAA-approved training program.

The flights in question took place between February 19, 2009 and July 9, 2009.

FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said, “Even though Evergreen now complies with its training program, this penalty is appropriate because requiring operators to complete required, approved training is the only way to make sure crews are fully qualified to operate the equipment and systems to manage flights safely.”

Evergreen has 30 days to respond to the FAA regarding the allegations.

New science-based rules for mitigating pilot fatigue proposed by the FAA

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced what it calls "a landmark proposal to fight fatigue among commercial pilots by setting new flight time, duty and rest requirements based on fatigue science."  The new rules, if adopted, will apply to pilots of all carriers that operate under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.  It will not apply to pilots at Part 135 carriers.

The FAA spells out details of the new rules in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) announced on September 10, 2010 [link below].  In summary, the NPRM states:

The proposal recognizes the growing similarities between the types of operations and the universality of factors that lead to fatigue in most individuals.  Fatigue threatens aviation safety because it increases the risk of pilot error that could lead to an accident.  The new requirements, if adopted, would eliminate the current distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental operations.  The proposal provides different requirements based on the time of day, whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone, and the likelihood of being able to sleep under different circumstances.

In some areas, the FAA proposes to relax current requirements, while in others, it strengthens them to reflect the latest scientific information.  Here are some key differences between the new proposal and the rules currently in place:

• The proposal reflects the universal nature of fatigue.  The proposed rules would be the same for all types of Part 121 flights (passenger and cargo airlines): domestic, flag (international), or supplemental (unscheduled).  Currently, there are different requirements for each of these categories of operations. The proposed rule does not apply to Part 135 operators, but FAA says it may address fatigue for Part 135 operators in the future.
• Unlike the current rules, the proposal provides a circadian component for reducing the flight time and duty time when the pilot is operating in his or her window of circadian low.   The proposal clearly states that fatigue mitigation is the joint responsibility of both the airline and the pilot.   A pilot may not accept an assignment if that pilot is too fatigued to fly.
• The proposal would give airlines the flexibility to adopt individual Fatigue Risk Management Systems.  Fatigue Risk Management Plans, recently mandated by Congress and now addressed by FAA policy, would set out a carrier’s own policies and procedures for reducing the risk of fatigue and improving alertness.  These plans are specific to an air carrier’s type of operations, are subject to the FAA’s review and acceptance, and include fatigue education and awareness training.

Rest

The new rule proposes to set a nine-hour minimum rest period prior to flying-related duty.  Under current rules, there is a minimum daily rest requirement of 8-11 hours for domestic flying.   For international flying, the current minimum is 8 hours, or twice the number of hours flown.

Flight Time

Weekly:  Currently, pilots flying domestically are limited to 30 hours of flight time in any seven consecutive days.  Those flying international operations are limited to 32 hours in seven consecutive days, and there is no seven-consecutive-day limit for supplemental operations.  The proposal provides all Part 121 pilots with at least 30 consecutive hours per week free from all duty, compared to the current 24 hours free from all duty on a weekly basis – a 25 percent increase.

Monthly:  Under the proposal, there is a 100-hour maximum for flight time in any 28 days.  Current rules set a limit of 100 hours for every 30 days.

Yearly:  There is a current limit of 1,000 hours in any calendar year for domestic flights.  Under the proposal, all types of operations will now be limited to 1,000 hours per 365 days.

Duty Time

There is currently a 16-hour duty period between rest periods. The proposal would limit the daily flight duty period to 13-hours, which could slide to nine hours at night (depending on take-off time and number of segments scheduled).
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Importantly, the provisions of this new rule indicate that the FAA finally has recognized that there are no physiological differences between pilots who fly cargo and those who fly passengers.  It's about time that pilots flying for Part 121-Supplemental operators are treated identically to those who fly for scheduled airlines.

Likewise, the elimination of the domestic/international distinction in favor of a focus on the length of a trip will be beneficial.  The FAA proposes to deal with longer flights through crew augmentation "rather than simply by extending the allowable flight time."

The NPRM states that crew augmentation requirements should take into consideration "circadian rhythms, acclimation to time changes, and multiple flight segments should be considered in determining how much augmentation is required.  Further consideration should be given to the quality of the available rest facility."

The issue of crew fatigue has been a perennial item on the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 'Most Wanted List' for aviation safety improvements.  It's good to see some concrete movement on this issue, and it's even better that the proposed rule changes are based on well-established scientific data about fatigue rather than on mere politics.

The 60-day public comment period closes on Nov. 13, 2010.

LINKS:

• Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM):  Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements - 145-page 'pdf'
• FAA Fact Sheet:  Pilot Fatigue

One for the record books: FAA hits American Airlines with $24.2 million fine

by B. N. Sullivan

A press release issued earlier today by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that the agency has proposed a $24.2 million civil penalty (i.e., fine) against American Airlines "for failing to correctly follow an Airworthiness Directive involving the maintenance of its McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft."  The proposed fine would be the largest ever levied against an airline by the FAA.  American Airlines has 30 days in which to respond, and the airline already has announced that it will challenge the proposed penalty, stating, "We are confident we have a strong case and the facts will bear this out."

The fine arises from alleged violations of a 2006 Airworthiness Directive (AD), which required the airline to inspect wire bundles in the wheel wells of MD-80 aircraft.  The AD required MD-80 operators to look for chafing or signs of arcing of the wire bundle for the auxiliary hydraulic pump, and to perform corrective actions if such defects were found.

The FAA explains:

The purpose of the Airworthiness Directive [AD 2006-15-15] was to prevent the shorting of wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump, which could result in loss of auxiliary hydraulic power or a fire in the wheel well of the aircraft. The Airworthiness Directive also sought to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with the flammable vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion.

The airline had until March 5, 2008 to accomplish the required inspections, but on March 25, 2008 the FAA discovered two aircraft that were not in compliance with the AD.  This prompted a series of re-inspections and maintenance work.

On March 26, after American performed additional maintenance on its MD-80 fleet, the FAA inspected eight aircraft at American’s Tulsa maintenance base and found that seven did not comply with the Airworthiness Directive. On April 7, the FAA inspected another nine MD-80 aircraft at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport and found that eight of them still did not comply with the AD. A tenth aircraft inspected by American mechanics also did not comply. On April 8, American began grounding its MD-80 fleet to conduct new inspections and redo work as necessary.

The FAA subsequently determined that 286 of the airline’s MD-80s were operated on a combined 14,278 passenger flights while the aircraft were not in compliance with Federal Regulations. American ultimately completed the work required by the 2006 Airworthiness Directive.

The alleged non-compliance with the AD proved very costly for the airline, even before the current proposed fine.  During April of 2008, the temporary grounding of American's entire fleet of MD-80 (S-80) aircraft caused well over 2,000 flights to be canceled.  This disrupted the travel plans of many thousands of passengers and shippers, and resulted in a massive loss of revenue for the carrier.

In addition, American Airlines agreed to provide pay protection to pilots and flight attendants who had been scheduled to work the canceled flights.

It will be interesting to see what details emerge in the airline's response to the FAA.  The airline claimed at the time that the grounding of the MD-80 fleet for re-inspection was "related to detailed, technical compliance issues and not safety-of-flight issues."

Here is the link to the FAA report that details the violations that are the basis for the huge proposed civil penalty: Enforcement Investigative Report No. 2008SW210302 - 58-page 'pdf' document

Related posts on Aircrew Buzz:

• American Airlines pilots' view of MD-80 groundings and re-inspections - Apr 8, 2008
• American Airlines pilots affected by canceled flights get pay protection - Apr 12, 2008
• American Airlines flight attendants get pay protection for lost time - Apr 12, 2008

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FAA says Mexico not in compliance with ICAO safety standards

by B. N. Sullivan

Earlier today, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released the following statement regarding aviation safety standards in Mexico:

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced that Mexico is not in compliance with international safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), following an assessment of the country’s civil aviation authority. As a result, the United States is downgrading Mexico from a Category 1 to Category 2 rating.

As part of the FAA’s International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program, the agency assesses the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that operate or have applied to fly to the United States and makes that information available to the public. The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety standards, not FAA regulations. With the IASA Category 2 rating, Mexican air carriers cannot establish new service to the United States, although they are allowed to maintain existing service.

While Mexico has been responsive to the FAA’s findings and has made significant improvements in recent months, it was unable to fully comply with all of the international safety standards. However, under the leadership of Director General Hector Gonzalez Weeks, Mexico continues to make progress. The FAA is committed to working closely with the Mexican government and providing technical assistance to help Mexico regain its Category 1 rating.

A Category 1 rating means the country’s civil aviation authority complies with ICAO standards. A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with international standards, or that its civil aviation authority – equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record-keeping or inspection procedures.

Countries with air carriers that fly to the United States must adhere to the safety standards of ICAO, the United Nations’ technical agency for aviation that establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

IASA information is atwww.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa/.

Today's safety downgrade will prevent U.S.-based carriers from engaging in code-sharing relationships with Mexican carriers.

NTSB final report on US Airways Flight 1549 Hudson River accident

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released its final report on the now-famous ditching of a US Airways Airbus A320 in the Hudson River on January 15, 2009.  Readers will recall that US Airways Flight 1549 lost power in both engines due to a multiple bird strike while climbing out from New York's La Guardia Airport.  All 155 crew and passengers on board survived.

If you are interested in having a look at the final report, here is the link: NTSB Report AAR10-03.  Warning: this is a hefty document in the form of a 213 page 'pdf' file, so it may take quite awhile to download.

RELATED: Click here to view all posts about US Airways Flt 1549 on Aircrew Buzz.

Near midair collision between US Airways A319 and Cargolux B747 at Anchorage

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) announced today that it has begun an investigation into a near midair collision between a commercial airliner and a widebody cargo plane at Anchorage a week ago. The incident involved an Airbus A319-100 operated by US Airways, and a Boeing B747-400 freighter operated by Cargolux. The A319 had 138 people on board; the freighter had a crew of two. No one was injured.

According to the NTSB, the incident occurred shortly after midnight on May 21, 2010. US Airways flight USA140 was arriving at Anchorage International Airport (ANC) from Phoenix, and Cargolux Airlines International flight CLX658 was departing ANC for Chicago-O'Hare. The US Airways plane was on approach to runway 14 at ANC when the crew executed a go-around. The Cargolux freighter was departing runway 25R. The NTSB says the two aircraft "came within an estimated 100 feet vertically and a .33 mile lateral separation."

From the NTSB statement announcing the investigation of the incident:

According to the TCAS report from the A319 crew, that aircraft was approaching ANC when, because of the effects of tailwinds on the aircraft's approach path, the crew initiated a missed approach and requested new instructions from air traffic control. The tower controller instructed the A319 to turn right heading 300 and report the departing B747 in sight.

After the A319 crew reported the B747 in sight, the controller instructed the A319 to maintain visual separation from the B747, climb to 3000 feet, and turn right heading 320. The A319 crew refused the right turn because the turn would have put their flight in direct conflict with the B747.

The A319 crew then received a resolution advisory to "monitor vertical speed" and the crew complied with the descent command. During the descent, the A319 crew lost sight of the B747. At about 1700 feet above ground level, the A319 crew received a "clear of conflict" aural command.

The NTSB notes that the incident occurred in night visual meteorological conditions with 10 miles of visibility.

ATSB: Preliminary report on the Airnorth Embraer 120 crash at Darwin

by B. N. Sullivan

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a preliminary factual report concerning the crash of an Airnorth EMB-120ER at Darwin, Australia earlier this year. The accident happened as the aircraft (registration VH-ANB) was departing from runway 29 at the Darwin Airport on the morning of March 22, 2010. Both pilots were killed; there were no passengers on board.

The new ATSB report confirms that the accident flight was a training flight. Quoting from the report's abstract:

The training captain advised the aerodrome controller that the departure would incorporate asymmetric flight (simulated engine failure) and was approved by the controller to perform the manoeuvre.

After becoming airborne, witnesses reported seeing the aircraft roll and diverge left from its take-off path. They watched as the aircraft continued rolling left, and entered a steep nose-down attitude. It disappeared into trees south of the runway threshold from where a column of black smoke was seen shortly afterwards.

Aerodrome rescue and fire fighting services were in attendance very shortly thereafter and extinguished the fire. Both pilots were fatally injured and the aircraft was seriously damaged due to impact forces and an intense post-impact fire.

The report says that both the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were located in the aircraft's tail section, and had sustained minor damage.

The CVR's 30-minute recording "covered cockpit preparation, engine start, taxiing and the flight. Prior to departure the crew's conversation included briefing for the simulated engine failure exercise and subsequent training manoeuvre." The FDR "contained 25 hours of aircraft operation covering the accident flight and 15 previous flights."

The CVR and FDR information showed that a simulated left engine failure exercise was conducted during the accident flight. The simulated left engine failure commenced about 1 second after the aircraft became airborne.

Analysis of the CVR and FDR data is ongoing.

The ATSB report noted that the crew consisted of a supervisory pilot/training captain and another captain who was undergoing a check for the renewal of his command instrument rating (CIR). Planned for the training flight were "a number of emergency training manoeuvres, including a simulated engine failure at takeoff, known as a 'V1-cut'."

As a result of the investigation, to date, the ATSB has identified safety issues that "should be addressed by the relevant organisations," including fleet inspection and "the use of aircraft simulators for asymmetric and other high risk training."

Here is the link to the report: ATSB Preliminary - VH-ANB (7-page 'pdf' file)

Earlier posts on AircrewBuzz.com about this accident:

• Fatal training accident for Australia's Airnorth - March 21, 2010
• Update on the Airnorth crash at Darwin - March 23, 2010

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FedEx subject to $1.55 Million fine for violation of FAA regulations

by B. N. Sullivan

Today the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that it has proposed a $1.55 million civil penalty against Federal Express (FedEx). The FAA alleges that FedEx failed to revise its Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program in accordance with FAA regulations.

Specifically, the FAA alleges that FedEx "failed to ensure that the air carrier used approved standards, inspections, and time limitations for 14 cargo Unit Load Devices (ULDs) used on the company’s airplanes beginning in early 2008."

In its announcement of the proposed fine, the FAA explained:

During a routine surveillance from March 14-20, 2008, FAA inspectors determined that Federal Express had failed to incorporate Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) into its Continued Airworthiness Maintenance Program for 14 cargo ULDs. The TSOs contain specific maintenance instructions for the ULD smoke detector, power distribution feed, and batteries. Federal Express could not ensure that it used approved maintenance standards for the 14 newly installed ULDs because the company failed to make the necessary revisions to its program for overhauling and inspecting the devices.

On March 20, 2008, Federal Express was notified of the problem by the FAA but did not make the necessary revisions to its Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program until April 17, 2008.

The FAA says that the civil penalty addresses 124 flights from March 20 to April 17, 2008.

FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said, “When it comes to maintenance, it’s unacceptable for any air carrier not to meet the FAA’s standards.”

FedEx has 30 days to respond to the FAA.

Atlas Air fined by the FAA for several alleged safety violations

by B. N. Sullivan

Earlier this month, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposed $572,150 in civil penalties against air cargo carrier Atlas Air, Inc. for alleged violations of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

According to a press release about the proposed fine, issued by the FAA on May 5, 2010:

The FAA alleges that Atlas Air incorrectly installed a replacement cockpit window on a Boeing 747F, and then operated the aircraft on 49 flights between April 4 and April 27, 2009, when it was not in compliance with those regulations.

The FAA said Atlas Air replaced one of the windows at the first officer’s position, but failed to use the methods, techniques and practices specified in the manufacturer’s maintenance manual or alternate procedures accepted by the FAA for the B-747F. The airline then approved the aircraft for return to service. As a result, the replacement window suffered pressurization leaks while in flight according to multiple reports made by crews operating or maintaining the aircraft. The FAA has proposed a penalty of $506,150 for those violations.

In a second instance, the FAA alleges that on May 14 and 15, 2009, Atlas Air operated a Boeing 747 on international flights from Huntsville, AL, to Glasgow, Scotland, Luxembourg City and back to Huntsville without a required outboard engine pylon access panel door. The FAA said Atlas Air improperly fabricated a panel cover from aluminum sheet metal and affixed it with speed tape over the access door opening. On each of these flights, the panel came off the aircraft enroute and a new panel was fabricated and installed in the same manner at each subsequent stop. The FAA has proposed a civil penalty of $66,000 for those violations.

Atlas Air has 30 days to respond to the FAA.

Continental Airlines maintenance lapse earns $325,000 FAA fine

by B. N. Sullivan

The alleged mishandling of a maintenance issue on a Continental Airlines Boeing 737 aircraft has resulted in the imposition of a hefty fine by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The agency announced earlier this week that it was proposing a $325,000 civil penalty against the carrier "for operating an aircraft on at least a dozen commercial flights without properly maintaining its right main landing gear."

Here is how the FAA press release about the fine explained the alleged safety violation:

The FAA alleges that on December 20, 2008, the crew of a Continental Boeing 737 saw a warning light on the right main landing gear indicator after the gear retracted on a flight from Houston to Los Angeles. After discussing the situation with Continental maintenance control, the crew elected to continue the flight.

However, the flight diverted to Phoenix after the crew noticed the aircraft was burning an excessive amount of fuel. On the ground, Continental maintenance workers inspected the landing gear but did not make a required entry in the aircraft’s maintenance log or any other maintenance record about the abnormal landing gear indication.

The FAA alleges the airline operated the aircraft on at least 12 additional passenger flights before the abnormal gear indication was addressed by mechanics, in violation of Federal Aviation Regulations.

The FAA announcement also quoted FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt, who said, “Air carriers cannot let maintenance issues lapse. When a problem is discovered, it needs to be corrected immediately.”

Continental Airlines has 30 days to respond to the FAA’s civil penalty letter.

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Flight attendants honored for response to the Christmas Day 'underpants bomber'

by B .N. Sullivan

The flight attendants who dealt with the infamous 'underpants bomber' on Northwest Flight 253 this past Christmas Day have been honored by their union. The Detroit-based flight attendants were given the prestigious C.B. Lansing Award for successfully thwarting the terrorist attack on December 25, 2009. The award ceremony took place earlier this week at the annual board meeting of the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) in Las Vegas.

Quoting from the AFA press release about the award:

“A catastrophe was averted on Christmas day because of the professionalism of the flight attendants on Northwest flight 253,” said Patricia Friend, AFA-CWA International President. “Their quick responses were nothing short of heroic as they identified and mobilized the necessary resources on board and saved the lives of 290 passengers and crew. They exemplify what it means to be a flight attendant in 2010, a front-line safety and security professional.”

The C.B. Lansing Memorial Award was established following the tragic and heroic events aboard Aloha Airlines flight 243 on April 28, 1988 when Aloha flight attendants faced a sudden and serious aircraft incident. C.B. Lansing did not survive the incident; however her fellow flight attendants persevered, rendering life-saving first aid in-flight as they planned for an emergency landing.

“On the eve of the anniversary of the heroism of C.B. Lansing and the Aloha crew, we honor our fellow flight attendants for their service to the flight attendant profession and once again reminding the public of our true mission,” said Friend.

AFA notes that the C .B. Lansing Award is not an annual presentation; rather it is "presented to a crew or crewmember who displays heroism beyond the call of duty."

There have been seven prior recipients of this honor in the history of AFA-CWA.

FAA fine season continues: Chautauqua Airlines nailed with $348,000 penalty

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed a $348,000 civil penalty against Chautauqua Airlines, alleging that the airline operated some of its regional jets without performing inspections required by five different FAA airworthiness directives (ADs).

From the FAA press release about the proposed fine:

FAA investigations found that problems with Chautauqua’s management of its maintenance program and its system for tracking the status of airworthiness directives led to the alleged violations.

One AD compliance issue involved mandated repetitive inspections for possible cracks in the lower wing planks of Canadair Regional Jets (CRJ) after every 5,000 flights. The FA alleges that:

• Eight different Chautauqua CRJs conducted more than 9,900 flights between October 2007 and December 2008 before the required lower wing inspections were done.
• In January 2009, the airline operated another CRJ on 231 flights without inspecting a different section of the lower wings for cracks and flew a different CRJ for 61 hours without a required inspection of electrical relays.
• Another Chautauqua CRJ made more than 17,600 flights between November 2007 and January 2009 before mandatory inspections of the plane’s GE engines were performed. Chautauqua also flew one of its Embraer 145 regional jets for 43 days past the time one of its inertial navigation units should have been replaced.

Commenting on the proposed penalty against Chautauqua, FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said, “An air carrier’s maintenance program can’t function without a good system to compliance with airworthiness directives. Problems with the AD system are inconsistent with an airline’s continued safe operation.”

Chautauqua, which is a subsidiary of Republic Airways, has 30 days to respond to the allegations.