Crew fatigue cited in Delta Air Lines Boeing 767 taxiway landing at Atlanta

by B. N. Sullivan

A final report has been issued by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding its investigation of a 2009 incident in which a Delta Air Lines Boeing 767-332ER aircraft landed on a taxiway at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL).  According to the report, crew fatigue was a major cause of the incident.

At the time of the incident, on October 19, 2009, the aircraft (registration N185DN) was arriving at Atlanta.  The aircraft was operating as Delta Flight 60, a scheduled passenger service from Rio de Janeiro (GIG) to ATL.  The NTSB report summary gives this account of what happened:

During the flight one of the three required flight deck crew members became ill and was considered to be incapacitated.  The remaining two crew members conducted the entire night flight without the benefit of a customary break period.  Throughout the flight the crew made comments indicating that they were fatigued and identified fatigue as their highest threat for the approach, but did not discuss strategies to mitigate the consequences of fatigue.  At the time of the incident, the crew had been on duty for about 12 hours and the captain had been awake for over 22 hours, while the first officer had been awake for at least 14 hours.

During the descent and approach, the flight crew was assigned a number of runway changes; the last of which occurred near the final approach fix for runway 27L While the flight was on final approach, the crew was offered and accepted a clearance to sidestep to runway 27R for landing.  Although the flight crew had previously conducted an approach briefing for two different runways, they had not briefed the approach for runway 27R and were not aware that the approach light system and the instrument landing system (ILS) were not available to aid in identifying that runway.  When the crew accepted the sidestep to runway 27R, the captain, who was the flying pilot, saw the precision approach path indicator and lined the airplane up on what he said were the brightest set of lights he could see.  During the final approach, the first officer was preoccupied with attempting to tune and identify the ILS frequency for runway 27R.  Just prior to the airplane touching down, the captain realized they were landing on a taxiway.  The airplane landed on taxiway M, 200 feet north of, and parallel to, runway 27R.

Postincident flight evaluations of the airport lighting indicated that there were a number of visual cues that could have misguided the captain to align with taxiway M instead of runway 27R while on final approach.  These cues included numerous taxiways signs along the sides of taxiway M which, from the air, appeared to be white and could be perceived as runway edge lights.  In addition, the blue light emitting diode (LED) lights used on the eastern end of taxiway M were perceived to be brighter than the adjacent incandescent lights on the airfield and the alternating yellow and green lights in the ILS critical area provided the appearance of a runway centerline.  The postincident flight evaluations indicated that when the approach lights or the ILS for runway 27R were available and used, it was clearly evident when the airplane was not aligned with the runway.

The NTSB determined the probable cause of this incident to be, "The flight crew’s failure to identify the correct landing surface due to fatigue."

Contributing causes were:

• the flight crew’s decision to accept a late runway change,
• the unavailability of the approach light system and the instrument landing system for the runway of intended landing,
• the combination of numerous taxiway signs and intermixing of light technologies on the taxiway.

No one was injured in the incident.

Here are the links to the NTSB's final report:

• NTSB ID OPS10IA001 - Summary
• NTSB ID OPS10IA001 - Full Narrative

RELATED:  NTSB investigating Delta Air Lines Boeing 767 taxiway landing at Atlanta - AircrewBuzz.com, Oct 21, 2009

New science-based rules for mitigating pilot fatigue proposed by the FAA

by B. N. Sullivan

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced what it calls "a landmark proposal to fight fatigue among commercial pilots by setting new flight time, duty and rest requirements based on fatigue science."  The new rules, if adopted, will apply to pilots of all carriers that operate under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.  It will not apply to pilots at Part 135 carriers.

The FAA spells out details of the new rules in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) announced on September 10, 2010 [link below].  In summary, the NPRM states:

The proposal recognizes the growing similarities between the types of operations and the universality of factors that lead to fatigue in most individuals.  Fatigue threatens aviation safety because it increases the risk of pilot error that could lead to an accident.  The new requirements, if adopted, would eliminate the current distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental operations.  The proposal provides different requirements based on the time of day, whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone, and the likelihood of being able to sleep under different circumstances.

In some areas, the FAA proposes to relax current requirements, while in others, it strengthens them to reflect the latest scientific information.  Here are some key differences between the new proposal and the rules currently in place:

• The proposal reflects the universal nature of fatigue.  The proposed rules would be the same for all types of Part 121 flights (passenger and cargo airlines): domestic, flag (international), or supplemental (unscheduled).  Currently, there are different requirements for each of these categories of operations. The proposed rule does not apply to Part 135 operators, but FAA says it may address fatigue for Part 135 operators in the future.
• Unlike the current rules, the proposal provides a circadian component for reducing the flight time and duty time when the pilot is operating in his or her window of circadian low.   The proposal clearly states that fatigue mitigation is the joint responsibility of both the airline and the pilot.   A pilot may not accept an assignment if that pilot is too fatigued to fly.
• The proposal would give airlines the flexibility to adopt individual Fatigue Risk Management Systems.  Fatigue Risk Management Plans, recently mandated by Congress and now addressed by FAA policy, would set out a carrier’s own policies and procedures for reducing the risk of fatigue and improving alertness.  These plans are specific to an air carrier’s type of operations, are subject to the FAA’s review and acceptance, and include fatigue education and awareness training.

Rest

The new rule proposes to set a nine-hour minimum rest period prior to flying-related duty.  Under current rules, there is a minimum daily rest requirement of 8-11 hours for domestic flying.   For international flying, the current minimum is 8 hours, or twice the number of hours flown.

Flight Time

Weekly:  Currently, pilots flying domestically are limited to 30 hours of flight time in any seven consecutive days.  Those flying international operations are limited to 32 hours in seven consecutive days, and there is no seven-consecutive-day limit for supplemental operations.  The proposal provides all Part 121 pilots with at least 30 consecutive hours per week free from all duty, compared to the current 24 hours free from all duty on a weekly basis – a 25 percent increase.

Monthly:  Under the proposal, there is a 100-hour maximum for flight time in any 28 days.  Current rules set a limit of 100 hours for every 30 days.

Yearly:  There is a current limit of 1,000 hours in any calendar year for domestic flights.  Under the proposal, all types of operations will now be limited to 1,000 hours per 365 days.

Duty Time

There is currently a 16-hour duty period between rest periods. The proposal would limit the daily flight duty period to 13-hours, which could slide to nine hours at night (depending on take-off time and number of segments scheduled).
---
Importantly, the provisions of this new rule indicate that the FAA finally has recognized that there are no physiological differences between pilots who fly cargo and those who fly passengers.  It's about time that pilots flying for Part 121-Supplemental operators are treated identically to those who fly for scheduled airlines.

Likewise, the elimination of the domestic/international distinction in favor of a focus on the length of a trip will be beneficial.  The FAA proposes to deal with longer flights through crew augmentation "rather than simply by extending the allowable flight time."

The NPRM states that crew augmentation requirements should take into consideration "circadian rhythms, acclimation to time changes, and multiple flight segments should be considered in determining how much augmentation is required.  Further consideration should be given to the quality of the available rest facility."

The issue of crew fatigue has been a perennial item on the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 'Most Wanted List' for aviation safety improvements.  It's good to see some concrete movement on this issue, and it's even better that the proposed rule changes are based on well-established scientific data about fatigue rather than on mere politics.

The 60-day public comment period closes on Nov. 13, 2010.

LINKS:

• Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM):  Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements - 145-page 'pdf'
• FAA Fact Sheet:  Pilot Fatigue

Fatigue caused go! Airlines pilots to fall asleep during flight, says NTSB

This week, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a final report on their investigation of an incident in which both pilots fell asleep during the cruise phase of a go! Airlines flight between Honolulu and Hilo, Hawaii, passing their intended destination before waking up. In their report, the NTSB attributed the incident to "the captain and first officer inadvertently falling asleep during the cruise phase of flight. Contributing to the incident were the captain's undiagnosed obstructive sleep apnea and the flight crew’s recent work schedules, which included several consecutive days of early-morning start times."

The incident occurred on the morning of February 13, 2008. The aircraft, a CRJ-200 (registration N651BR) was operating as go! Flight 1002, a scheduled inter-island passenger service between Honolulu and Hilo. It had completed its climb from Honolulu and was in cruise at FL210 with the autopilot engaged when both pilots "inadvertently fell asleep in the cockpit".

The pilots apparently slept for a period of approximately 15 minutes while the aircraft cruised on autopilot. During that time air traffic controllers and two separate airline crews in the area tried unsuccessfully to reach the incident crew by radio. The aircraft, still cruising at FL210, overflew its destination by about 26 nautical miles before the two pilots awakened, contacted air traffic control, and returned to Hilo for an uneventful landing.

The pilots flew the aircraft on the return leg to Honolulu, after which they reported the incident to the company. About two months later, both pilots were fired by Mesa Air Group, the parent company of go! Airlines.

Here is the link to the synopsis of the NTSB's report about this incident. Here is the link to the detailed full narrative report.

[Photo Source]

ALPA Congressional Testimony on Regional Air Carriers and Pilot Workforce Issues

Capt. John Prater, president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), appeared last week at a Congressional hearing regarding regional air carriers. Capt. Prater testified before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives. In his appearance on June 11, 2009, Capt. Prater addressed pilot workforce issues at regional carriers.

Here is an excerpt from Capt. Prater's oral testimony before Congress:

In recent years, the major airlines have come to rely heavily on codeshare arrangements with regional airlines to serve midsize and smaller cities in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. This has resulted in the exponential growth of the regional sector of the industry.

Still, the major carriers exert a great deal of economic pressures on the regional airlines to provide their service at the lowest possible price. They control ticket pricing and schedules, and regularly move flying between their regional partners. Some majors have even begun outsourcing their flying to regionals and laying off their own pilots with decades of experience in the process.

These experienced pilots cannot afford to work for a regional as a newly hired first officer. As a result, many of the smaller regional carriers hire pilots at the FAA minimum standards and do not employ screening processes during hiring that identify the “ideal” candidate.

As was brought out during the NTSB’s recent hearing on the tragic accident in Buffalo, many pilots who fly for regional airlines aren’t getting adequate training or enough rest. Airlines are requiring pilots to work longer days and more of them each month. Fleet and base changes are forcing pilots to decide between commuting and possibly taking a pay cut to train on new equipment. The consequence: the quality of airline pilot “careers” has been greatly diminished and severe erosion of benefits and quality of life are motivating pilots to move to other professions.

Current training practices do not take into account changing airline pilot demographics. Instead, they assume that pilots are far more experienced than they may actually be. ALPA believes there must be a new focus on standardization and even some fundamental flying skills. To meet this challenge, airlines and other training providers must develop methodologies to “train experience and judgment.” Current training practices may also need to be adjusted to account for the source and experience level of the pilot entering initial training at the airline.

ALPA also believes there should be more stringent academic requirements to obtain both commercial and airline transport pilot ratings in preparation for a career as an airline pilot. The FAA should develop and implement a structured and rigorous ground school and testing process for pilots who want to qualify to fly for Part 121 airlines.

ALPA also recommends that airlines provide specific command and leadership training courses for new captains to instill in them the necessary skills and traits to be a real leader on the flight deck. Airlines should also implement mentoring programs for both captains and first officers as they first enter operations in their crew positions to help them apply their knowledge and skills to line operations and supplement their own limited experience by learning from their peers.

Flight experience and pilot capabilities cannot be measured by mere flight hours. Screening processes should be established prior to initial pilot hiring to ensure that new‐hire airline pilots are indeed the best and the brightest as far as abilities, airmanship, professionalism, and performance.

Turning to another area of concern, fatigue has reached alarming levels within the industry. ALPA has long advocated changes to flight and duty time rules for commercial aviation operations, and we join the NTSB in calling for revisions that are based on readily available science.

We have talked long enough. It is time to implement these science‐based regulatory changes.

Other means to enhance safety and improve airline operations are data collection and analysis programs such as FOQA [Flight Operational Quality Assurance] and ASAP [Aviation Safety Action Plan] which provide important and needed safety information, not only internally within air carriers, but also for the overall air transportation system.

In order to allow these programs to grow and make the reports more readily obtainable, additional legislative protections need to be put in place that will limit the data use in civil liability cases. Restrictions also need to be strengthened to ensure the data is used for safety purposes only.

Many major carriers have implemented these programs and follow other best practices which should also be undertaken by their codeshare partners. ALPA joins with the NTSB in calling upon major airlines and their code‐sharing partners to establish a program of operational oversight that includes periodic safety audits of flight operations, training programs, and maintenance and inspection, as well as emphasize the exchange of information and resources to enhance the safety of flight operations.

The best safety device on any airplane is a well‐trained, well‐rested, highly motivated pilot. A strong safety culture must be instilled and consistently reinforced from the highest levels within an airline and among its codeshare partners. This type of organizational safety culture will encourage the highest levels of performance among professional pilots, improve airline operations, and, most importantly, advance aviation safety.

As is customary, Capt. Prater also submitted written testimony to the Congressional Committee. That document elaborates on the issues raised in the oral testimony, to provide more detail.



[Photo Source]

Emirates A380 pilots complain about 'too quiet' crew rest area

Pilots at Emirates Airline who fly the Dubai-based carrier's Airbus A380 are complaining that the aircraft's crew-rest area is too quiet to afford them proper rest. The crew-rest area is located in the aft section of the aircraft's all-economy main deck, and the pilots claim that noises from the passenger cabin -- ranging from crying babies to flushing vacuum toilets -- can be heard very clearly, interrupting their sleep.

One of the features about the A380 touted by Airbus is that engine noise is barely perceptible inside the aircraft cabin. Ironically, this is exactly what the problem is. Usually, engine noise works like 'white noise' to muffle more intermittent sounds. With no engine thrum to mask other sounds, every noise inside the cabin is heard rather clearly and acutely. Even though they wear earplugs, the pilots' sleep is repeatedly interrupted.

According to Flight International, which broke this story, the problem extends beyond noise, per se. Due to the location of the crew-rest area, passengers also mistake the rest area for a lavatory, and pull the door handle.

The Flight International article says:

Emirates is the only A380 operator so far to have situated the crew-rest areas at the rear of the main deck. It did not opt for Airbus' standard option of locating the pilots' compartment behind the cockpit as it would have compromised the design of the airline's upper deck first-class cabin, while the alternative location of the cargo hold was rejected as it thought crew would find it "claustrophobic".

I am wondering if, in addition, there may be safety implications for locating the crew-rest area in the aft section of the main deck, so far away from the flight deck. One can imagine an emergency arising that would urgently require the presence of a crew member who was on rest break. Imagine the poor pilot who has to make his or her way as quickly as possible from the crew-rest in the aft of the main deck, through the length of the 'super-jumbo' aircraft (possibly having to navigate around passengers, cabin crew, serving carts, and what have you), then  (eventually!) into the flight deck. Now add the not inconceivable dimension of an aircraft that, in said emergency, might not be flying along smoothly in level cruise. Good luck!

[Photo Source]

NTSB: Pinnacle Airlines pilots' poor decisions, fatigue caused 2007 accident

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued its synopsis report on the investigation of an accident in which a regional jet operated by Pinnacle Airlines overran the end of a runway in Michigan last year. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the pilots' poor decision-making, and that the poor decision-making "likely reflected the effects of fatigue."

Quoting from the Executive Summary of the NTSB Accident Report:

On April 12, 2007, about 0043 eastern daylight time, a Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19, N8905F, operated as Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, ran off the departure end of runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers (including 3 lap-held infants) and 3 crewmembers, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. Weather was reported as snowing. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and had departed from Minneapolis-St. Paul International (Wold-Chamberlain) Airport, Minneapolis, Minnesota, about 2153 central daylight time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilots’ decision to land at TVC without performing a required landing distance assessment based on runway contamination initially reported by TVC ground operations personnel and continuing reports of deteriorating weather and runway conditions throughout the approach. This poor decision-making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day, and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions.

Contributing to the accident were 1) the Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations that permitted the pilots’ long, demanding duty day and 2) the TVC operations supervisor’s use of ambiguous and unspecific radio phraseology in providing runway braking information.

The safety issues discussed in this report include the pilots’ actions and decision‑making during the approach, landing, and landing roll; pilot fatigue and line check airman duty time regulations; weather and field condition information and ground operations personnel communications; and criteria for runway closures in snow and ice conditions. [NTSB/AAR-0802]

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the NTSB made recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration in the following areas: the pilots' actions and decision-making during the approach, landing, and landing roll; landing distance assessment training; weather and field condition information and ground operations personnel communications; criteria for runway closures in snow and ice conditions; and alcohol testing.

Editor's Note: Before anyone jumps to any conclusions about the 'alcohol testing' item among the NTSB's recommendations, please note that it arose because the investigation showed that, while both pilots tested negative for illicit drugs, they were not tested for alcohol after the accident. This was an omission on the part of the airline. The text of the NTSB report clearly states, "Although there is no reason to believe their performance was affected by alcohol, the failure of the airline to perform required postaccident alcohol tests prevents a definitive statement on the issue."

Here is the link to the full text of the Synopsis Report: NTSB/AAR-08/02. The full report will be available on the NTSB website in several weeks.

go! Airlines fires pilots accused of passing their destination while asleep

Two go! Airlines pilots whose aircraft overshot their destination while they both were allegedly asleep on the flight deck have been fired, and may face FAA sanctions, according to a news article in the Honolulu Advertiser. The article quotes Paul Skellon, vice president of corporate communications for Phoenix-based Mesa Air Group, go!'s parent company, who confirmed that the unnamed pilots were fired.

The incident that prompted the firing, as well as investigations by the NTSB and the FAA, happened on February 13, 2008, during a scheduled passenger flight from Honolulu to Hilo. The crew failed to respond to air traffic controllers 11 times during the inter-island flight. By the time the pilots responded, the aircraft, a CRJ-200, had passed its destination airport by about 15 miles. The crew ultimately reversed their course and landed safely at Hilo. On board go! Airlines Flight YV1002, in addition to the pilots, were 40 passengers and a flight attendant.

Today's Honolulu Advertiser article quoted an FAA spokesman, who said findings from his agency's investigation will be released in a few weeks. Possible FAA sanctions against the pilots could range from a warning letter, to suspension, to revocation of the pilots' licenses.

Another Honolulu newspaper, the Star-Bulletin, quoted an attorney for the Air Line Pilots Association, the union representing the go! pilots, who said that ALPA has filed a grievance with the company on behalf of the pilots. He said the pilots had been terminated 10 days ago. Both pilots had been suspended since the day of the incident.

[Photo Source]

UPDATE May 1, 2008: A reader sent in the link to this YouTube video -- part of a broadcast on Honolulu TV channel KGMB -- that includes portions of an ATC recordings from the incident described above, and another about a month later. go! Airlines flight loses communication.

UPDATE Aug. 4, 2009: Fatigue caused go! Airlines pilots to fall asleep during flight, says NTSB

BBC reports on UK pilots and fatigue

BBC News has published a report on the issue of pilot fatigue among UK-based pilots. In an article titled Pilots raise fears over fatigue, the BBC says "Airline pilots have told the BBC they are increasingly concerned that fatigue is leading to potentially dangerous incidents in the air."

Following the BBC's inquiries, the UK's largest pilots' union, the British Air Line Pilots' Association, questioned 534 of its members.

Some 76% said their response times had been affected by fatigue, 72% said there had been an impact on decision-making skills and 41% said they would refuse to fly if fatigued.

But 12% said they would not feel able to refuse duties even if exhausted, while a further 33% said they would refuse - but feared disciplinary action.

A total of 63% said they are flying more hours than five years ago.

Overall, some 79% told Balpa the public should be concerned about fatigue.

Balpa chairman Mervyn Granshaw described fatigue is "the single biggest issue facing aviation".

He said: "At the moment we are not seeing it appear as accidents or incidents but we're getting closer to that point."

Click here to read the entire article on the BBC website.

Click here to watch a BBC video about pilot fatigue in the UK.

Fatigue in air traffic controllers: NTSB recommendations

Earlier this week, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), issued several formal Safety Recommendations to address the issue of fatigue in air traffic controllers.

In the first recommendation (A-07-30), the NTSB asks the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to work with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), the union representing the controllers, "to reduce the potential for controller fatigue by revising controller work-scheduling policies and practices to provide rest periods that are long enough for controllers to obtain sufficient restorative sleep and by modifying shift rotations to minimize disrupted sleep patterns, accumulation of sleep debt, and decreased cognitive performance. "

The second recommendation (A-07-31), also directed at the FAA, asks the agency to develop a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program for controllers, and for those involved in the scheduling of controllers for operational duty, that will address "the incidence of fatigue in the controller workforce, causes of fatigue, effects of fatigue on controller performance and safety, and the importance of using personal strategies to minimize fatigue."

The NTSB recommends that this training be provided in a format that promotes retention, and
that recurrent training should be provided at regular intervals.

The third recommendation (A-07-32) is directed to NATCA. It asks that the union work with the FAA to reduce the potential for controller fatigue "by revising controller work-scheduling policies and practices to provide rest periods that are long enough for controllers to obtain
sufficient restorative sleep and by modifying shift rotations to minimize disrupted sleep patterns, accumulation of sleep debt, and decreased cognitive performance. "

Click here for a printable ('pdf') copy of NTSB Safety Recommendations A-07-30 thru 32, mentioned above. The document is 11 pages long, but definitely is worth reading. As background, it reviews four runway incursions that the NTSB says highlight the impact fatigue can have on controller performance.

The document then goes on to review controller scheduling policies and practices; recent FAA research on controller shiftwork and fatigue; and findings regarding the awareness of fatigue-related issues in the air traffic organization.

This is such an important issue. Now it is up to the FAA and NATCA to cooperate in implementing these recommendations.

[Photo Source]

Flight Attendant Fatigue

An article in the Washington Times last week reported on a meeting among representatives from several Flight Attendant unions -- the first ever Flight Attendant Fatigue Summit.

The meeting was held in Euliss, Texas, outside Dallas, at the headquarters of the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, the union that represents the flight attendants of American Airlines. The meeting was co-hosted by the Transport Workers Union of America Local 556, which represents the flight attendants of Southwest Airlines, and the Association of Flight Attendants -CWA, which represents flight attendants at 26 different airlines.

These days, many airlines are pressing their flight attendants to work the maximum number of hours allowed by the FAA, interspersed with only the minimum rest periods allowed by law.

Technically, the carriers may be operating within FAA guidelines for crew rest. But part of the problem lies with how rest periods are designated.

If flight attendants with, say, a nine hour rest period could actually have nine hours of rest, they probably would not complain. The truth is that the rest period clock starts ticking before a crew even leaves the airport after landing. An hour or more may pass before a crew arrives at their layover hotel. At that point, "rest" may still be hours away.

During a rest period, a flight attendant will likely need to find the time to eat -- after first finding a place to eat! Necessary activities such as bathing and grooming also are carried out during the rest period. Then, in whatever time remains, the flight attendant is supposed to actually rest.

If only they had a little switch on their bodies that they could flip to enable them to go to sleep as soon as they got into bed! Instead of being able to rest on command, they often have trouble falling asleep, or staying asleep. They have to contend with time zone changes, unfamiliar surroundings, noise, and myriad other obstructions to a restful sleep.

The combination of long work hours and short rest periods for flight attendants is compromising safety, according to flight attendant labor leaders. They would like the FAA to reduce the maximum duty time for flight attendants, and increase the minimum rest period.

I would add that it also affects their health. As a researcher concerned with stress in the lives of aircrews, I know that there is hardly a more important topic than fatigue. I can't help but wonder, though, if "the powers that be" will listen to the flight attendants about their need for more rest.

Here's the first clue that "they" do not really care.

Cathy Lukensmeyer, APFA Treasurer, notes the following in a message she posted on the APFA website on April 1, 2005 concerning the Flight Attendant Fatigue Summit:

Unbeknownst to any of the Flight Attendant unions present, the Department of Transportation had scheduled a "Fatigue in the Workplace" seminar on Thursday, March 31, in Washington, D.C., during what has been labeled "National Sleep Awareness Week," March 28 through April 3. Ironically, no Flight Attendant representatives were invited to that conference.

Ironic indeed!!