FAA proposes to end the 'Age 60 Rule'

Today marks the beginning of the end of the debate about the 'Age 60 Rule' in the United States.

The New York Times and other news outlets are reporting that Marion Blakey, head of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), will address the issue in a speech she is scheduled to give today. She is expected to announce that the FAA will review its rule requiring airline pilots to retire at age 60, now that the International Civil Aviation Organization has raised the age to 65.

The so-called Age 60 Rule has been in force for well over 40 years in the United States. Under the current rule [Title 14 CFR, Chapter I, Part 121.383(c)], individuals who have reached their 60th birthday are prohibited from from piloting commercial aircraft operating under FAR Part 121 -- that is, commercial airliners.

Last year, a panel was formed to investigate and debate the issue of whether to change the mandatory retirement age for airline pilots in the United States to 65 instead of 60. At the end of November, 2006, the committee was disbanded after its members announced that they had failed to reach a consensus on the issue. The New York Times summarizes:

... [The committee's] members, including airlines, pilots’ unions and other specialists, simply laid out the pros and cons. But the group did recommend that if a change was made, it should be prospective, meaning that pilots who had already been forced to retire would not be allowed back.

Committee members who favored the change argued that there was no medical rationale for setting the retirement age at 60, and that a pilot shortage was coming and could be alleviated by letting pilots work longer. Those opposed said that setting a new age would replace one arbitrary limit with another and that no changes had been offered that would maintain current safety levels.

Some have cited safety reasons for keeping the mandatory retirement age at 60. However a number of health and safety experts have noted that age, in and of itself, is not a good predictor of whether a pilot can still safely fly an airplane. For example, the Aerospace Medical Association published a position paper on the Age 60 Rule, concluding that "there is insufficient medical evidence to support restriction of pilot certification based on age alone."

In fact, citing safety as the primary issue in this debate is a smokescreen. The real issues for those who argue both for and against rescinding the Age 60 Rule are economic. Junior pilots want the 'old guys' to retire so that the younger ones can move on up in the seniority system and earn more money. Older pilots want to continue earning a paycheck until they're eligible to collect their pensions -- what pensions they have left to look forward to after so many cuts at so many carriers. Older, more senior pilots earn higher salaries than their more junior counterparts, so they are more expensive for airlines to retain.

A turning point in the debate came last year when the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) amended its rule, raising the mandatory retirement age for commercial air transport pilots in multi-pilot crews to 65, with the provision that one of the pilots is less than 60 years of age. That rule took effect on November 23, 2006.

As of that date, foreign airline pilots older than 60 are allowed to fly into and out of the U.S. under the ICAO mandate, although U.S. pilots cannot. Since 1959 the FAA has required that all U.S. pilots stop flying Part 121 airliners at age 60. Most other nations eventually adopted the same age for mandatory retirement.

As a member of ICAO, the FAA must allow foreign pilots past age 60 to continue to work and fly in U.S. airspace. Twelve senators sent a letter to FAA Administrator Marion Blakey urging her agency to adopt the ICAO standard.

"We hope you appreciate that a finding [by the ARC] that leads to a rule allowing foreign pilots to work and fly in the U.S. to age 65 without affording U.S. pilots the same privilege will not sit well with the American people and most members of Congress," the senators wrote. [Aviation International News, Dec. 2006]

Since the new ICAO rule went into effect, we have had a situation in which pilots over the age of 60 flying aircraft operated by international carriers were allowed to fly in U.S. airspace, while their counterparts flying for U.S. carriers could not. Clearly, the time has come for the FAA to adopt the new ICAO standard.

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How's this for timing: I was just about to publish the above post when the FAA's press release, titled FAA to Propose Pilot Retirement Age Change, appeared in my email. For the record, here's the text:

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Marion C. Blakey today announced that the FAA will propose to raise the mandatory retirement age for U.S. commercial pilots from 60 to 65. Speaking before pilots and aviation experts at the National Press Club, Blakey said that the agency plans to propose adopting the new International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard that allows one pilot to be up to age 65 provided the other pilot is under age 60.

The FAA plans to issue a formal Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) later this year and will publish a final rule after careful consideration of all public comments, as required by law.

“A pilot’s experience counts — it’s an added margin of safety,” said Blakey. “Foreign airlines have demonstrated that experienced pilots in good health can fly beyond age 60 without compromising safety.”

On September 27, 2006, Administrator Blakey established a group of airline, labor and medical experts to recommend whether the United States should adopt the new ICAO standard and determine what actions would be necessary if the FAA were to change its rule. The Age 60 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) did not reach a consensus recommendation but did provide detailed insight and analysis that will be helpful as the FAA develops a rule.

Since 1959, the FAA has required that all U.S. pilots stop flying commercial airplanes at age 60. In November 2006, ICAO, the United Nations’ aviation organization, increased the upper age limit for pilots to age 65, provided that the other pilot is under age 60.

The November 29, 2006 Age 60 ARC report, appendices, and public comments are available online at http://dms.dot.gov, docket number 26139.

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UPDATE: If you'd like to read exactly what Marion Blakey said about the Age 60 Rule today, here's the link to the text of her speech to the National Press Club: Experience Counts - Marion Blakey, FAA

Stowaways in the gear bay

Not what you want to find on your pre-flight walk-around: A frozen body in a landing gear bay.

Yesterday a pilot did make such a discovery while making a pre-departure check of a British Airways B747-400 at LAX. The frozen corpse of an apparent stowaway was found in the front right gear bay of the aircraft, according to BBC News.

The aircraft had arrived at LAX from London's Heathrow Airport, and was being prepared for a return trip to LHR at the time the frozen body of the unfortunate young man was discovered. A UPI news report claimed that the body of the victim "had documents identifying him as a South African national born in 1989."

Earlier this month there was a similar incident at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. A dead body was discovered in the gear bay of a Delta Air Lines B767 upon its arrival at ATL from Johannesburg, South Africa via Dakar, Senegal.

An Associated Press article about that incident on the CBS News website suggested that the crew on the Delta flight may have been alerted to the possibility of a stowaway while they were airborne en route from Dakar to Atlanta: "The FAA says Delta was notified that the stowaway might be inside the plane after the Boeing 767 was already well into its flight. Delta apparently made a decision that it was too late for the plane to turn around."

The unanswered question is, when and how did these stowaways manage to secrete themselves aboard these aircraft without being detected before departure?

Mesa CRJ200 loses turbine blade during cruise

This past Thursday, a CRJ200 aircraft operated by Mesa Airlines experienced an uncontained engine failure during a flight between Denver and Phoenix. According to media reports, the number one engine, a GE CF34-3B1, threw a fan blade during cruise. The failed blade took out the engine's forward cowling as it departed the aircraft.

The aircraft, which was said to be about 50 nm out from Denver when the incident happened, returned to DIA where it made an emergency landing. There were 50 pax and 3 crew aboard the flight. No evacuation was necessary, and no one was injured.

For more info, check out the article about the incident posted on the Aero-News Network, and another article with a photo of the aircraft showing the damaged engine on the FlightGlobal.com website.

The NTSB is investigating the incident, and FlightGlobal.com says that "engine manufacturer GE has sent three representatives to support the NTSB in its investigation." According to the Aero-News Network, "GE says there hasn't been a failure such as this in any of the more than 2000 CF34-3B1 engines placed in service since 1992."

UPDATE Jan. 31, 2007: The NTSB issued a press release today about this investigation. Among other things, it mentions that they have notified local law enforcement agencies on the ground near the area where the incident occurred "that there could be engine debris on the ground in their jurisdictions," and asking that the NTSB be notified if any such debris is found. Here is the link to that press release: NTSB Investigating Uncontained Engine Failure in Colorado, Seeking Lost Engine Components

UPDATE Feb. 5, 2007: The Aero-News Network is reporting that NTSB searchers have found the debris from the jet engine that failed over Colorado last week. According to the article, "Using trajectory analysis, NTSB crews pinpointed an area in Teller County where they searched for and found most of the engine debris. The debris will be studied to determine the cause of the failure and if the problem affects similar jet engines."

New ASDE-X system at MDW to prevent runway incursions

An article from the Chicago Sun-Times, republished on Airport Business, says that an Airport Surface Detection Equipment-X (ASDE-X) system may be installed by 2010 at Chicago's Midway Airport. ASDE-X systems are radars aimed at preventing runway incursions "by immediately notifying pilots and air traffic controllers of potential collisions with other aircraft and vehicles on runways and taxiways."

In 2006, there was one runway incursion at Midway, compared to 10 at Chicago's O'Hare Airport. It was announced earlier that the ASDE-X system will be installed at O'Hare this summer.

In addition to ASDE-X, Midway will get arrestor beds -- crushable concrete at the ends of four runways to slow planes that overshoot their landings -- installed later this year.

Freight Runners collision at Milwaukee

Earlier this week, two cargo aircraft operated by Freight Runners Express collided on a taxiway at Milwaukee's General Mitchel International Airport. Both aircraft caught fire, but the pilots were reported to have escaped without serious injuries.

It was not immediately clear what caused the collision between the Beech 99 and the Cessna 402. An Associated Press article about the accident quoted airport director Barry Bateman who said, "I'm told that one (plane) had just landed and was taxiing into the cargo area. A significant fireball occurred."

Today Airport Business published an update on the accident from the Associated Press. The article says that Freight Runners Express is blaming air traffic control at Milwaukee for the accident.

"Both aircraft were operating in controlled areas under explicit instructions of air traffic control," according to a statement by Freight Runners Express Inc. of Milwaukee.

An investigation is underway.

Adam Air flight 574 flight data recorder found?

The major news services are reporting today that the flight data recorder from Adam Air Flight 574 may have been located. The aircraft, a Boeing 737-400, disappeared on New Year's Day during a domestic flight in Indonesia. It is believed to have crashed, although only small pieces of wreckage have been found so far. The flight had 102 souls on board, and while no bodies have been found, all are presumed to have perished.

A Reuters article on Airwise.com says that signals believed to be coming from the downed jetliner's flight data recorder have been detected by an American ship that has been assisting with the search. The USNS Mary Sears, an oceanographic survey ship with specialized equipment, found heavy debris scattered over a wide area and was analyzing the data.

"During the search of the projected crash site of Adam Air Flight 574, the Mary Sears, using a Towed Pinger Locator, detected pingers on the same frequency of the black box associated with the missing airplane," the US embassy said in a statement.

An Associated Press article, published on the CBS News website and elsewhere, elaborates:

The hull of the aircraft has not yet been recovered, but the statement said the Mary Sears "detected heavy debris scattered over a wide area" close to where the signals were coming from.

Eddy Suyanto, the Indonesian air force commander in charge of the search and rescue mission, said he had not been formally told of the ship's findings.

"One thing is for sure, up until this second, I have not received any report from the (Indonesian) liaison officers who were on board the ship," he said.

The device may indeed have been located, but retrieving it from the depths of the sea may be another thing entirely. According to an an article on the BBC News website:

Officials said the government would now have to decide whether to try and retrieve the boxes from the ocean bed.

"We do not have the technology to retrieve the black boxes," Setio Rahardjo, chairman of the National Commission on Transport Safety told AFP news agency.

"Assuming we have the funds, then we have to ask for a country who has sophisticated technology, such as the US," he added.

I will continue to post key developments in the story of Adam Air flight 574 as they occur.

UPDATE Jan. 26, 2007: The Associated Press is reporting that Indonesia will attempt to retrieve the flight data recorder from Adam Air flight 574 from the sea floor. Since the water at the site where signals from the device were detected is so deep, the operation might turn out to be prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, Adam Air spokesman Ali Leonardi said, "If the signals really were from the black boxes and the technology is available to retrieve them, we will keep on trying. It does not matter what the cost."

NTSB: 2005 crash of Cessna Citation 560 in Pueblo, Colorado

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued a report on the February 2005 crash of a Cessna Citation 560 (similar to the one in the photo) in Pueblo, Colorado. The twin engine business jet was operated by Martinair, Inc. for Circuit City Stores, Inc.

At the time of the accident, the aircraft was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 on an IFR flight plan. The aircraft crashed about 4 nautical miles east of Pueblo Memorial Airport on February 16, 2005, while on an ILS approach to runway 26R. The two pilots and six passengers aboard were killed and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire.

In a press release that accompanied the report, the NTSB summarizes the cause of the accident as "the flight crew's failure to effectively monitor and maintain airspeed and comply with procedures for deice boot activation on their approach to Pueblo, Colorado, which led to an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the FAA's failure to establish adequate certification requirements for flight into icing conditions, which led to the inadequate stall warning margin provided by the airplane's stall warning system."

The Board's investigation determined that the aircraft encountered icing conditions during the flight resulting in an accumulation of thin, rough ice on the wing leading edges that degraded the aircraft's performance. According to the Cessna 560 airplane flight manual (AFM), pilots are trained to increase the landing reference airspeed whenever any residual ice is present or can be expected during approach and landing. An examination of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) did not record either pilot mention increasing the airspeed during the approach.

Additionally, company and AFM procedures for approach and landing in icing conditions required pilots to activate the deice system when any ice accumulation, regardless of thickness, was visible and to continue to monitor the wing leading edges for ice. Despite this guidance, there is no evidence that the accident flight crew activated the deice boots during the approach. The flight crew of the trailing Circuit City "sister ship" did cycle the deice boots numerous times and maintained increased airspeed during the approach and subsequently landed safely.

As a result, the Board recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require that operational training for the Cessna 560 (Citation) aircraft emphasize the AFM requirements to increase airspeed and operate the deice boots during approaches when ice is present on the wings. The Board also recommended that the FAA require that all airplanes equipped with pneumatic deice boots have a mode that will automatically continue to cycle the deice boots once the system has been activated.

The investigation also determined that the airplane's stall warning system did not activate until after the aerodynamic stall occurred. The warning system is intended to provide flight crews with adequate warning of an impending stall in time to take preventative action. Because of the higher stall speeds that occur in icing conditions, the margin between the warning and the stall occurrence can be diminished. The Board recommended that the FAA require modification of the Cessna 560's stall warning system to provide an adequate warning margin in icing conditions that existed on this approach.

The Board further concluded that ice bridging does not occur on modern airplanes; therefore, there is no reason for flight crews to delay activation of the deice boots. The Board recommended that the FAA require that guidance for aircraft with pneumatic deice boots be revised to indicate that the leading edge deice boots should be activated as soon as the aircraft enters icing conditions.

The Board also called on the FAA to develop pilot training programs to emphasize monitoring skills and workload management.

Additionally, the Board reiterated two recommendations issued in 1996 and 1998 to the FAA calling for revised certification standards for aircraft operating in icing conditions. The Board has classified the FAA's response to these recommendations as unacceptable.

Here is the link to the synopsis of the NTSB report: NTSB Synopsis AAR-07/02

The press release notes that the NTSB's full report will be available in several weeks.

NTSB: New safety recommendations for RJ ops

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued some safety recommendations as a result of its investigation into the cause of an aircraft accident that occurred in October of 2004. The accident involved a Pinnacle Airlines Canadair CL-600-2B19 Regional Jet.

The ferry flight, operating as Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701 en route from Little Rock to Minneapolis-St. Paul, crashed at Jefferson City, Missouri, killing both pilots. There were no passengers or other crew aboard the plane.

Here is a synopsis of NTSB Safety Recommendations A-07-1-11, published on January 23, 2007.

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Work with members of the aviation industry to enhance the training syllabuses for pilots conducting high altitude operations in regional jet airplanes. The syllabuses should include methods to ensure that these pilots possess a thorough understanding of the airplanes' performance capabilities, limitations, and high altitude aerodynamics. (A-07-1)

Determine whether the changes to be made to the high altitude training syllabuses for regional jet airplanes, as requested in Safety Recommendation A-07-1, would also
enhance the high altitude training syllabuses for all other transport-category jet airplanes and, if so, require that these changes be incorporated into the syllabuses for those airplanes. (A-07-2)

Require that air carriers provide their pilots with opportunities to practice high altitude stall recovery techniques in the simulator during which time the pilots
demonstrate their ability to identify and execute the appropriate recovery technique. (A-07-3)

Convene a multidisciplinary panel of operational, training, and human factors specialists to study and submit a report on methods to improve flight crew familiarity with and response to stick pusher systems and, if warranted, establish training requirements for stick pusher-equipped airplanes based on the findings of this panel. (A-07-4)

Verify that all Canadair regional jet operators incorporate guidance in their double engine failure checklist that clearly states the airspeeds required during the procedure and require the operators to provide pilots with simulator training on executing this checklist. (A-07-5)

Require regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 to provide specific guidance on expectations for professional conduct to pilots who operate nonrevenue flights. (A-07-6)

For those regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 that have the capability to review flight data recorder (FDR) data, require that the air carriers review FDR data from nonrevenue flights to verify that the flights are being conducted according to standard operating procedures. (A-07-7)

Work with pilot associations to develop a specific program of education for air carrier pilots that addresses professional standards and their role in ensuring safety of flight. The program should include associated guidance information and references to recent accidents involving pilots acting unprofessionally or not following standard
operating procedures. (A-07-8)

Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators incorporate into their oversight programs periodic Line Operations Safety Audit observations and methods to address and correct findings resulting from these observations. A-07-9)

Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators establish Safety Management System programs. (A- 07-10)

Strongly encourage and assist all regional air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 to implement an approved Aviation Safety Action Program and an approved Flight Operational Quality Assurance program. (A-07-11)

Here is the link to the full document: NTSB: Safety Recommendations A-07-1-11 [17 page 'pdf' file]